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In this study, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied to the field 
of elites. Although sociological research has examined the reproduction of Chile’s elites, there 
is little empirical evidence as to how different forms of capital operate within them. Based on 
a survey of the country’s elites, this thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital 
(cultural, social and political) on access to strategic positions in the legislative and executive 
branches of government. It focuses on the political elite in the 20 years between 1990, when 
military dictator Augusto Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his 
democratically elected successor, and 2010, the end of President Michelle Bachelet’s first 
government. At least three points are germane to this analysis: (1) understanding the nature of 
the party elites during the political transition; (2) describing and explaining the main aspects of 
the party elites’ background and social resources, including their family networks (independent 
variables); and (3) exploring the effect of those variables on individuals’ chances of achieving 
strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as 
represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable). 
 
The data was obtained through a survey of 386 members of the nucleus of the Chilean political 
elite, enquiring about their social, academic and family background, social resources and 
professional and political careers, among other topics. The empirical analysis includes network 
analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 
1990-2010. The results indicate that age, gender and variables related to cultural, social and 
political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, but with opposite 
effects. Only family capital has a significant effect in the same direction for the two branches 
of government. However, the effects of the variables vary when differentiating by period. The 
originality of the research lies in the collection and analysis of new empirical data that throws 
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An elite is a select and often small group of citizens and/or organisations that has an important 
level of power, occupying “those positions in society which are at the summits of key social 
structures” (Lipset & Solari, 1967, p. vii). Most such groups display their sense of superiority 
through material and aesthetic attributes and are constantly seeking differentiation and 
separation from the rest of society (Daloz, 2010). They are formed by highly educated, 
informed, wealthy and, in some cases, politically active individuals who have an important 
influence on the public sphere (Castells, 2011). This influence is central to the research object 
of this study: political elites that form power groups which are strategically positioned at the 
core of the political system (Mills, 1956) and govern society (Dahl, 1961) by operationalising 
a series of strategic ties that allow them to maintain a position of dominance as the ruling class.    
 
The study of political elites is important in order to understand the evolutive logic of the 
distribution of power in societies. As Lipset and Solari (1967) point out, although the term 
“elite” was first used in the seventeenth century by merchants to identify their goods as being 
of superior quality, the concept evolved over time and was adopted as a category of analysis by 
sociology and political science to refer to a society’s governing groups and/or dominant strata. 
In this context, “elite analysis” emerged as an alternative to “class analysis” since, under this 
approach, it is assumed that the social structure and its complexity permit the creation of 
barriers to the direct exercise of power by the mass of the population. These barriers are used 
by minority groups that endure over time, regardless of the society’s predominant economic 
structure. This is why it is possible, through the study of elites, to identify these select groups 
and explain their functioning in terms of the social mechanisms and strategies they use to 
maintain their position of power within a particular society.   
 
A key question in the study of elites is whether they are born or made. Although different 
research approaches have been used in a bid to answer this question, there is consensus that 
these select groups function and reproduce themselves through social resources or forms of 
reciprocal capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that allow them to create and maintain ties and differentiate 
themselves from the rest of society (Daloz, 2007). These ties may be strong or weak 
(Granovetter, 1973), but it is clear that the elites are socially very homogenous (Higley & 
Burton, 2006). Moreover, elite analysis is useful for defining and explaining the specific 
characteristics of a social order and the way in which the social structure is defined and 




countries where social, political and economic inequalities remain a challenge for their 
sustainable development.     
 
In recent years, empirical political elite research in Latin America has used a wide range of 
methods of data collection and produced an increasing number of comparative national studies. 
Most of this research has focused on the political elites’ role in the region’s processes of 
democratic transition and consolidation (Cheibub, Pzeworski, Limongi Neto, & Alvarez, 1996; 
Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Higley, Pakulski, Pohu, & Dobry, 2000; Linz 
& Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; O´Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; 
Schmitter, 1988). Research has also been carried out into the elites’ political perceptions 
(Alcántara & Rivas, 2007), their biographies and familial, educational and professional 
trajectories and their recruitment (Camp, 2013; 2006; 2002; 1982; Morgenstern & Siavelis, 
2008).  
 
In the Chilean case, political elite research has often used publicly available biographic 
information about the elite’s members, relying mostly on qualitative methods. It includes the 
study of technocracy or, in other words, those governments in which public positions are held 
by experts in particular economic sectors or areas of knowledge, rather than by politicians. This 
topic has been studied extensively, making a significant contribution to our understanding of 
the formation and evolution of government elites (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993; Montecinos, 
1998; Silva, 2009; 1991). This line of research has dominated much of the study of elites in 
Chile (González-Bustamante, 2013). Secondly, there is the work that seeks to analyse the 
origins of the elites and their networks of socialisation in order to identify their composition, 
structure and levels of social cohesion (Cordero, 2003; Espinoza, 2010).  
 
Other studies have focused on the elites’ socialisation and political competition (Barozet & 
Aubry, 2005; Joignant & Navia, 2003) while some empirical studies have sought to define and 
analyse the profiles of their members with regard to their familial, educational and professional 
or political trajectories (Delamaza, 2013; González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante 
& Olivares, 2016; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; Joignant, 2014; Joignant & 
Güel, 2011). These studies have complemented qualitative information with surveys of the 
elites that have enabled researchers to gather data on, for example, attitudes, perceptions and 
opinions among Chile’s political elites. Moreover, this work “has broadened the range of 
research questions that can be empirically studied since it permits collection of information on 
subjective indicators such as role perceptions, attitudes and interaction patterns of elites” 




research has also focused on the role the elites played during the political transition (Garretón, 
1995; Moulian, 1994).  
 
Although this work has made it possible to study Chile’s political elite throughout its history, 
these approaches have some limitations that need to be mentioned here in order to understand 
the contribution of this thesis. The biographic approach has made a significant contribution to 
the development of categories of analysis as regards the definition, development and evolution 
of the political-government elites. However, viewed from a sociological standpoint, it does not 
permit observation and empirical measurement of how these groups use the social resources 
that permit their formation and functioning over time. In turn, the approach which analyses the 
origins and social networks  (structure and level of cohesion) of the political elites has not gone 
beyond an analytical logic that describes, rather than explains, the effects of certain variables 
that play a key role in the formation (access) and functioning  (performance) of the political 
elites.    
 
Studies of socialisation and political competition also have a similar limitation in that they tend 
to be descriptive and do not necessarily explain the effects of the formation of government or 
party elites. The exception in this case are some studies that explain the effects of variables 
related to candidates’ performance in congressional elections (i.e. Navia 2000). This is also the 
case of studies of the role of the elites in the political transition, most of which describe and 
explain the processes related to the decisions and negotiations through which the political-party 
elites sought to restore democracy in Chile.   
 
Finally, the approach based on the definition and analysis of the profiles of the members of the 
political elite in terms of their familial, educational and professional or political trajectories is 
relevant for this research. This approach stands out for its development of models of 
quantitative analysis for studying the effect of certain variables on the political and professional 
trajectories of the political elites, but does not include work to measure the effects that variables 
associated with the use of species of capital have on the formation of elites. This is the context 
in which this research was undertaken, taking as its reference the typologies of Bourdieu with 
respect to the uses of species of capital, in order to measure the effect of these variables on 
individuals’ chances of attaining strategic positions in the political field, comparing the 






Chile is a particularly interesting case for the study of political elites from this perspective. 
Historically, since its colonisation, it has experienced an evolutive process marked by economic 
inequality and the concentration of political power. It is a textbook case of how certain social 
mechanisms have operated and endured over decades, allowing the elites to maintain certain 
positions of privilege and political control over society. Indeed, some scholars have argued that 
the prevalence of democratic elitism after the country’s successful democratic transition was 
mainly a result of the ongoing existence of the oligarchic structures and patterns of social 
concentration seen prior to the Pinochet regime (Delamaza, 2013; Robinson, 2013).  
 
A large volume of empirical research has demonstrated that the prevalence of authoritarian 
enclaves after the transition to democracy (Garretón, 2012; 1999; Siavelis, 2009; 2009b)2 
resulted in an elitist form of politics between 1990 and 2013. This allowed both the centre-left 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and the right-wing Alianza por Chile coalitions 
to control the political system during this period.3 With its four successive presidential terms 
between 1990 and 2010, the Concertación became the longest ruling coalition in the country’s 
history and is an exception in Latin America. During this period, it delivered positive 
macroeconomic results and important social progress (such as the reduction of poverty). It also 
succeeded in stabilising the country after the military regime (ECLAC, 2001; IMF, 2007).  
 
During these years, the Concertación shared legislative power with the Alianza, due to the 
country’s binomial system for congressional elections which ensured the shared dominance of 
the two coalitions (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). This voting system was designed by the 
dictatorship to over-represent conservative and pro-regime forces after the defeat suffered by 
Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite (Navia, 2000; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). The regime’s view 
was that it would ensure the country’s post-dictatorship political stability (Carey, 2006). The 
binomial system resulted in a closed political structure under which, for over 20 years, the two 
coalitions maintained a balance of power in the allocation of positions of political 
representation (Siavelis, 2009).  
 
As ruling elites, the Concertación and the Alianza remained mostly unchanged, fairly closed 
and insufficiently porous. Different studies have argued that most of their members not only 
had a similar social origin, but also had access to social networks with frequent interaction, 
 
2 The enclaves included el “cuoteo”, elite control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party 
dominated politics, elitist and extra-institutional policy-making, and the untouchability of the economic 
model inherited from the Pinochet government (Siavelis, 2009b). 
3 After being defeated in 2010 presidential election, the Concertación was replaced by New Majority 




enabling them to reduce their ideological differences and become more compact and effective 
at keeping outsiders and newcomers out of the political system (Cordero, Hunneus, Berríos, & 
Gamboa, 2006; Espinoza & Madrid, 2010; Espinoza, 2010; Joignant & Navia, 2003). However, 
although González-Bustamante (2013) studied the factors affecting the access and permanence 
of the governmental political elite in Chile, none of these studies has empirically measured the 
effect of variables related to social, economic and cultural capital on access to strategic 
positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches.  
 
In this dissertation, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied to 
the field of elites. Although sociological research has examined the reproduction of Chile’s 
elites, there is little empirical evidence as to how different forms of capital operate within them. 
Based on a survey of elites in Chile, this thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital 
(cultural, social and political) on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the 
political field. It focuses on the political elite that existed between 1990, when Pinochet handed 
over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and the end of 
Michelle Bachelet’s first government in 2010. At least three points are germane to this analysis: 
(1) understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; (2) describing and 
explaining the main aspects of the party elites’ background and social resources, including their 
family networks (independent variables); and (3) exploring the effect of those variables on 
individuals’ chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the 
legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent 
variable). 
 
The data was obtained through a survey of 386 members of the nucleus of the Chilean political 
elite, enquiring about aspects such as their social, academic and family background, social 
resources and professional and political careers. The empirical analysis includes network 
analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 
1990-2010. The results indicate that age, gender and variables related to cultural, social and 
political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, but mostly with 
opposite effects. Only family capital has a significant effect in the same direction for both 
positions. However, the effects of the variables vary when differentiating by period. The 
originality of this research lies in the collection and analysis of new empirical data that throws 
light on a subject of longstanding speculation. 
 
Although numerous approaches can be used to analyse the phenomenon of political elites, the 




profiles of an elite’s members as regards their familial, educational and professional or political 
trajectories. The data used was obtained from the FONDECYT4 project entitled “Political elites 
in Chile: Sociology of the governmental, parliamentary and party staff (1990-2010)” (Project 
Nº 1100877), led by Dr. Alfredo Joignant. As part of this project, a census of Chile’s political 
elite was carried out, covering 386 of its members. Although the database obtained from this 
project was used for this research, additional variables (related to family capital, the 
government in which a position was held, age and education) were created by the author and 
used in quantitative analysis of the data. This is explained in greater detail in Chapter VI on 
methodological definitions. A series of interviews were also conducted to gather information 
about the Chilean political elite and served to define the lines of the quantitative analysis (see 
Appendix III). 
 
The database has been used for numerous studies within this line of research (for example,  
Delamaza, 2013; González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 
2018; Joignant, 2014). However, this thesis is the only one to focus on measuring the effect of 
different species of capital on access to the positions of minister and deputy, comparing the 
executive and legislative branches, in three periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. Its 
methodology was defined as a function of the study’s theoretical approach, which points 
fundamentally to a conception of political elites in the framework of power structure research 
(Domhoff, 2006; 1990; 1967; Mills, 1959; 1956). This theoretical definition is important 
because the research centres on a unitary conception of the elite in contrast to other more 
pluralist visions (Dahl, 1956; Schumpeter, 1943; Simon & Eitzen, 2002). It is, in addition, 
based on an approach that considers species of capital according to the definition of Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu, 1989; 1984) and their use through strategic relations of power (Boix & Posner, 
1996; Lin, 1999). 
 
Although elite research is not as developed as other areas of political sociology research in 
Chile, it is essential in order to explain and analyse the political elite’s creation, evolution and 
transformation after the end of the military dictatorship in 1990. Little work has been done on 
this and the research reported here aims to contribute empirical evidence by measuring the 
effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on the access of certain 
individuals to strategic positions in the political field. 
 
4 The National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT) programme aims to 
encourage and promote the development of basic scientific and technological research. It is the main 
public fund of this kind in Chile. It was established in 1981 and has financed over 16,000 research 
projects, whose impact has benefitted the scientific community and society as a whole. I worked as 
research assistant on this project. As lead researcher, Dr. Joignant gave permission for use of the data. 





Since political sociology offers a framework for the analysis of political processes according to 
their context and the configurations determining their duration (Déloye, 1997; Garretón, 2000; 
Payne, 2007), this research analyses the effects of social resources on the formation of one or 
more elites or, in other words, groups of agents whose common denominator is a shared 
worldview (Mills, 1956). It also describes and analyses qualitatively certain key independent 
variables, notably family connections (including network analysis) within the party elite. The 
aim of this research is not merely to describe how different forms of capital are used by political 
elites, but also to measure their impact in obtaining access to certain important positions within 
the political system. 
 
This doctoral thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter I, entitled “The study of political 
elites: theoretical framework”, discusses in detail the main theories and relevant empirical 
research that have contributed to the study of political elites and provide this study’s theoretical 
framework. This chapter deals extensively with the theoretical-empirical contributions that 
determined the definition of this research and serve as the context for its empirical contribution 
to the study of political elites as a sociological phenomenon using Bourdieu’s notion of species 
of capital. 
 
Chapter II on “Political elites and social, political and economic transformations in Latin 
America” examines key aspects of the context in which Latin America’s recent political 
evolution has occurred. This is essential in order to understand the specificity of the Chilean 
case in relation to the region. Latin America’s recent history has been shaped by the existence 
of authoritarian regimes, with the resulting incentives for maintaining inequalities in the 
distribution of political power. This has also been reflected in the economy and different 
spheres of social life. Latin America is particularly interesting because of the institutional 
instability seen in most countries as from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial regimes were 
established, through to the 1990s when democracy had mostly been restored.   
 
Chapter III on “End of the authoritarian regime and rearticulation of the political elites in Chile” 
examines the context in which the Concertación and Alianza coalitions were created. It looks 
specifically at the political transition in the light of the institutional factors that made the 1988 
plebiscite possible, including the 1980 Constitution, because of its importance in defining the 
institutional framework for the Pinochet regime, and the transition process at the end of the 




explain the existence of authoritarian enclaves in the Chilean political system after the 
restoration of democracy. 
 
Chapter IV on “Two new coalitions in post-authoritarian Chile: the Concertación and the 
Alianza” looks at the definition and formation of the Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia and the Alianza por Chile, the two coalitions that governed Chile for more two 
decades after the restoration of democracy. This chapter explains their origins, the parties by 
which they were formed and the parties that ultimately remained in them.  
 
Chapter V on “Political performance of the party elites after Pinochet: 1990-2010” analyses the 
transformations seen in the party system after the end of the Pinochet regime and the subsequent 
restoration of democracy. The establishment of a binomial electoral system, together with the 
existence of other authoritarian enclaves, allowed the political elites to remain in power without 
great changes with respect to the period prior to the Pinochet regime. The binomial system 
allowed the Concertación and the Alianza to maintain a balance of parliamentary power during 
the period studied here, with the Concertación winning the four presidential elections held 
between 1990 and 2010. 
 
Chapter VI presents the methodology used in this doctoral thesis. It first explains the 
methodological design of the research and then the sampling procedure used to select the 
individuals surveyed and those interviewed in order to provide perspective and guide the 
quantitative analysis. Finally, this chapter explains the fieldwork and methodological decisions 
on the statistical technique of quantitative analysis and the variables considered in line with the 
research objectives.  
 
Chapter VII on “The importance of family ties in the Chilean political elite” examines the 
historical evolution and importance of family ties in the Chilean political elite. Eight families 
considered “influential and traditional” in Chile’s political history are studied. They were 
selected based on an extensive review of the literature on families involved in politics in Chile 
as well as information obtained from preliminary interviews. These families are referred to as 
political dynasties and, as the analysis shows, most of them produced at least two presidents of 
Chile. Gephi software was then used to map family networks in the political elite. After 
analysing the individual biographies and political careers of the 386 cases, other members of 
the elite were added concerning their family connections, bringing the total to 588 individuals 
(nodes). Among these, 328 family ties were found, with these defined as a connection as 





Chapter VIII on “Measuring and comparing species of capital in the Chilean political elite, 
1990-2010” examines the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to 
strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches, as 
represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. First, the hypotheses are 
presented and the analysis technique is explained, before the chapter goes on to present the 
descriptive results and measurement of the effects of the species of capital (independent 
variables) on access to positions in the legislature and the executive. 
 
Chapter IX sets out the conclusions and main findings of the research. The conclusions are 
divided into general conclusions and the specific findings of the research, referring to each 



























CHAPTER I: THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter discusses in detail the main theories and relevant empirical investigations that have 
contributed to the study of political elites and serve as the theoretical framework for this 
research. It first contextualises the definition of elite as a category of sociological analysis 
before briefly discussing the relevance of the term ‘political elite’ and its relation with social 
class as a category of analysis.  
 
The conceptual relationship between elites, political representation and the power structure is 
then addressed. These discussions are fundamental to contextualise the definition of elites as 
an object of study in the social sciences and, more specifically, in sociology. Subsequently, the 
chapter looks extensively at the theoretical-empirical contributions that shaped the definition 
of this research and serve as the context for its empirical contribution to the study of political 
elites as a sociological phenomenon. 
 
In addition to presenting these theoretical approaches, this chapter examines their limitations, 
including a detailed discussion of the theoretical definitions of social capital of Bourdieu, 
Coleman and Putnam, in order to identify their main strengths and weaknesses and justify the 
use and relevance of species of capital as a category of analysis in this research. The recent 
context of the study of political elites in Latin America and Chile is then presented before, 
finally, discussing the reasons for using Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to species of capital in 
defining the categories of analysis used in this research and the empirical contribution it makes. 
 
 
i. The sociology of elites 
 
An elite is a select and powerful group of citizens and/or organisations. In a bid for social 
distinction from other groups (Daloz, 2010), elites typically strive for differentiation and 
separation from the rest of society. In sociological terms, this concept has analytical importance 
in that it represents a unit of analysis for identifying a form of social differentiation that is 
shaped by numerous practices and social and symbolic representations. Normally, the concept 
of elite is used to analyse groups that either control societies or constitute their upper layer. The 
creation of an elite is also the result of the evolution of elites throughout the history of humanity, 





Elites and social distinction have a long and vibrant history. Since the times of Ancient Greece 
and the Roman Empire, social status has been important. Whereas Greek society was divided 
mainly into free people and slaves, the social structure of Ancient Rome was based on property, 
wealth, citizenship and freedom, with heredity also playing quite an important role. Social 
stratification existed in both cases but, in Ancient Rome, was established through objective 
norms (Grantt, 1978). This form of distinction through social status persisted through the 
Middle Ages and on to modern societies where it could currently be considered the main 
principle of social organisation. Research in the social sciences has emphasised the tendency 
of elites to endure and reproduce their power over time at “political and economic levels, 
potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. For instance, one specific 
form of élite persistence is illustrated by the existence of dynasties, a particular form of élite 
persistence in which a single or few family groups monopolize either political and/or economic 
power” (Querubín, 2012, p. 2). 
 
Numerous scholars have studied elites. Using a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative 
variables such as social status, social stratification and local culture, they have developed 
theories about their evolution and performance in modern societies. However, a key issue has 
emerged as regards extrapolation and predictive capabilities: “One serious problem with this 
topic is that social theorists have all too often been more interested in finding confirmation for 
their respective grand theories than in considering the various realities of distinction 
comparatively. Whenever they have brought empirical evidence to support their position, the 
main shortcoming has been extrapolation: that is the claim to provide sociological Laws on the 
grounds of one particular case during a given period” (Daloz, 2010, p. 2).  
 
In this context, Daloz argues that one of the major issues for elite research is its dubious 
extrapolations (Daloz, 2010; 2007). In the literature of elite research, there is a tendency 
towards generalisation which, through “universal” principles, seeks to reproduce theoretical 
schemes across different societies. However, the particularities of each society prevent the 
complete reproduction of these theoretical frameworks, explaining the claim of Daloz (2007) 
about the “paradox of grand theories” in elite research. According to Daloz, this issue can be 
seen from a number of classical theoreticians such as Spencer, Tarde, Veblen, Simmel, Weber 
and Sombart through to major subsequent neo-Marxist, functionalist and post-modern 
contributions that have analysed social distinction and emulation (Daloz, 2010). However, 
when sociological research began to relate social distinction to the creation of elites, a new 
theoretical background emerged. Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) is probably one of the 




the premise of “no judgement of taste is innocent”, Bourdieu analysed the French bourgeoisie’s 
tastes and preferences, carrying out a vast ethnographic study of contemporary France through 
analysis of the bourgeois mind. A remarkable quote, which summarises one of the main 
principles of distinction in the social sciences according to Bourdieu’s ideas, is the following: 
 
 “Principles of division, inextricably logical and sociological, function within and for the purposes 
of the struggle between social groups; in producing concepts, they produce groups, the very groups 
which produce the principles and the groups against which they are produced. What is at stake in 
the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and 
systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization 
and demobilization: the evocative power of an utterance which puts things in a different light (as 
happens, for example, when a single word, such as ‘paternalism’, changes the whole experience of 
a social relationship) or which modifies the schemes of perception, shows something else, other 
properties, previously unnoticed or relegated to the background (such as common interests 
hitherto masked by ethnic or national differences); a separative power, a distinction, diacrisis, 
discretio, drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the 
undifferentiated” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 479). 
 
One of this theory’s most important contributions is the idea that social class plays a significant 
role in the construction of personal identity (i.e. a person’s interests). Thus, the constant 
interaction of social classes in the course of daily life reinforces “social differences” such as 
taste which, according to Bourdieu, is an “aesthetic” value defined by the ruling class. These 
social uses of communication (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991) also have to do with relations 
between elites and the mass of the population (Hartmann, 2007). However, this distinction is 
also related to other social resources such as political power and economic wealth.  
 
 
ii. Political elites and social class 
 
A political elite is a group of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of 
civil society organisation that manages and organises government and all the manifestations of 
political power: “Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in 
large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes 
regularly and substantially” (Higley, 2008, p.3). Social class and elites are linked. Scholars 
have shown that social class is, indeed, a key aspect of the formation of elites (Huckfeldt & 
Kohfeld, 1989; Lane, 2007; Moore, 1966). The most influential perspectives in sociological 
research have historically been provided by Marxism and functionalism (Wright, 2005). Max 
Weber’s sociology developed a strong theoretical framework for understanding the connection 
between social strata and political action in modern societies. Influenced by Marx’s ideas, 




in social interplay. He emphasised the idea that, besides class, there were other sources of power 
in modern societies such as status defined by consumption (Weber, 1978; 1964; 1958). 
 
Since the 1970s, a wide range of sociological empirical research has sought to explain the social 
determinants of ruling elites. Considering aspects such as social origins, type of education, 
socioeconomic status and social and political capital, some authors have analysed the factors 
behind the creation of elites as well as how they evolve over time. The main principle of 
research of this type is the Weberian sociological concept of “elective affinity” (Weber, 1958) 
which defines the association between certain variables defined by beliefs, actions and/or 
unknown or unexpected consequences of social action (Howe, 1978). It is important to consider 
this concept of elective affinity because there is a link between the Bourdieusian theory of 
distinction and the social uses of values and this Weberian concept.  
 
Figure 1. Political elites and the mass 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, political elites must deal with conflict on two different levels: first of all, 
they must resolve conflicts or potential conflicts with other political elites and, second, with 
society in general (the masses). By resolving conflicts on these two levels, they earn legitimacy 
and exercise authority (Pareto, 1991; Putnam, 1976; Schattschneider, 1975; 1942). 
Furthermore, political elites constantly use their resources of power to exercise control over the 
mass of the population. The elites have power over the state, that is, the civil organisation of 
political power. Although they may have conflicts with the mass, which can certainly affect 
political decisions from “top down” to “bottom up” (Easterly, 2008), the possession of multiple 
forms of capital (social, cultural, economic and political, among others) allows elites to ensure 







iii. Elites, political representation and power structure 
 
Political elites and representation are often related because the elites constantly seek to control 
government. In modern democracies, political authorities are presumed to represent citizens’ 
interests and, to win elections, candidates must persuade voters that they deserve their support. 
Politicians frequently have to reconcile the “mandate” of their position with the interests of the 
people they represent as reflected, for example, in opinion polls. 
 
In Western democracies, political representation depends on political parties. The functioning 
of democratic systems is determined not only by the action of citizens or the performance of 
the political system, but also by the behaviour of the political actors. Decision-makers in public 
institutions are political elites and they operate through political parties. What is in permanent 
tension in current societies is the relationship between power, conflict and authority (Laswell 
& Kaplan, 1950). Political elites have to deal with the institutions through which power is 
exercised and “shape” the political system. In some cases, they draw up strong rules in order to 
maintain their power and avoid political competition. In other cases, they must compete among 
themselves and/or with other citizens. This raises the question of whether society is controlled 
by a small group of insiders. The challenge for political elites is the balance between political 
representation and maximisation of their own interests. 
 
However, beyond that challenge, elite behaviour is also determined by the definition of the 
power structure. Most social scientists consider that power can be studied either as collective 
power (the capacity of a group to achieve its common goals) or as distributive power when 
there is a fixed amount of power to be distributed among groups and/or individuals, creating a 
zero-sum game. In this context, it is relevant to analyse the ability of a group (elite) to gain 
power within a community (over other groups). Both dimensions are intertwined, but the 
second prevails when studying political elites. 
 
The theoretical starting point for research into elites and power structures is that, in modern 
societies, the basis of power, authority and conflict lies in human organisations (Domhoff, 
2006). Because elites are formed to accomplish a set of purposes, they often develop rules, 
specific roles and routines. Frequently, they also have to compete with each other. In political 
sociology, five theories have, from different perspectives and using different models, attempted 















Pluralism General theory of 
society 
Multiple centres of power Robert Dahl, Seymour 
Martin Lipset 
State Autonomy Theory of 
government as an 
independent force 
Government as power centre Theda Skocpol 
Elite Theory Theory of 
organisations 
The leaders of large 
organisations inevitably 
dominate all large-scale 
societies. 
Thomas Dye 
Marxism Marxist theory of 
historical 
materialism 
Class domination Antonio Gramsci, 
Gerald Cohen, John 
Roemer, Jon Elster, 
Erik Olin Wright 
Class-Domination 




Domination by the few does 
not mean complete control, 
but rather the ability to set the 
terms under which other 
groups and classes operate. 
Charles Wright Mills, 
G. William Domhoff 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
The pluralist theory takes the view that, in modern societies, power is held by a wide range of 
groups and individuals while the state autonomy theory argues that it is held principally by the 
state. The elite theory, which is closer to pluralism, asserts that global and local societies are 
controlled by large organisations such as the state and/or large enterprises which are, in turn, 
under the control of small groups. Following the theory of historical materialism, Marxism 
categorises societies using the concept of social class, with each individual having a “position” 
in the means of production. Finally, the class domination theory analyses power structures in 
terms of the different positions of domination of each group in the social order and social 
networks in terms of how power is wielded (who benefits? who governs? who wins?). This 






Unlike state autonomy and Marxist theories, the class domination theory does not focus on only 
a single organisational basis of power (the political network for the state autonomy theorists 
and the economy for Marxists). In addition, unlike the elite theory, it does not consider that 
domination by a few leaders means complete control of the society, but rather the ability to set 
the terms under which other groups and classes must operate. 
 
Pluralism could be considered similar to class domination theory. However, there is an 
important difference in their definition of the power structure. Whereas pluralism tends to 
relativism, arguing that, instead of hierarchies, there are multiple centres of power, the class 
domination theory asserts that control and authority inevitably produce a power structure based 
on domination. Following this approach, many scholars have studied political elites at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. Several authors have also examined social structures in order 
to compare the influence of the elites across the political system and the rest of the society.  
 
In “Who Rules America?” (1967), Domhoff analysed the power structure in the United States 
as regards local and national decision-making networks. Following Hunter’s ideas (1953), he 
pointed out that, rather than “group struggles” (Davis J. , 2011), there was an upper economic 
elite in which political power was concentrated (Domhoff, 1978; 1967). In later research, 
Domhoff explained two essential concepts related to this upper elite. On the one hand, there 
was a power or ruling elite, formed by the leaders of high-level organisations, and, on the other, 
the rest of the elite’s members who were not involved in the task of ruling (Domhoff, 2002; 
1996; 1990).  
 
Domhoff made a significant contribution to the study of political elites in terms of 
understanding their composition, the ways they act and their spheres of influence on society. 
His research has proven very useful in analysing elite interactions, given that most political 
elites tend to comprise several networks which are the result of its members’ institutional and 
social resources.  Domhoff (2012) developed a strategy for power structure research. He argued 
that the first step consists in the identification of a power structure and that, through the use of 
two analytical methods, the objective is then to understand, describe and define the groups that 
control power. 
 
 Figure 2 shows how network and content analysis are connected in explaining a power 
structure. In sociology, social network analysis has emerged as a key technique for addressing 
complex sets of relationships at different levels, from interpersonal to organisational relations. 




and describing power groups. After that, “once the membership networks have been 
established, there are many other types of links that might be analyzed, such as kinship ties or 
flows of information between organizations. One of the most important of these other types of 
links concerns the size and direction of money flows in the network” (Domhoff G. , 1967, p. 
73). 
 
Figure 2. Power structure research 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on Domhoff, 2012. 
 
Content analysis focuses on human communication, including all its manifestations and 
properties, in a bid to understand the meaning of language, words and phrases. It is used to 
analyse communications in networks at the interpersonal and organisational levels, with the 
aim of defining what type of individuals and organisations are participating, how elites develop 
their recruitment strategies, what kind of ideologies are involved, what is their influence and 
what are their public-private alliances. This methodology is crucial for identifying the specific 
characteristics of the power structure and the elites that are involved. Based on these empirical 
findings, Domhoff argues that elite theory can be applied at the local level. This perspective 
opens up a new insight for understanding elites from the macro to micro levels. 
 
Other scholars have studied a wide range of links in order to define, describe and explain the 
performance of “power networks” in societies. Gaxie (1983) studied the social factors 
determining governmental careers during the Fifth Republic in France between 1959 and 1981, 
concluding that some political networks were created according to social determinants such as 
family, social class and/or social status. A similar conclusion was reached by Hughes (1993) 
when analysing the conformation of power networks in Western societies during the half-
century between 1880 and 1930, following the change in electricity supply systems. According 




and politics, determining the emergence of new elites (Hughes, 1993, p. 175). He compared 
this change with the impact of manorialism on medieval society. 
 
In the case of the relation between elites, politics and economic power, Kadushin (1995) 
analysed ties of friendship within the French financial elite. In one of his most important 
findings, he concluded that most members of the financial elite had significant ties of 
friendship, allowing them to construct and maintain a certain level of enforceable trust, a key 
factor in high finance (Mendras & Suleiman, 1997). Similarly, when analysing the performance 
of the members of Socialist cabinets in France, Mathiot and Sawicki (1999) concluded that this 
principle of homogeneity of the trajectories of the elite’s members can lead to homogeneous 
behaviour in the public and social spheres (Mathiot & Sawicki, 1999). Confrontation can, 
however, occur among elites and, particularly, between political and economic elites when their 
interests diverge, as Garrigou (2016) found in the French case. 
 
Finally, Genieys (2005) attempted to measure and explain the impact of the elite’s performance 
on France’s development. Distinguishing between professionals and politicians “by instinct”, 
he analysed French elites from three perspectives - comparative, historical and policy-making 
- and concluded that, in order to improve empirical observation of elite action, it is necessary 
to study the decision-making process. He argued that, during this phase of the public policy 
process, the “select groups” that act can be identified, making it possible to explain how new 
power elites are formed.  
 
In research into the relationship between elites and the power structure, there has as yet been 
little work on the development of predictive models to explain the composition and 
performance of elites over time. In this context, incipient applied sociological approaches have 
sought to go beyond the definition and interpretation of the processes and structural factors that 
condition positions of domination in societies and have focused on the analysis of key variables 
in a bid to explain the formation of elite groups and their trajectories over time. This thesis 
seeks to contribute to this line of work by empirically measuring the effects of species of capital 










iv. The study of political elites 
Definition of the theoretical-analytical perspective of the research 
 
The objective of this research is to analyse the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, 
social and political) on access to strategic positions in the legislative and executive branches of 
government between 1990, when military dictator Augusto Pinochet handed over the 
presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and the end of Michelle 
Bachelet’s first government in 2010. This implies addressing the political elites as an object of 
study and the forms of capital as a unit of analysis in order to explain and measure the effect of 
their use in the formation of these select groups by comparing access to key positions in the 
executive (as represented by ministers) and the legislature (represented by deputies). 
 
In the study of political elites, significant contributions have shaped this line of research at the 
global, regional and Chilean level. These contributions can be classified into three topics of 
study: political-government elites as a community of power; political elites and their role in 
processes of democratisation and economic development; and political elites and their 
trajectories, resources and mechanisms of social differentiation. Even though this research 
focuses on the third topic, it is important to define the topics of study in order to understand the 
context that determined the development of this study. 
 
 
iv.i. Political-government elites as a community of power 
 
The first academic research on political elites was framed in this perspective, which 
predominated until the mid-twentieth century. It reflects a conception of elites in general and 
political elites in particular as those select communities that rule over society. It focuses 
fundamentally on the factors that determine the formation and functioning of these groups. Two 
perspectives of analysis have shaped the development of this approach: the centralist 




iv.i.i. The centralist perspective: political elites as a ruling minority 
 
The centralist perspective begins with the work of three Italian authors who are considered the 




in modern societies: Wilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. Elitist theories arose 
in the early twentieth century in response to egalitarian thinking and these authors were pioneers 
in the political importance they gave to the role of elites and leaders in democratic regimes. 
Although their theories differ in a number of aspects, all three concur that, throughout history, 
societies have been governed by small elites and that the institutional structure has been 
conducive to their endurance over time.  
 
Pareto (1847-1923) was one of the first sociologists to define the concept of ruling elites 
(Pareto, 1901; Zuckerman, 1977) and his study of the political role played by the aristocracy in 
Italian society is one of the early attempts at sociopolitical analysis of elites (Rossides, 1998, 
p. 23). Interested in explaining the social factors that affect human action, Pareto developed 
one of the main arguments of the social cycle theory: that the evolution of society and human 
history tend to repeat themselves in cycles. Although recognising the idea of social progress, 
this theory is in contrast to social evolutionism, which viewed society and human history as 
constantly progressing in some new, unique direction and/or pattern (Turchin, 2003). 
 
Pareto defined elites as those small and select political groups of individuals, with superior 
personal qualities, who govern the mass of society or, in other words, all the other individuals 
whom he considered unintelligent, irrational and, therefore, poorly organised and who could be 
manipulated by the ruling elite through “carefully used” political propaganda (Pareto, 1991). 
Implicit in Pareto’s definition is the assumption that individuals differ markedly in their 
physical, biological, moral and intellectual characteristics. In their social interactions, this 
produces asymmetries of power which are operationalised through the exercise of intellectual 
and psychological skills and the use of material resources, as Pareto points out in his Manual 
of Political Economy: “For a very long time, and among a large number of peoples, political 
power has belonged to the owners of the land” (Pareto, 1972, p.62).  
 
Pareto’s theory of elites made an important contribution as regards the distinction between 
ruling and non-ruling elites. While the former is a small select group with political power, the 
latter is an also select group that occupies privileged positions in certain activities considered 
essential for society’s development. Together, the two groups form the upper stratum of society, 
positioned above the lower or non-elite strata of those individuals without the capacity to 
influence society. According to Pareto, the majority of the population falls into these lower 
strata (Pareto, 1991). 
 




ties to it, there is no guarantee they will retain their privileged positions over time. In contrast 
to the Marxist class concept, Pareto believed that not all elite groups have the capacity to 
administer their power satisfactorily and permanently. On the contrary, he argued that elites 
and aristocracies may eventually disappear. According to Pareto, all elites, therefore, need to 
organise themselves within the social structure and to maintain strategic links between their 
members and the rest of society because their position of power depends on these relationships, 
which may be determined by loyalty, reciprocity or domination. When an elite group suffers a 
crisis, a new elite may emerge and position itself at the head of the social structure. For Pareto, 
these permanent struggles and the circulation of elites are essential for the evolution of history. 
A social revolution, for example, may not only have consequences at the level of the country, 
but may also serve to foster a crisis in the traditional elite and the emergence of a new one.  
 
Pareto’s theory is based on a circulation of elites in power in which there are families that are 
constantly vying for these privileged positions. In order to be successful, it is not only social 
distinction that matters and it is also necessary to build strategic ties with a wide range of 
individuals or groups (families) in order to exercise influence over society as a whole. Pareto 
emphasised that these permanent dynamics of circulation permit the rise and fall of elites. In 
this sense, the true struggle for power is not between the elites and the masses, but between the 
incumbent elites and their challengers. Rather than talking about the goodwill of rulers towards 
the people, Pareto believed that it is necessary to analyse the resources they use to maintain 
control in the face of possible threats. 
 
Finally, Pareto argued that the dynamics of circulation offer incentives for the emergence of 
new elites and the disappearance of others. There is, therefore, not a single elite, but rather elites 
that are the result of the dynamics of succession in the domination of power. Hence his famous 
phrase: “History is a graveyard of aristocracies”. For both Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, 
considered by many scholars to be the other founder of this field of study, the circulation of 
elites was the key concept for their analysis (Bottomore, 2006). 
 
Gaetano Mosca (1939) is recognised as one of the founders of Italian political science. His 
contribution covers a wide range of topics related to institutions, the role of parties and the state 
and government in society. However, it is his theory of the political class that is traditionally 
regarded as his most important contribution to the theory of elites (Martinelli, 2009). In contrast 
to Pareto, Mosca argued that the formation of elites is determined strictly by the social structure. 




society who also wield the greatest political power (Bottomore, 2006; Mosca, 1939; 
Zuckerman, 1977,). 
 
Unlike Pareto, Mosca tried to develop a comprehensive universal approach based on a theory 
of the political class (Martinelli, 2009). He argued that, in human societies, the administration 
of political power depends on a special class of individuals who constitute an organised 
minority, which he referred to as the political class. Under this assumption, Mosca argued that, 
in every society, there will be two classes of people: the rulers and the ruled. In this context, 
those who govern are the political class within which there are different hierarchies and levels 
of authority. This is what Mosca termed the ruling class (Mosca, 1939). 
 
In this division of society into those who govern and the governed, Mosca’s approach was 
similar to that of Pareto but, unlike Pareto, he argued that the ruling class constitutes a select 
group with different hierarchies, the highest being the level responsible for directing, 
safeguarding and administering the interests of the state. For Mosca, the political class is 
permeable to the interests of the governed class, implying that it reacts to the pressures and 
interests of citizens, even when it cannot be replaced by those it governs. 
 
Mosca argued that, within the ruling class, there is an elite with greater resources of power in 
administering the state and that this elite must be connected with the population it governs. This 
is a fundamental principle of the exercise of the ruler’s role: “There is a close connection 
between the intellectual and moral worth of the second and larger stratum of the ruling class 
and the intellectual and moral worth of the man who is actually at the head of the political 
organization and the small group of persons who directly assist him. The men who occupy 
higher posts are more or less imbued with the ideas, sentiments, passions and, therefore, 
policies of the social strata which come just below them, the strata with which they are in 
continuous and immediate contact and without which they could not govern” (Mosca, 1939, 
p.430). 
 
Another point of agreement between Mosca and Pareto has to do with the concept of circulation 
of elites. Mosca argued that their rapid circulation is crucial for guaranteeing the evolution of 
societies over time: “Human societies are always governed by minorities... Rapid class 
circulation is essential to progress” (Mosca, 1939, p.xviii). However, for Mosca, there is clear 
tension between the ruling minority and the community it governs since the larger the latter the 





Mosca maintained that the existence of the political class is a product of societies’ political, 
economic and cultural evolution in which economic and political power are inextricably linked. 
This occurs because, with political power, it is also possible to control wealth and, therefore, 
maintain an institutional framework for its accumulation and conservation. However, for 
Mosca, there remained the question of how the elite elicits obedience from the majority of the 
population. For him, the answer is that the ruling class initially has a de facto justification in 
the face of the need to administer the political power (control and authority) that arises from 
living as a community. However, Mosca argued that this alone does not suffice since a moral 
and legal structure is also required to give legitimacy to the established order on the basis of 
which the government operates. 
 
The existence of an elite that administers political power is, for Mosca, the result of a need that 
manifests itself in human interaction where power determines the existence of conflicts and, 
therefore, of authority. In this sense, Mosca considered that there is a universal need to govern 
and to feel governed, which each society addresses through different political formulas. These 
are the institutional orders which, according to Mosca, must be based either on supernatural 
beliefs or on concepts that, if they are not positive, must have their root in reality or rational 
criteria. For Mosca, another key element has to do with the ties that are established between the 
governing class and the governed. In this relationship, the aspiration of the dominated to one 
day become part of the class of the dominators must always prevail.  
 
The third classic author is Robert Michels (1915) who, after analysing the German and Italian 
political systems, concluded that political parties, including those considered socialist, cannot 
be democratic because, after their foundation, they inevitably tend to become bureaucratic 
oligarchies (Michels, 1915). Following Max Weber, Michels claimed that the main objective 
of a democracy, which he defined as a society without elites, was inevitably unattainable 
because democracy is rooted in some form of acknowledgment from the ruling elite. Since, in 
modern societies, the oligarchy is the elite that rules due to its power, this form of political 
domination is inevitable (Michels, 1915). Michels developed the theory of the “iron law of 
oligarchy” which is his most important contribution to sociopolitical thought (Bottomore, 2006; 
Mills, 1959; Putnam, 1976; Zuckerman, 1977).  
 
The work of Michels is important for the study of the forms of elitism seen in modern societies 
under democratic regimes. He studied the ways in which power is organised and administered 




considering particularly the prevalence of the national socialist and fascist ideologies at the 
time. Although there are similarities with the work of Pareto and Mosca in the way Michels 
understands the governing class as a select group that forms part of an organised power 
structure, he developed a strategy of analysis based on the nature of elite-mass relations in 
organisations, putting forward proposals about the limitations of the structural forms of an 
organised division of labour under democracy. 
 
The fundamental thesis of the work of Michels is that democracies are subject to the existence 
of oligarchic bureaucratic organisations that control power. For Michels, individuals tend to 
form organisations that enable them to achieve certain goals and objectives that it would be 
impossible for them to achieve individually. The problem is that the creation of these 
organisations tends to lead to a differentiation and specialisation of functions and, therefore, to 
hierarchies and forms of domination. This implies that, at some point, organisations cease to be 
a means to achieve certain objectives and become an end in themselves. This also has 
consequences for the roles of the leaders who, for Michels, eventually tend to protect the 
organisation’s own interests.  
  
He also saw this tendency in the political organisations of the working class. Despite initially 
being created to defend the workers’ interests, they also become an end in themselves and, 
through the posts that are created and the need to maintain the organisation, develop a 
bureaucracy. In this context, the leaders of these movements, although initially guided by the 
will of the masses and defining themselves as revolutionaries, soon become conservative and 
defend the interests of the organisation. For Michels, leaders will always seek to increase or 
maintain their power at any price, even at the expense of their former ideals. 
 
As a result, Michels considered that all organisations tend to become elitist. This is the origin 
of his “iron law of oligarchy” through which he sought to explain why political parties, albeit 
the main institutions of democracy, are not democratic organisations. The organisation is what 
gives rise to the dominance of the elected over those by whom they were elected. Organisations 
produce “hierarchical orders, of oligarchies” (Michels, 1915, p.55) and, in this context, the 
great problem of democratic regimes is that the parties, which constitute their base, are 
dominated by elites that function in a non-democratic way within the organisations, but need 
democracy in order to legitimise their internal power and to aspire to power beyond the 






The iron law of oligarchy is based on three arguments. First, the larger an organisation becomes, 
the more bureaucratic it will also become because it specialises and must, moreover, take 
decisions that are increasingly complex and do so more quickly. Those individuals who know 
how to deal with the complex issues facing the organisation gradually become indispensable, 
forming an elite. Second, a dichotomy between efficiency and internal democracy arises, with 
the organisation requiring strong leadership in order to be efficient, even if this means less 
internal democracy. Finally, the very psychology of the masses makes leadership desirable 
because they are apathetic, unsuited to solving problems on their own, grateful to the leader 
and prone to the cult of personality. Their only function would, therefore, be to choose their 
leaders from time to time. 
 
Leadership annuls democracy since the latter is understood by Michels in the Rousseauist way 
as the government of the people. However, democracy is a better system for the selection of 
oligarchies than a hereditary system. The work of Michels had a significant influence on authors 
such as Schattschneider, Schumpeter and Key. 
 
The unitary conception was further developed by Charles Wright Mills (1956), who used a 
conceptual theoretical approach with a sociological emphasis to define and analyse the power 
elite in the United States. Following a Weberian approach to legitimation and forms of 
domination, he studied the formation and functioning of the country’s elite. A distinctive aspect 
of his theory has to do with the understanding of what, for the author, is the psychological 
functioning of elite groups, which depends on how their members behave in their respective 
milieux: “In so far as the power elite is composed of men of similar origin and education, in so 
far as their careers and their styles of life are similar, there are psychological and social bases 
for their unity, resting upon the fact that they are of similar social type and leading to the fact 
of their easy intermingling. This kind of unity reaches its frothier apex in the sharing of that 
prestige that is to be had in the world of the celebrity; it achieves a more solid culmination in 
the fact of the interchangeability of positions within and between the three dominant 
institutional orders” (Mills, 1956, p.19). 
 
Taking the American power structure as a reference, Mills identified three forms of power: 
military, corporate and political. They are subject to communities formed through complex 
interactions between different individuals and groups. Mills, unlike the authors discussed 
above, took into account the way in which these forms of power are interrelated. For this author, 




widely used by members of the higher circles in order to interact and make decisions about 
public affairs (Mills, 1956, p.5). 
 
Mills defined these forms of power as domains (Mills, 1956, p.6) and maintained that they 
interact with each other and are not unified, constituting a power-wielding body that 
concentrates, administers, controls and exercises power in society in general. He viewed these 
communities as the result of a complex historical process of rationalisation of work, which 
underwent a decisive evolution after the industrialisation process when the progressive 
development of new forms of production permitted the consolidation of accumulation as a 
strategy for concentrating economic resources and political power in general. In other words, 
the creation of wealth opened the way to the consolidation of new actors capable of exercising 
influence over public affairs outside the sphere of elected representatives and, in this way, led 
to the degradation of democracy. 
 
For Mills, this is reflected in the public domain’s relegation as a decision-making space to one 
in which certain discourses on public affairs converge. In other words, elected representatives 
also respond to the networks of influence of actors interested in certain matters of a public 
nature. Taking as his reference the elite of American society, Mills explained how this new 
order positions itself and operates: “The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisers and 
consultants, spokesmen and opinion makers are often the captains of their higher thought and 
decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of 
power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper 
classes of town and city and region. Mingling with them, in curious ways we shall explore, are 
those professional celebrities who live by being continually displayed but are never, so long as 
they remain celebrities, displayed enough.” (Mills, 1956, p.74) 
 
The centralist perspective predominated in the study of political elites until the middle of the 
twentieth century when a new pluralist perspective emerged. Rather than seeing the elite as a 
unified and centralised community, it takes the view that there are multiple axes or centres of 
power, which interact and compete with each other to administer power. 
 
 
iv.i.ii. The pluralist perspective 
 
Unlike the unitary perspective, the pluralist perspective views the elites as multiple groups that 




community, there are multiple centres of power that coexist with each other and are shaped by 
this competition between individuals and groups that vie for power. This new perspective 
emerged in the mid-twentieth century and two of its important exponents are Schumpeter and 
Dahl. 
  
One of the roots of this theoretical-analytical perspective is found in the work of Schumpeter 
on capitalism, socialism and democracy (1943), which was a pioneer in its analysis of the 
evolution and relationship between these three concepts in government regimes in modernity. 
Schumpeter used the structural-functionalist paradigm to problematise the classical conception 
of democracy, focusing on the principle of the common good, with respect to the notion of 
individual rationality. For Schumpeter, individual understanding of aggregate social welfare is 
limited because the multiplicity of interests which each person has do not necessarily coincide 
at the aggregate social level. In this way, he contributed to the establishment of rational choice 
and methodological individualism as a discipline in political science (Downs, 1957). 
 
Schumpeter points out that the classical theory of democracy is based on trust that citizens’ 
virtues will lead them to behave according to electoral expectations, but argues that, under 
certain conditions, individuals will not behave as expected. Individual interests do not always 
coincide with those of the group and even subjects’ own interests can be at odds with each 
other. Schumpeter argues that individual interests depend on both social dynamics and a 
person’s own rationality. In this context, optimism about electoral expectations as regards 
popular representation, which is typical of classical democracy, can be utopian. 
 
Schumpeter’s main reason for asserting the existence of this electoral democratic utopia has to 
do with the problem implicit in the election of representatives as guarantors of the sovereign 
mandate and/or citizen interests. Citizens vote to elect political authorities who are 
representative of their interests but, in practice, there is no guarantee that these authorities will 
effectively represent their voters’ interests. In addition, in electoral contexts, political 
authorities must compete to ensure a victory and have rationales of action that are determined 
by these competitive contexts. 
 
Schumpeter points out that modern democracies have a tendency to develop elitisms, that is, 
groups which establish themselves in power whose competitive rationale of action is geared to 
retaining power and does not necessarily fully reflect citizens’ interests. However, these groups 




political and economic) within the social order. Schumpeter’s work constitutes a first approach 
to the pluralist idea. 
 
Another important study as regards this approach is that of Floyd Hunter (1953), who examined 
power relationships in a group of small communities in the US, studying the structural and 
functional uses of power as well as the definition of hierarchies in social networks. His 
sociopolitical analysis of power, based on the “mapping” of social relations, later became an 
important resource for the study of corporate elites (Schwartz, 1987). According to Domhoff 
(1967), this was the starting point for the systematic study of power by sociology. 
 
Hunter’s micro-level study focused on Atlanta, the capital of the state of Georgia, at a time 
when the city was beginning to grow steadily (1950-1951). He distinguished between two 
approaches to understanding power: on the one hand, a sociological approach where the 
fundamental assumption lies in the definition and institutional configuration, implying that 
power remains under a structure and its exercise is role-based, and, on the other hand, a political 
science approach under which power is understood through the way it is exercised, beyond 
institutional logics because, according to Hunter, these change over time. This approach is, 
therefore, assumed to be individual-based. 
 
Hunter took the first approach to studying community power in Atlanta society. Using a 
reputational method and snowball sampling, he constructed a sample of those individuals who 
occupied leadership positions in social organisations, business and universities as well as 
political positions and positions of influence and wealth. Then, with a list of these names, he 
asked people whom they identified as the most powerful, adding new names to the list 
depending on the points of view of interviewees. Since many of his interviewees had direct 
experience of power, Hunter acknowledged a certain bias in his research. 
 
Among his most important findings, Hunter identified who were really powerful and how their 
power resources operated. A majority of the most powerful individuals held positions of 
leadership in the financial sector (business, banks and financial companies), including 
particularly business owners (Hunter, 1953, p.12). In this context, he noted that the elite’s main 
interest was in maintaining and increasing its monetary wealth, accompanied by effective 
mechanisms for the protection of private property (Hunter, 1953, p.105). Both strategies 
became the motor of the city’s development. Moreover, Hunter established a distinction 
between men of independent decision or, in other words, an upper layer of leaders (who set 




“understructure of power” or those individuals who implemented the upper leaders’ decisions 
and who varied from issue to issue (Hunter, 1953, p.91). 
 
In one of his important conclusions, Hunter argued that the ruling elite exists within a power 
structure which determines a certain order of community life in the context of which the elites 
ignore the interests of other groups because their power means they have no incentive to take 
them into account. He maintained that local elites do not operate in a competitive context, 
marking a difference with Schumpeter’s thesis of democracy as the institutional arrangement 
necessary to guarantee electoral competition between power groups (Schumpeter, 1950). In 
addition, Hunter distanced himself from the pluralistic theses of Dahl (1961) and Truman 
(1951) who, albeit corresponding to different periods, both argued that a plurality of influence 
groups implies the existence of different levels at which power is shared as a resource. By 
contrast, Hunter argued that a plurality of groups does not mean widely shared power (Hunter, 
1953, p.90-91). 
 
The work of Hunter constituted a significant contribution to the study of elites in that he 
installed the idea of the existence of a power structure inserted in the community. His empirical 
study, based on the situation in a city, showed that, beyond the formal power structure, there 
were individuals and groups that concentrated real power. By mapping these relationships, 
Hunter demonstrated that hierarchies exist beyond the formal institutional framework and that 
they correspond to the underlying structure of community life. Based on this idea, Hunter 
questioned democratic theories and proposed moving towards a real democracy representative 
of citizens’ interests. This idea was taken up by later studies, including particularly the work of 
Schwartz, who applied this approach to US corporate elites (Schwartz, 1987). 
 
The work of Robert Dahl (Dahl, 1979; 1961) is also representative of this pluralist perspective. 
Dahl’s career focused mainly on areas related to political philosophy but his book, “Who 
Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City”, is an empirical case study that seeks 
to understand the functioning of the elite by examining political power and representation in 
the town of New Haven, Connecticut. Taking Hunter as a reference, Dahl sought to analyse the 
political elite through the relationships established by the different interest groups in this 
community, examining the social dynamics of the power structure with regard to the behaviour 






Dahl’s research provides empirical evidence for the pluralist perspective and, in this respect, is 
probably the single most important piece of work. He demonstrated the existence of diversified 
elite groups, which do not necessarily correspond to the same group or community and can be 
differentiated by interests. However, these groups do interact with each other, beyond 
competing to control power in their area of interest. In addition, they share spaces of 
socialisation, such as education, and there are schools and universities where the elite is formed 
and recognises itself. 
 
Dahl’s research was of transcendental importance for understanding the functioning of elites as 
multiple centres of power that operate through interconnected social networks, which determine 
the way they compete for access to power (Hunter, 1962). 
 
Although the centrist and pluralistic approaches are important in defining the field of study of 
political elites, there are also other approaches, which developed later and address other 
dimensions. They include two approaches that have been very important for the study of 
political elites in Latin America: one that has focused on their role in democratisation and 
development processes and one that has focused on the study of trajectories and the social 
resources of their members. 
 
 
iv.ii. Political elites and their role in democratisation processes and economic development 
 
The study of elites’ role and impact in the definition of political regimes, processes of 
democratisation and economic development has been characterised principally by its analysis 
of the functioning of political elites through party dynamics and their ideological projects as 
reflected in electoral competition and the implementation of their government agendas. 
 
One of the first key authors corresponding to this perspective was Schattschneider (1960). 
Although there are similarities between his research and Michels’ research, Schattschneider 
took American post-war society as his reference, both authors attribute significant importance 
to the relationship between political organisations and democratic regimes. Although carrying 
out his research several decades later, Schattschneider shared Michel’s democratic elitist 
perspective under which political parties are viewed as organisations that respond to the 
interests of a dominant elite. In a more recent study, Nardulli explains this perspective: “Rather 




dominance of elites in the management of party affairs. Thus, they conceive of parties as 
political tools elites use to achieve personal concerns and interests” (Nardulli, 2013, p.84). 
 
Schattschneider’s most important work is “The Semi-Sovereign People” (Schattschneider, 
1960) in which he attempted to explain the relationship between organisations, political power 
and conflict and their impact on the functioning of democratic regimes. Schattschneider based 
his analysis on the premise that, in societies, it is not possible to understand politics “unless we 
know what the struggle is about” (Schattschneider, 1975, p.v). In line with this premise, one of 
the key questions he asked was “what makes things happen in American politics?”, arguing 
that the probability of understanding their dynamics might increase “if we knew what is going 
on when things are happening” (Schattschneider, 1975, p.v). 
  
Based on this question, Schattschneider took a critical view of the American political theory of 
pluralism, whose best-known exponents are Dahl (1961), Lipset (1959) and Truman (1951). In 
general terms, this theory asserts that, in addition to the government, there is a wide range of 
interest groups that use their resources to influence political decisions. In this context, the 
central question is about how power is distributed within a process or political system. For 
Schattschneider, on the other hand, that question was already answered by observing the 
characteristics of the democratic system: “Democracy is a competitive political system in which 
competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that 
the public can participate in the decision-making process” (Schattschneider, 1960, p.141). 
However, operationally, democracy is subject to the power of a minority and marked by social 
differences between those who hold power and the rest of society: “The flaw in the pluralist 
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 
percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system” (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35). 
  
This idea is crucial for the argument that people are actually semi-sovereign because they 
exercise institutional power through the voting system, but are not able to surmount the barrier 
of social inequality with respect to those with a high economic income and a higher educational 
level or, in other words, the select group that, according to Schattschneider, holds the true 
power. In his view, the voting system serves a legitimising role, but does not represent the 
exercise of substantive political power, which is the prerogative of a minority. It is the latter 
that really exercises political power in all its fullness. 
 
Despite sharing a democratic elitist vision, Schattschneider and Michels differ on the existence 




makes the existence of democratic regimes inconceivable because, although conferring 
legitimacy, this principle is ultimately at odds with democracy itself due to its contribution in 
shaping the iron law discussed above. Schattschneider, on the other hand, argued that the 
existence of parties contributes to the maintenance of a semi-sovereign order under which 
citizens exercise a deliberative role protected by the role of these organisations: “Party 
government is good democratic doctrine because the parties are the special form of political 
organization adapted to the mobilization of majorities” (Schattschneider, 1960, p.208). 
 
However, Schattschneider argued that these semi-sovereign regimes are restricted by the 
opportunities citizens have to exercise their deliberative right and the matters on which they 
can do so: “In mass-democracy, the people are a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two 
words, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. This sovereign, moreover, can speak only when spoken to” 
(Schattschneider, 1960, p.52). This idea is related to the lack of incentives for citizens to be as 
well informed as their political authorities and the elite and the barriers (mainly educational and 
income-related) to being so. In his study of the United States, Schattschneider asserted that the 
greatest obstacle to the development of party governments is intellectual, not legal, and, insofar 
as this is understood by the authorities, new ways of defining the democratic regime can be 
promoted through the Constitution (Schattschneider, 1942, pp. 209-210).  
 
In addition to Schattschneider, there is the work of Domhoff (Domhoff, 1990). His theory, 
which is also similar to that of Michels, focuses on the role of organisations as key parts of the 
power structure. He took Mann’s research into the evolution of power structures in Western 
civilisation as a reference and, specifically, his idea that power structures are defined by the 
intertwining of organisations and their relative importance at any given time in four overlapping 
and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power (Mann, 1986). For Domhoff, these networks 
correspond to the ideological, economic, military and political spheres. Unlike Mills, Domhoff 
attached importance to the ideological factor as a relevant aspect of the generation of networks 
of power.      
 
Domhoff referred to this model of four intertwined networks as the IEMP model (ideological, 
economic, military, and political networks). In methodological terms, his research strategy 
meant that the study of power in societies was able to incorporate both the individual and 
organisational levels: “This strategy (the IEMP model) was music to the ears of those who 
analyse American power structures as networks of people and institutions” (Domhoff, 1990, 




networks are the most useful organisational bases for the generation of power (Domhoff, 1990; 
Mann, 1986).    
 
Rather like Hunter, Domhoff attempted to define and explain the structure of power in 
American society. In probably his most famous work, “Who rules America?” (Domhoff, 1967), 
he explored the functioning of local and national decision-making networks as a means of 
illustrating the power structure in the United States. Like Hunter, Domhoff argued that 
American power structures are dominated by an elite class which owns and manages large 
income-producing properties (that is, banks, business corporations): “Only the American upper 
class is made up exclusively of the descendants of successful businessmen and corporation 
lawyers. Whatever their pretensions, few families are ‘old’ enough or rich enough to forget this 
overriding fact” (Domhoff, 1967, p.12). Domhoff also asserted that this form of organisation 
includes succession mechanisms that enable the elite to maintain its privileged position. This 
form of domination, subject to continuity over time, is determined by the ongoing existence of 
the power structure through which it is possible to maintain an order that is functional to the 
elites.     
 
James Burnham is another relevant scholar that studied political elites under this perspective. 
Albeit a Trotskyist at the beginning of his career, Burnham moved to the liberal right after 
actively participating in World War II and later the Cold War. In his best-known work, “The 
Managerial Revolution” (Burnham, 1945), he argued that a new political class - the managers 
- was emerging and transcending the capitalist class as the guiding force in productive and 
distributive processes and in the arena of national and international political decisions. 
Burnham was writing in the context of an evolutive historical process which he believed had 
begun with World War I in 1914 and would last almost a century. 
 
This new stage would, according to Burnham, be marked by a transition from a capitalist system 
to a managerial one, a process qualitatively comparable to the transition from the feudal to the 
capitalist way of production. Although this latter transition took almost 300 years between the 
fourteenth and eighteenth centuries (Sweezy & Dobb, 1950), Burnham argued that the new 
transition would be quicker because of the level of specialisation achieved by labour and 
economic activity, which had brought with it new forms of organisation of work that, according 
to Burnham, had a significant effect on organisation of the state and the functioning of the 
government regime since, in this new scenario, the state would become the main owner of the 





In this context, Burnham argued that a managerial revolution would consolidate the position of 
managers not only as a new political class, but also as the new ruling elite. Although central 
planning models have historically not been successful, Burnham was right about the 
consolidation of managers as an important part of the ruling elites, due to the complexity and 
scale of production processes in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Most of Burnham’s 
ideas were adopted by some theorists of the managerial state (Francis, 1984; Gottfried, 1984). 
 
Studies of elites’ role and influence in the definition of political regimes and development 
strategies had a significant impact on research into democratisation processes in Latin America, 
as will be shown later in section vi. However, in recent times, the approach that has acquired 
importance for applied research into political elites is the study of their social resources, the 
political and professional careers of their members and the way in which their mechanisms of 
social differentiation operate.  
 
 
iv.iii. Political elites and their mechanisms of social differentiation 
 
One of the first authors to establish the notion that elites use specific mechanisms to achieve 
social differentiation was Dahrendorf (1959). His sociological analytical approach is based on 
a critique of Parsons’s structural functionalism theory and Marx’s theory of conflict and 
development. Dahrendorf put forward a theory of conflict that would account for social 
differentiation and is the basis of his conception of power elites. 
 
His theory is based on the limitations of structural functionalism and Marxism, both of which 
he viewed as having weaknesses that prevented them from providing an acceptable perspective 
on advanced society: “He claims that structural functionalists neglect realities of social conflict 
and that Marx defined class too narrowly and in a historically-specific context. Furthermore, 
that traditional Marxism ignores consensus and integration in modern social structures” 
(Tittenbrun, 2013, p.118). Dahrendorf argued that, in Parsons’s functional structuralism, there 
is a limited notion of “social change” due to the theoretical-analytical specification implicit in 
the conception of structure and system. In other words, Dahrendorf considered that this 
analytical framework simplifies reality and does not necessarily capture social phenomena, 
particularly at the level of social conflict. 
 
The notion of social conflict is a key element in the sociology of Dahrendorf. Through it, he 




and their efforts to achieve integration into the social structure. The underlying idea behind this 
argument is that conflicts materialise a relationship of opposition between those who defend 
the interests established in the social structure and those who wish to change them. Conflict is 
the motor of history because it is through conflict that the social structure is transformed. For 
Dahrendorf, the relationship between those who dominate and the dominated presupposes the 
existence of multiple groups that dispute their interests in society. In this sense, he distanced 
himself from Marx by arguing that the concept of class needed to be updated because the 
evolution of capitalism to a new post-capitalist phase had brought with it a diversification of 
the social structure and interest groups. He nonetheless maintained that a governing class and 
a governed class exist, but that this was determined by a diversified social structure under which 
some classes exercise power and others do not, and it is these classes that can operate as blocks. 
 
Another relevant scholar as regards this perspective is Putnam (1976), who made an important 
empirical contribution to the study of elites. His work analyses society in terms of social trust 
and the use of social capital. However, in contrast to Bourdieu, Putnam’s concept of social 
capital has three components: moral obligations and norms, social values and social networks. 
In the case of political elites, Putnam argued that, although they tend to position themselves at 
the summit of the social structure, their definition and analysis are complex because of the way 
in which their members use their capital and social networks. He, therefore, proposed three 
strategies through which to identify the political elite: positional analysis (the positions held by 
individuals), reputational analysis (based on prestige) and decisional analysis (decision-making 
processes). 
 
Reputational and decisional analysis are more complex than positional analysis due to 
difficulties in accessing the information and its analytical interpretation. Reputation is a matter 
of perceptions that are not necessarily explicit while, in the case of decisional analysis, the 
disaggregation and monitoring of decision-making processes can be very complex, particularly 
at the state level, due to their scale and the number of actors involved. Indeed, one of the most 
important studies that can be considered to apply this strategy, Dahl (1961), only considered 
the case of one relatively small municipal district (New Haven). 
 
Another important contribution by Putnam to the study of elites was his much later work with 
Aberbach and Rockman, which used a sample of some 700 government officials and 600 
politicians from seven countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, 
Italy and the Netherlands) for comparative analysis of their behaviour (objectives, attitudes and 




(Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981). This study made a significant contribution to 
understanding the decision-making of individuals in senior positions in a political system. A 
similar approach was subsequently used to study public policy processes (Domhoff & Dye, 
1987; Dye, 2001; Gilens & Page, 2014; Gonzalez, 1998). 
 
This idea of differentiation is fundamental for subsequent research into political elites which 
focused on the definition of certain social resources, referred to as capital, and analysis of their 
use as a means of forming select groups and maintaining them over time. In addition to Putnam 
himself, research by authors such as Bourdieu and Coleman laid the foundations for studying 
social capital as an analytical category to identify a type of intangible resource (additional to 
economic resources) with positive effects (acceptance) or negative effects (rejection) on certain 
forms of social integration in specific groups (Portes, 1998). 
 
 
v. The study of political elites through their species of capital. Identifying the theoretical 
contribution of this study 
 
Elite power can be defined according to either the type or level of control that these select 
groups have over others. This control is usually exercised in the interests of the elite itself or at 
least consistently with its preferences and actions (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 43-44). An elite is not 
the same as the upper class, which is formed by social groups and communities with shared 
links based on heritage and social ties, whereas a power elite is, in addition, characterised by 
institutional and organisational arrangements that allow it to acquire, maintain and protect 
different forms of power and control (Domhoff, 2006). 
 
As C. Wright Mills argued, “Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the 
arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their 
times. Events that are beyond human decision do happen; social arrangements do change 
without benefit of explicit decision. But in so far as such decisions are made, the problem of 
who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power…” (Mills, 1958, p. 29). This 
definition is closely linked with political elites since they manage and organise government and 
all the manifestations of political power (Higley, 2008). The power resources of political elites 
may be multiple and include “property, income, decision control, knowledge, expertise, 
position, rank, as well as social and ideological resources such as status, prestige, influence, 
respect, and similar resources attributed to them by other elites, institutions, groups, or other 





In modern societies, one of the main stabilisers and facilitators of static social domination is 
the constant access of elites to the higher and technical education that equips them to take 
advantage of opportunities for economic development (Navlakha, 1989). As most elites are 
composed of individuals with a wide range of social resources, there are certain requirements 
for becoming part of an elite. Social resources include certain forms of social capital and social 
connections with one or more of the elite’s members (Granovetter, 1973) as well as mechanisms 
of social differentiation that determine the elite’s specificity (Bottomore, 2006; Domhoff, 2012; 
1990; 1967; Mills, 1956; Stanworth & Giddens, 1974). 
 
The interest of this work lies precisely in its bid to analyse the effect of certain social resources 
(defined as species of capital) on access to key positions in the legislature and the executive. 
Although social capital has been studied from numerous perspectives, three authors have made 
the greatest contribution to the definition and operationalisation of this concept as a category 
of analysis for studying social phenomena: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert 
Putnam. This section examines these three approaches as background to the theoretical-
empirical contribution of this thesis and its analytical approach. 
 
Bourdieu’s sociological theory has had an important influence on empirical studies of 
governmental elites (Joignant, 2009). His concept of species of capital (Bourdieu & Thompson, 
1991; Bourdieu, 1989; 1986; 1984) is related to the different positions that a particular agent 
may occupy in the setting where agents interact and define their social positions. According to 
Bourdieu, capital, in its objectified or embodied forms, can be classified into three types or 
species: economic, cultural and social (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247).  
 
The different species of capital are resources that form part of the individual’s habitus and 
determine that individual’s behaviour in a practical sense, at both the reflexive and non-
reflexive levels (Aldridge, 1998; Aguilar, 2017). This is a central part of Bourdieu’s theory of 
action since analysis of the species of capital is an important input for the correct interpretation 
of the significance of social practices (Bourdieu, 1990). These forms of capital are often used 
by the actors in order to maintain certain positions of privilege within society. This is also 
related to the logic of reproduction of power in a society since, for Bourdieu, power is a cultural 
and symbolically-created phenomenon, subject to a process of constant legitimisation through 
an interplay of agency and structure. In line with this, the principal assumption of the research 
presented here is that the species of capital constitute a form of power whose possession has 





In addition to the work of Bourdieu, there are other approaches that are relevant for the analysis 
of social capital as applied to the study of political elites. James Coleman developed a relational 
approach in which social capital is defined by its function and exists within the structure of 
relations between and among the actors (Coleman, 1988, p.98). In this case, social capital 
constitutes a strategic resource that gives rise to social action and makes it possible to answer 
the sociological question of agency, structure or both. Coleman views social capital as a 
resource that resides in the ties between individuals and is, therefore, not privately held 
(Coleman, 1990; 1988).  
 
According to this author, social capital is a mechanism that serves to link the capacity of 
individuals to act and decide independently and freely (agency) with the relatively stable 
criteria that influence or limit the available choices and opportunities (structure): “Social 
capital is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and then facilitate certain actions of actors 
-whether persons or corporate actors-  within the structure” (Coleman, 1988, p. 98). For 
Coleman, the family is the natural place where social capital is produced since it is here that 
children receive their primary socialisation and the structure of their relations is determined, 
particularly by the parental relationship (Thapar-Bjorkert & Sanghera, 2010).  
 
Another important contribution was made by Putnam’s work focusing on the analysis of social 
capital in terms of volunteering, cooperation and civil action in society. He argues that, in 
communities with a higher level of social capital, collaboration also tends to be greater due to 
the norms of reciprocity of the social networks to which these individuals belong. These norms, 
the networks and trust serve as mechanisms that facilitate the coordination of social action and, 
therefore, favour social prosperity (Putnam, 1993). Like Coleman, Putnam takes the view that 
social capital resides in the social ties of individuals within a community of relations.   
 
In this context, Putnam analysed how social capital generates collective goods through the 
formation of power networks (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005; Putnam, 1977; 1976). Putnam was 
one of the first scholars to analyse the relationship among elites and technocracy. Working on 
lines similar to Hughes (1993), he studied the transformation of elites in the wake of the 
Industrial Revolution and how technocracy became a significant resource for them. However, 
Putnam did not go so far as to argue that technocracy permitted the advent of a new elite of 





Putnam (1977; 1976) also proposed three strategies for defining and analysing elites. The first 
uses positional analysis, defining elites in terms of the position they occupy according to their 
institutional affiliation. In the second strategy, this approach is combined with reputational 
analysis, which relies on informal perceptions about reputation and power, while the third 
strategy corresponds to decisional analysis and focuses on the decision-making process as seen 
in specific case studies. Although the research presented here does not use this methodology, it 
is comparable to some aspects of the positional approach in that its methodological strategy 
seeks to measure the effect of species of capital on certain positions of power. 
 
In the work of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam on the use and significance of social capital, it 
is possible to observe an important difference in use of this concept as a category of analysis. 
For Bourdieu, social capital is related to an individual’s habitus and its operationalisation 
depends on its recognition by other individuals. Coleman and Putnam, on the other hand, see 
social capital as a strategic resource that can be operationalised using networks and power 
structures that allow individuals to position themselves in a certain way. This approach assumes 
a strategic rationale associated with the actors’ use of this intangible resource.  
 
The different forms of convertibility of the different species of capital are central to Bourdieu’s 
approach. He argues that recognition of species of capital can guarantee the access through 
which individuals are able to acquire new forms of capital or, in Bourdieu’s words, convert one 
type of capital into another. For example, in the case of the formation of political elites, certain 
subjects can access these select groups thanks to education, which is strictly a cultural species 
of capital, but, when recognised by members of the political elite, permits the individual’s 
incorporation into it, thereby converting cultural capital into political capital. This recognition 
of practical dispositions, expressed through certain species of capital, permits distinction, the 
transformation of social spaces and the symbolic reproduction of power (Bourdieu, 1990; 1989; 
1986). 
 
One of the fundamental criticisms and/or limitations of Bourdieu’s theory lies precisely in this 
idea of the convertibility of species of capital. Some authors argue that this idea of convertibility 
and/or transformation of species of capital is theoretically diffuse and not very concrete 
(Tittenbrun, 2018). In addition, some have argued that this Bourdieusian notion of capital 
convertibility implies a deterministic approach to individuals’ social practices as regards the 





Coleman’s approach, on the other hand, has limitations in the opposite direction to those of 
Bourdieu’s approach since his definition of social capital reflects a logic based on rational use 
of this resource with regard to an established structure of relations in which individuals position 
themselves according to their social resources. This is also reflected in the interpretative sense 
that Putnam observes as regards individuals’ possibility of undertaking actions of a cooperative 
nature. Here, the problem or limitation lies in the notion of networks since the uses of social 
capital cannot necessarily be explained using the notion of reciprocity or in terms of a rationale 
of joint action by the subjects (Ponthieux, 2004). 
 
In sociological terms, each of these approaches to social capital has limitations and advantages 
for the study of political elites. Bourdieu’s notion of species of capital is useful for observing 
and analysing individuals’ practices and the recognition of these forms of capital. This approach 
is also useful for the study of complex phenomena where there are not necessarily power 
structures or networks or they are difficult to detect. In this context, an important weakness of 
the approach, which this thesis attempts to address, has to do with empirical measurement 
(beyond conceptual examination) of the relationship between species of capital and access to 
important positions in the political field. 
 
The approach of Coleman and Putnam, in turn, is useful for analysing elites according to how 
they define and operationalise their power networks. This implies a complex methodological 
exercise since knowledge of the meanings associated with the relationships established by 
individuals is required in order to reach this level of definition. In this context, this approach is 
useful for studying organisations whose relationships are previously defined (power structure). 
 
This thesis, therefore, takes the work of Bourdieu as a reference in attempting to explain how 
the different species of capital are instrumental in accessing important positions in the political 
field. Rather than merely considering power networks, it focuses on an empirical application to 
study the effect of multiple species of capital on the formation of the Chilean political elite, 
comparing their effect on access to key positions in the legislature and the executive.  
 
The use of species of capital (social, cultural and economic) in the formation of political elites 
assumes three possible situations (Boix & Posner, 1998). The first corresponds to the 
spontaneous emergence of stable cooperation between individuals, constituting the most basic 
manifestation of use of this resource. Individuals recognise each other and operate based on 
this common social resource. The second situation occurs when there is collaborative 




mechanisms of rational cooperative action in order to obtain benefits at the individual and/or 
collective levels or, in other words, to maximise well-being through cooperative action. Finally, 
the third situation implies a more complex logic of action since it occurs when the ability and/or 
capacity to exert influence over other individuals are used in interactions of this type. In other 
words, these are situations in which people are able to create and bring into play networks of 
cooperation, whether with strong or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) in pursuit of both individual 
and aggregate interests. 
 
The assumption behind this research is based on the first case. It is assumed that recognition of 
certain species of capital guarantees access to important positions in the political field when 
these forms of capital are shared by individuals who have the same social position and, 
therefore, affinities in a practical sense (for example, activities, education, lifestyles, etc.). This 
idea enshrines a fundamental analytical principle as regards the creation and reproduction of 
political elites. 
 
This is particularly relevant in the case of the Chilean political elite. Chile is a very socially 
unequal country. Although the Chilean model has been one of the most successful in Latin 
America in terms of economic growth and the reduction of poverty, income inequality has 
remained high (UNDP, 2010). Chile is, indeed, one of the OECD member states with the 
highest levels of economic inequality. Social inequality implies a dissimilar use of many forms 
of capital, including social capital, a resource that is expressed in socio-collaborative 
interactions and the use individuals make of the resources involved in interactions of this type, 
basically in the form of affections, trust, formal and informal norms and the creation of social 
networks of influence. These resources determine not only individuals’ behaviour, but also the 
objectives they pursue when they take individual and collective decisions (Coleman, 1973). 
 
Although this research is based on data from a census of the political elite, its objective is to 
observe whether there are species of capital that are significant for access to key positions in 
the political field. This implies recognition of certain forms of capital that allow the political 
elite to reproduce itself over time. Comparative empirical measurement of resources of this 
type represents a theoretical and empirical challenge for studying how the political elite has 
endured over time, based on the evidence of the members of the executive and the legislature 
between 1990 and 2010. This is the fundamental assumption which determined the definition 






vi. Study of political elites in Latin America and Chile 
 
The study of the social origins, education and career patterns of political elites is part of the 
classical tradition of political sociology (Burch & Moran, 1985, p. 1). However, beyond the 
significant influence that classical theories have had on the definition and development of 
research into political elites, the literature about them in Latin America has generally focused 
on socio-historical and qualitative analysis of their evolution since the region’s processes of 
colonisation and independence. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant 
increase in quantitative and mixed research in line with the evolution and potential of these 
techniques for studying social phenomena (González-Bustamante, 2013).  
 
In Latin America, one of the first scholars to study the performance of elites and their political 
influence was Lipset (Lipset & Solari, 1967; Lipset, 1959). Lipset’s research focused on the 
role of the elites in democratisation processes and economic development. However, his work 
with Solari, for which he is perhaps best known, includes numerous studies of the region’s 
elites from different perspectives: their role as regards the performance of the economy and 
business, with respect to the sociopolitical, cultural, religious and military spheres and with 
respect to their secondary and higher education (Lipset & Solari, 1967). This work is a key 
reference point for subsequent lines of research into Latin American elites. Currently, the 
literature on political elites in Latin America in general can be classified into three approaches 




















Table 2. Research on political elites in Latin America and Chile 
 
Latin America Chile 
• Role in democratisation processes 
and economic development 
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; 
Mainwaring et al., 2001; Higley & 
Gunther, 1992; Higley & Burton, 
1989) 
 
• Political perceptions (Alcántara & 
Rivas, 2007) 
 
• Family, educational and professional 
background (Camp, 2013, 2006, 
2002, 1982) 
• Role in democratisation processes 
and economic development 
(Siavelis, 2009; Menéndez-Carrión, 
Joignant, & Garretón, 1999; Godoy, 
1999; Garretón, 1999; Moulian, 
Limitaciones de la transición a la 
democracia en Chile, 1994) 
 
• Focus on biographies, socialisation, 
political competition and electoral 
growth (Espinoza, 2010; Filippi, 
2006; Cordero, 2006; Barozet & 
Aubry, 2005; Joignant & Navia, 
2003; Gazmuri, 2000; de Ramón, 
1999) 
 
• Focus on technocracy and 
reproduction of power (Delamaza, 
2013; Joignant, 2011; Dávila, 2011; 
Siavelis, 2009; Silva, 2009, 2007, 
1994, 1991; Montecinos, 1998; 
Markoff & Montecinos, 1993) 
 
• Recent studies on the origin, 
evolution and/or professional career 
of members of the elite (González-
Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 
2018; González-Bustamante & 




Source: Compiled by author.  
 
The first of the approaches seen in work on Latin America focuses on the role played by elites 
in post-authoritarian democratisation processes and economic development. As from the 
beginning of the 1990s, a number of scholars studied the links between, on the one hand, elites 
and, on the other, political regimes and political stability. This approach has been useful for 
studying political transitions, particularly in East European and Latin American countries. 
According to this theoretical perspective, the basic condition for a solid and stable regime is 
the “unity” of the different elites, which must be expressed mandatorily at the institutional level. 
In other words, for democratic consolidation, it is necessary to achieve  the “consensual unity” 
of the elites, understood as agreement of all the country’s politically important elites on the 




accompanied by increased “structural integration” among those elites (Higley & Gunther, 1992; 
Vanden & Prevost, 2002). 
 
In this approach, the concept of national elite is used to explain variations in the political 
stability of democratic regimes and has been critical in the discussion about democratic 
consolidation in Southern Cone countries (Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; 
Higley, Pakulski, Pohu, & Dobry, 2000; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; O´Donnell 
& Schmitter, 2013). These studies have produced significant evidence for viewing political 
elites as a critical aspect of the analysis of democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns 
as temporary fluctuations in the forms that unstable regimes take. In this approach, the 
consensual unity of elites is considered a sine qua non if democracies are to endure (Cheibub, 
Pzeworski, Limongi Neto, & Alvarez, 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; 
O´Donnell & Schmitter, 2013) and a critical variable for explaining both political transitions 
and democratic consolidation (Higley & Burton, 1989). 
 
Over time, this line of research has resulted in numerous applied and comparative studies of 
the role of elites in the democratisation and economic development of different countries. Much 
of this work has focused on the strategies implemented by elites in the restoration of democracy, 
the country’s economic stabilisation and the definition and adoption of development strategies. 
Each process had its own specific characteristics, reflecting the decisions of a country’s elites 
in line with its sociopolitical situation (Higley & Burton, 1989).  
 
This line of work has also been complemented by studies analysing the transfer and acquisition 
of expertise within the elites, based on the influence exercised over Latin American countries 
by the world’s major powers. In work along these lines, Dézalay and Garth concluded that the 
export of expertise and ideals from the United States to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico 
has played a crucial role in transforming their states and economies since World War II 
(Dézalay & Garth, 2002). In the political transitions of the 1980s, for example, the Washington 
Consensus had a significant impact on the economic development strategies adopted by most 
Latin American countries. This line of work is also related to research that has analysed the 
ascendancy of technocracy and the imposition of neoliberal economic policies in Latin America 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Centeno & Silva, 1998). This work has, in addition, examined the 
influence of certain professions (notably economists) on the expansion of the technocratic 






The second approach focuses on elites’ political perceptions and behaviour as regards political 
cleavages (Alcántara & Rivas, 2007). This research has looked at why these cleavages exist 
and analysed recent transformations of Latin American party systems, highlighting new critical 
junctures “that are likely to have a lasting impact on party competition and on individual 
political behavior” (Bornschier, 2009, p.1). Generally, the term cleavage is used to refer to 
divisions that occur because of the structure of the social system. These divisions lead to 
conflicts which, in turn, produce cleavages that can affect politics in both its practical and 
operational dimensions (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Numerous empirical studies have shown how 
the configuration of party systems is related to a society’s structure of cleavages (Dix, 1989; 
Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Moreno, 1999; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 
2002). More sociological studies have also sought to explore the ideological preferences of 
cleavages with respect to matters of political interest (Alcántara & Rivas, 2007, p. 350).  
 
Finally, the third approach analyses Latin American elites in terms of their family, educational 
and professional background. It is characterised by its use of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies and ranges from socio-historical studies of the elites and their performance to 
empirical measurement of the effects of certain variables related to family, education and 
professional history on access to and permanence in positions of power (González-Bustamante, 
2016).  
 
The most important contributions of the socio-historical approach include the work of Camp 
on Mexico. In particular, his work on the biographies of Mexican politicians (Camp, 2013; 
1982) provides an important insight into their personal histories as well as their political and 
professional careers. He also went on to analyse Mexican mandarins in terms of their mentoring 
processes and networking (Camp, 2002). Camp’s work clearly demonstrates the existence of 
select private preparatory schools and graduate educational centres and universities for 
influential members of the Mexican elite. It also provides evidence that the social composition 
of students at private universities differs greatly from that at state universities.      
 
Years later, Camp empirically analysed leadership preparation and attributes as well as 
mechanisms for influencing succession in Mexico’s elites (Camp, 2006). Other studies, using 
a similar methodology, have also examined the biographies of Latin American politicians. In 
the Chilean case, de Ramón has studied the biographies of Chilean politicians from 1876 to 






vii. Political elite research in Chile 
 
As shown in Table 3, it is possible to identify four lines of research on Chile’s political elites. 
One of these focuses on the role they played in democratisation and economic development; 
another on their biographies, socialisation processes and electoral competition; another on 
technocracy and the role of the members of the elite in the country’s development; and the 
fourth, and most recent, on their origin, evolution and/or professional career.     
 
The first approach looks at the role elites have played in processes of transition, democratic 
consolidation and economic development. Numerous studies have examined negotiation 
strategies and the impact of the new institutional order created by the political elite (Garretón, 
1999; Godoy, 1999; Menéndez-Carrión, Joignant, & Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009). However, 
as regards the elites’ role in these processes, it is the work of Moulian (1994) that stands out. It 
shows how the logic of agreements within the elite opened the way to an institutional order that 
gave continuity to a series of reforms and transformations introduced by the Pinochet 
dictatorship. Similarly, Garretón (1995) analysed the way in which the political elites devised 
strategies for reaching consensus on the maintenance of the authoritarian enclaves that affected 
the process of re-establishing democracy. This line of work helped to understand not only 
Chile’s transition to democracy but also the prevalence of asymmetries of power in its post-
dictatorship social order.  
 
The work of Ffrench-Davis, although not focusing on the elites as such, is also among the most 
important for understanding Chile’s economic development strategy after the breakdown of 
democracy in 1973 and through to 2017 (Ffrench-Davis, 2017). This is the continuation of 
earlier work by the same author analysing the relationship between growth and equity with 
reference to Chile’s economic development strategy (Ffrench-Davis, 1999). More recently, 
Solimano (2012) has studied Chile’s political economy since the political transition, examining 
the attempt to build a market society in a highly inegalitarian society. His research provides 
historical background to the Chilean economy and society and discusses the cultural effects of 
the imposition of free markets, the country’s macroeconomic and growth performance in the 
1990s and 2000s and the social record of the privatisation of education, health and social 
security. It shows how these new policies fostered a growing concentration of economic power 
in small groups of elites after the end of the Pinochet regime. 
 
A second line of research has focused on biographies, socialisation, political competition and 
electoral growth (Barozet & Aubry, 2005; Cordero, 2006; de Ramón, 1999; Espinoza, 2010; 




case of the National Renewal (RN) party as an example of how a party’s institutional structure 
affects its electoral performance. Among other important findings, they concluded that, despite 
its low level of institutionalisation, the RN has shown great capacity to survive in the post-
dictatorship democratic system, withstanding the efforts of the Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI), the other main right-wing party, to establish hegemony.  
 
Other important work within this line of research has examined the profiles of party members 
as compared to their electoral performance. Joignant and Navia (2003), for example, analysed 
the UDI from three standpoints: socialisation, political skills and electoral growth. Among other 
results, they concluded that, as a party, the UDI is rooted in a strong conservative structure of 
values inspired by the authoritarianism of Pinochet and related to the Catholic Church 
(principally Opus Dei). They also showed that it owes its political success not only to its 
territorial strategies but also to its logic of growth, electoral consolidation and the homogeneity 
of its representatives in Congress where this elite’s reproduction strategies play a vital role.    
 
This line of research can also be said to include work of a socio-historical nature that focuses 
primarily on the personal biographies of the members of the political elite. This research stands 
out for the detail of the information it provides about the individuals studied. De Ramón (1999, 
1999b, 1999c and 1999d) analysed the biographies of the members of the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches in relation to the evolution of the Chilean state between 1876 and 1973. 
Similarly, Filippi (2006) analysed the biographies of the members of the country’s political 
elite, including a broad range of positions in these three branches as well as comptrollers 
general, governors of the Central Bank, Army commanders, heads of the National Plainclothes 
Police Service, mayors and former presidents during the period between the second government 
of Arturo Alessandri Palma (1932-1938) and that of Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006).  
 
In addition, Gazmuri (2001) identified certain patterns that are essential in defining the origin 
and evolution of the Chilean elites between 1930 and 1999. His research examined their 
educational and professional careers, rather than family resources, and found that, throughout 
most of Chile’s republican history, the elites and, in particular, what Gazmuri terms “the elites 
with a vocation for public service” (Gazmuri 2001: 105) were a product of the University of 
Chile. This, however, changed as from the 1930s when other institutions such as the Catholic 
University began to share this role.  
 
Some work on the evolution of “political cleavages” in Chile can also be included in this line 




political legacies on Chile’s party system between 1973 and 1995. In contrast to society-
oriented approaches to the formation of party systems (Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 1985), they 
assert that the appearance of cleavages in a party system depends on political agency, which 
can even create or recreate social identities and social conflicts. They used the Chilean case to 
illustrate this point because the structure of its party system is deeply influenced by distinctive 
political legacies from the authoritarian period. Other similar studies also provide evidence of 
the existence of cleavages in Chile and other Latin American countries (Roberts & Wibbels, 
1999; Scully, 1992). 
 
In the case of the impact of social resources on the formation of party elites, Cordero (2006) 
analysed in detail the social background of the members of the Chamber of Deputies between 
1961 and 2010. He found, firstly, that most incumbent members of Congress had evolved 
satisfactorily in terms of their educational careers and, secondly, that common patterns of 
socialisation seen during these careers, together with the prolongation of their period as 
incumbents, permitted the consolidation of a parliamentary elite. Taking an approach different 
to that of Cordero, Espinoza (2010) examined the underlying dynamics of the social base of the 
power of the Chilean political elite, looking at the networks of members of Congress between 
1990 and 2005. He argues that a similar social background, combined with common social 
spaces of interaction, reduced ideological differences within the elite and had an impact on the 
stability of the political system.  
 
A third line of research has focused on technocracy and the reproduction of power (Dávila, 
2011; Delamaza, 2013; Joignant, 2011; Siavelis, 2009; Silva, 2008, 2006 and 1991). Delamaza 
(2013 and 2011) argued that, in recent decades, the social reproduction of the political elite has 
been determined by both democratic elitism and techno-politics. While the first of these 
concepts refers to agreements, pacts and elite decisions that restrict the access of non-members 
of the elite to positions of power (Avritzer, 2002), the latter refers to how technocracy has 
become an important resource for accessing the political elite and remaining there. As a 
concept, technocracy has to do with “the political situation in which effective power belongs to 
technologists termed technocrats” (Meynaud quoted by Silva, 2009, p.4). The study of 
technocracy has proved important for understanding the impact that the positivist idea has had 
on government behaviour (Centeno, 1993; Centeno & Silva, 1998; Silva, 2009). Although the 
role of technocrats in Chilean politics has been studied extensively (Dávila, 2011; 2010; 
Markoff & Montecinos, 1993; Montecinos, 1998), it is the work of Silva (Silva, 2009; 2007; 





His book, “In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile” (Silva, 2009), which 
examines the impact of technocracy on successive governments in the twentieth century, 
starting with the first government of President Carlos Ibáñez (1927-31), is the most important 
study on this subject. Silva shows that, contrary to the common belief based on the prominent 
role of the so-called Chicago Boys during the Pinochet dictatorship, technocrats have existed 
throughout Chile’s recent history, including its democratic regimes. He notes, for example, that 
President Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-64) used the slogan “government of managers” to 
signify administration of the state by highly qualified people. He installed a technical team of 
lawyers, engineers and doctors and the principal aim of his government was to bring about a 
transformation of the economy, reducing the role of the state and giving the private sector 
greater autonomy.   
 
Silva also shows how the influence of the positivist paradigm began to expand in Chilean 
intellectual circles at the end of the nineteenth century, even before the start of industrialisation. 
As from the first Ibáñez government onwards, technocrats held important positions in the 
design and implementation of development strategies and the management of public affairs. In 
addition, Silva shows that, during this period, the technocratic ideology was compatible with 
the interests and demands of the middle classes, particularly those espousing the values of 
personal merit and educational achievement as against privilege rooted in social background. 
Another factor highlighted by Silva is the positive role played by experts in generating 
agreements and consensus and setting reasonable limits to political discussion, which was 
certainly beneficial for the functioning of democracy in Chile, both before and after the military 
dictatorship.  
 
Some recent studies have gone on to define the concept of technopols as individuals who 
operate transversally across the political system with two types of resources: skills certified by 
leading international universities and political capital in the form of ties, recognition and 
capacity to operate within the system (Domínguez, 1997; Joignant, 2011). While technocracy 
as a concept refers to those members of the political elite with high-level academic 
qualifications in economics and technical expertise, the concept of technopols corresponds to 
certain members of the elite who, as well as academic qualifications and technical expertise, 
have political connections: “Successful technopols have made economics ‘political’ and, in so 
doing, have created their own power and have enabled their political allies to govern more 





In the Chilean case, Silva argues that, in addition to the decisive role played by both technocrats 
and technopols during the political transition and the subsequent democratisation process, the 
technocratic elite critical of the dictatorship played a key role in opposition to it through, for 
example, think-tanks and foundations. This gave it, and has continued to give it, a measure of 
influence over public life (Silva, 1991). 
 
Dézalay and Garth (2002) analysed the underlying patterns of networks of power, profiles and 
the reconstruction of ties within Latin American elites during political transitions and 
subsequent democratisation processes. They drew attention to the important influence of 
hegemonic countries as seen, for example, in that exercised by the University of Chicago in the 
training of the government elites of Chile and Argentina. This evidence is also backed by the 
thesis of Silva about the important role played by a growing technocratic elite in Chile as from 
the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
Finally, a fourth and more recent approach uses applied methodologies to analyse the profile, 
origin and evolution of the careers of members of the elite within the political system 
(González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; González-
Bustamante & Olivares, 2016; Joignant, 2014; 2011). Unlike earlier approaches, this line of 
research is characterised by its use of applied methodological designs to measure quantitative 
empirical relations between variables related to the careers of members of the Chilean political 
elite. This work seeks to define careers and profiles in terms of the types of capital possessed 
by the agents, considering either their static dimension - that is, the individual’s personal 
qualities and psychological characteristics - or the dynamic dimension related to continuous 
training and the agent’s own career path or cursus honorum (Alcántara, 2013; González-
Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018, p.32). This thesis forms part of this line of research.  
 
González-Bustamante (2013) analysed the factors affecting access to the government elite in 
Chile between 1990 and 2010 and the ability to remain part of it. In one of the most important 
conclusions of his work, he notes that, although a strong technical profile can facilitate access 
to senior positions in the elite, political capital and prior participation in a think-tank can be 
decisive in ensuring permanence there. In addition, he shows that, while academic and 
professional credentials can be important for appointment to senior positions, it is political 
capital, expressed as access to leading positions in the parties of the coalitions, which permits 






Recent work on elites and, particularly, that based on this approach has focused on the 
definition of profiles and the analysis of the careers of members of governmental and ministerial 
elites (González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016) as well as on 
family relations and capital (González-Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014). González-
Bustamante and Garrido-Vergara (2018) analysed the prior and subsequent careers of Chilean 
government ministers between 1990 and 2010, identifying not only common patterns of 




viii. Political elites, social capital and species of capital in Chile 
 
Political elites are built and reproduce themselves through the strategic use of social resources. 
Among these resources, social capital is a key variable for explaining the appearance and 
evolution of sociopolitical actors. There is extensive literature on the concept of social capital 
but, in the case of Chile, this research focuses on the Bourdieusian concept of species of capital 
and also considers the research of Boix and Posner (1998 and 1996), which identifies three 
possible explanations for the origin and use of social capital.    
 
The first and most commonly cited explanation arises from experimental research showing how 
stable cooperation can emerge among actors if they value future payoffs and expect to interact 
again over time. A second explanation distinguishes between collaborative interactions to 
produce public or private goods while the third emphasises the ability of a third-party enforcer 
to compel mistrustful people, “even through the threat of force or the creation of cooperation-
facilitating institutions, to overcome the collective action dilemmas that beset them” (Boix & 
Posner, 1998, p.687). However, even when social capital has a concrete expression in the 
functionality represented by its use, different types of capital exist depending on the type of 
relationship and the resources that individuals invest.   
 
In this thesis, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied 
sociologically to the field of elites. It thesis focuses on the political field and attempts to define 
different social resources and, therefore, types of agent, based on the theoretical species of 
capital and hypothetical types of political agent proposed by Joignant (2012) for the Chilean 







Table 3. Theoretical species of capital and hypothetical types of political agent 
 
Species of capital Type of agent 
Familial   Heir 
University   Student leader 
Political Subspecies: militant Party man 
Political Subspecies: oligarchical Professional politician 
Technocrat Subspecies: pragmatic Pragmatic technocrat 
Technocrat Subspecies: political Political technocrat 
Technopolitical   Technopol 
Notoriety   Celebrity 
Charismatic   Charismatic leader 
 
Source: Joignant, 2012, p.610. 
 
However, these categories are simply a reference framework since the research objective is to 
determine which of these categories effectively operate as differentiators within the Chilean 
political elite. In other words, the aim is to examine the effect of species of capital on the access 
of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative 
(deputies) and executive (ministers) branches. Despite the extensive literature on the concepts 
of social, cultural and economic capital, there is a lack of comparative empirical research into 
the effects that these three forms of capital can have on both the formation of elites and their 
functioning, which is precisely the focus of this research.  
 
Additionally, this study considers Cordero’s (2006) descriptive analysis of the Chilean 
parliamentary elite, which shows that education, professional career and political and 
socioeconomic background play a decisive role in its members’ socialisation and social 
interaction, and attempts to test this conclusion using inferential models for the Chilean political 
elite. To sum up, using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010, this 
thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on the 
access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the 
legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers. The empirical 
analysis includes logit models for three periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. 
 
It focuses on the political elite in the 20 years between 1990, when military dictator Augusto 
Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, 




germane to this analysis: (1) understanding the nature of the party elites during the political 
transition; (2) describing and explaining the main aspects of the party elites’ background and 
social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and (3) exploring the 
effect of those variables on individuals’ chances of achieving strategic positions in the political 




ix. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has reviewed studies of political elites focusing on the importance of the social 
distinction theory and the class-domination theory as a theoretical background for 
understanding elites, political elites and social change. Class-domination theory is an important 
landmark in political sociology. Domhoff provides a theoretical background and method based 
on the idea that domination by the few does not mean complete control, but rather the ability 
to set the terms under which other groups and classes must operate. This principle has permitted 
analysis of the elite’s performance through the policy network, which contributes to 
understanding the influence of political dynamics on social change. 
 
Elite research is not as developed as other areas of political sociology. Social distinction and 
power structure theories are essential for identifying which groups are elite and which are not. 
When the composition of the power elite is clearly stated, it is possible to show how social 
relations are defined considering the interest of the upper class and the corporate community. 
Finally, as the very phrase “power structure” suggests, it is extremely difficult to change power 
arrangements, even in those countries where citizens can vote and there is a high level of 
freedom of expression. 
 
The theoretical framework means that it is possible to combine the power structure approach 
with analysis of elites. However, one of the limitations of these theoretical currents has to do 
with understanding how certain social resources operate or function in forming and maintaining 
these unitary groups. This is crucial in order to define and categorise elites’ mechanisms of 
differentiation and social closure. In this context, the concept of social capital is an essential 
resource for analysing political elites. 
 
Social capital is an abstract resource that is expressed in the creation of individual bonds or 
recognitions which favour certain reciprocal social actions or behaviour. This is where the 




Bourdieu. While the former associate the use of this resource with the formation of cooperative 
reciprocal social networks, Bourdieu defines it as a species of capital (in addition to the 
economic and cultural species) that requires its recognition by other individuals for its 
conversion into a new type of capital. For example, if education at certain schools is valued and 
recognised as a means of access to the political elite, then those individuals who possess this 
species of cultural capital can turn it into political capital if they enter the political elite. 
 
In other words, in the case of Bourdieu, recognition of the species of capital (expressed through 
practical dispositions characteristic of the habitus of each individual) is conducive to certain 
actions or behaviour of a social nature that favour certain types of social relations. However, 
there has as yet been no empirical evidence to prove this theory at the level of political elites. 
In this framework, the research presented here seeks to analyse species of capital as strategic 
resources which the members of the political elite can use to access certain positions of power 
within the political system. 
 
Beyond the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, 
this research takes as its reference the study of the effects that species of capital have on the 
formation and reproduction of the Chilean political elite. Its aim is to compare the different 
species of capital (independent variables) as regards access to positions in the legislature and 
the executive as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variables), considering three 

















CHAPTER II. POLITICAL ELITES AND SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 




The recent political and economic transformations seen in Latin America are fundamental for 
understanding the evolution of political elites in the region and in Chile. In the 1980s, most of 
the region’s countries experienced reformist military dictatorships that sought to implement 
sociopolitical transformations and development models based on reducing state intervention in 
the economic system. Chile was no exception. After the crisis that brought down the 
government of Salvador Allende in 1973, the military regime of Augusto Pinochet implemented 
a series of political and neoliberal transformations that modified the role of the state in the 
economy and, after the return to democracy in the late 1980s, the transition agreed upon by the 
political elites favoured the maintenance of these reforms.  
 
This chapter deals with Latin America’s recent political and economic development as the 
background to the evolution of political elites in the region and, particularly, Chile. It examines 
indicators of democratic development and the region’s recent history, taking as a reference the 
cases of Brazil and Argentina. Another important aspect discussed in this chapter is the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in Latin American countries since it is 
an important indicator of the quality of the region’s democracies.  
   
Latin America is a region that has been shaped by the existence of authoritarian regimes in its 
recent history. Among other consequences, this has meant incentives for maintaining inequities 
in the distribution of political power. This has also been reflected at the economic level and in 
different spheres of social life. Latin America is particularly interesting because of the 
institutional instability seen in most of its countries as from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial 
regimes were established, through to the 1990s when democracy had mostly been restored. 
 
One notable feature of the region is that its elites have endured over time. As some studies have 
shown, its elites’ development models have been based on forms of circulation and continuity 
that have prevailed over time, thanks to their mechanisms of differentiation and social closure, 
as well as their forms of selective integration, albeit with variations in magnitude between 
countries (Rovira, 2018). This sociopolitical phenomenon occurs against the background of the 
numerous forms of inequality that have existed in Latin America since the period of Spanish 





Certainly, the development of political elites depends on the political regime and, more 
specifically, the development of democracy. This chapter, therefore, provides a descriptive 
analysis of the historical evolution of Latin American democracies, taking into account the 
Polity Score developed by the Center for Systemic Peace. This is one of the most important 
indices for measuring the development of democracies globally and uses a spectrum of 
governing authority represented by a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 
+10 (consolidated democracy). 
 
Latin America is a region accustomed to numerous forms of inequality. Most Latin American 
societies are characterised by their high levels of social stratification and poverty. In this 
context, the region’s political elites have historically developed in a centralised and, in some 
cases, transnational form and those families with economic and political power have exercised 
great influence (Birle, Hofmeister, Maihold, & Potthast, 2007). In order to put Chile in the 
context of the region, this section presents a selection of indicators comparing the political 
regimes of Chile, Brazil, Argentina and the rest of Latin America. The indicators are about 
democratisation index and data on the legislative power and success of the executive branch. 
Information about the economic and social changes experienced by the region is also included.  
 
Latin America is particularly interesting because of the institutional instability seen in most 
countries in the nineteenth century as the result of the colonisation period and then again as 
from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial regimes were established in the context of the Cold 
War and the threat of communism, through to the 1990s when democracy was mostly restored. 
In the Chilean case, it is very important to establish the sociopolitical and economic context 
that has favoured elitism and the consolidation of numerous forms of inequality because these 
two phenomena have shaped the recent political evolution of most Latin American countries.  
 
 
ii. Political elites and dictatorial regimes 
 
A number of dictatorships were established in Latin America during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Most of the region’s dominant elites promoted and/or supported coups and 
the subsequent installation of different types of dictatorial regimes. Although most were anti-
Communist, there were exceptions such as Cuba where Fidel Castro took power after 
overthrowing Fulgencio Batista through armed revolution. Because the Batista government was 
considered a military dictatorship, Castro’s coup was initially viewed as a revolution and was 





Most of Latin America’s dictatorial regimes were headed by a military junta. In the case of 
Chile, the junta that took power after the 1973 military coup against President Salvador Allende 
comprised the heads of the Army (Augusto Pinochet), the Air Force (Gustavo Leigh Guzmán), 
the Navy (José Toribio Merino) and the Police Service (César Mendoza Durán). It was led by 
Pinochet until 1981 when he became President of the Republic, a position he held until the 
junta was dissolved in 1990.   
 
Pinochet gradually consolidated power around his figure and, despite the restoration of 
democracy in 1990, held a life Senate seat until 2005 when this position was eliminated. The 
Chilean case can be compared to the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer in Bolivia whose 
first government (1971-1978) followed the coup which overthrew Juan José Torres, a left-wing 
military president.  
 
Similarly, the 1976-1983 military government in Argentina, with its so-called “Process of 
National Reorganisation” overthrew the government of President María Estela Martínez de 
Perón. In this period, Argentina was governed by military juntas formed by the heads of the 
Army, Navy and other branches of the armed forces, but it differed from Chile in that the 
president of the junta, who served as head of state, rotated. In all, there were four juntas between 
the coup in 1976, led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, and the end of the dictatorship (1976-
1980, 1980-1981, 1981-1982 and 1982-1983). A similar system also existed in Uruguay 
between 1973 and 1985, although there the coup was led by a politician, Juan María 
Bordaberry. 
 
Brazil’s dictatorship also involved changes of leadership. It began in 1964 with the coup against 
the government of President João Goulart and lasted until 1985 under leaders who included 
Marshall Humberto Castelo and Marshall Artur Da Costa, whom Congress subsequently 
elected as President in 1966. The restoration of democracy was accompanied by a number of 
periods of political instability.   
  
There was also a dictatorship in Venezuela in the second half of the twentieth century. It was 
led by General Marco Pérez Jiménez, who governed the country from 1953 to 1958 and was 
overthrown in a coup by other discontented sectors of the armed forces, led by Wolfgang 
Larrazábal. Democracy was restored in 1959 when President Rómulo Betancourt was elected. 
In other cases, dictatorial regimes lasted for longer. In Paraguay, for example, General Alfredo 
Stroessner held power for 35 years from 1954 to 1989. Similarly, Rafael Trujillo governed the 




Anastasio Somoza García, governed Nicaragua between 1936 and 1956, establishing a family 
dynasty that remained in power until 1979 when President Francisco Urcuyo Maliaños was 
appointed, before being rapidly replaced by a Junta of National Reconstruction.   
 
In general, these dictatorial regimes arose in response to specific situations characterised by 
imbalances of power between the political parties, the interests of specific groups and/or the 
interventionism of other countries in the context of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 was decisive in the consolidation of the democratic transitions of most of the region’s 
countries.  It was only in Cuba that Fidel Castro remained in power until 2008 when he was 
replaced by his brother Raúl. 
 
Figure 3. Democratisation index: Latin America, 1800-2017 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. Note: The "Polity Score" captures 
this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested 
three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -





Figure 3 also shows that, as from the region’s colonisation and throughout the nineteenth 
century, Latin America’s average for democratic development was negative. This reflects the 
prevalence of manorial institutions and high levels of political inequality, maintained by means 
of censitary democracies in which only those meeting certain requirements could vote. Social 
inequality, the prevalence of poverty and illiteracy and the legacy of Spanish authoritarianism 
were key features of this period. It was only as from the 1950s that democracy as such began 
to be established and it then weakened again significantly in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of 
a process of militarisation and the establishment of dictatorships in most of the region’s 
countries (Victoriano, 2010). 
 
Figure 4. Democratisation index: Chile, 1800-2017  
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. Note: The "Polity Score" captures 






In the Chilean case, which is the object of analysis of this thesis, authoritarian tendencies are 
apparent as from the mid-twentieth century. However, Figure 4 shows that, until 1973, there 
was a democratic regime that was then interrupted by the 1973-1990 Pinochet dictatorship.   
 
There have been two dictatorships in Chile: that of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-1931) and 
that of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-1990). The latter, which was established after the 
overthrow of the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende, has some particular 
characteristics in that Pinochet remained in power for 17 years, after validating his regime in a 
plebiscite in 1980 that was highly questioned by the opposition. This plebiscite was also used 
to approve a new political constitution as a means of giving the military government some 
institutional legitimacy.  
 
The absence of democracy persisted until 1988 when, in another plebiscite, Pinochet was 
defeated, opening the way to the democratic transition that began with congressional and 
presidential elections in 1989. As a result, the quality of democracy in Chile improved 
significantly that year - due to the reestablishment of democratic elections and Congress5 - and 
continued to improve in subsequent years under the Concertación coalition.  
 
Chile’s political transition was shaped by negotiations among the political elites, leading to a 
pact that gave the transition process stability and meant the ongoing existence of the military 
regime’s authoritarian enclaves (Godoy, 1999; Siavelis, 2009b). It also meant that post-
Pinochet renewal of the political elites was quite limited. Most of the more powerful parties 
that existed before the coup continued to hold central positions of power in a phenomenon 
referred to as partyarchy (Siavelis, 2009). This is analysed in greater detail in Chapter V where 
the post-transition electoral performance of Chilean political parties is discussed.  
 
In order to compare in greater detail the context in which Chile’s political regime evolved, 
Brazil and Argentina are taken as a reference, due to their importance in the region. This 





5 After the government’s overthrow on 11 September 1973, the military junta took control of political 
power, establishing an authoritarian government. Its immediate measures included the closure of the 
National Congress, a ban on the functioning of political parties and the imposition of a State of Siege 
throughout the country, all of which certainly affected the working of democracy. The military junta 
governed the country until 11 March 1990 when political parties were once again formally permitted and 




Figure 5. Democratisation index: Brazil, 1800-2017  
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2013. Note: The "Polity Score" captures 
this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy). 
 
Like most of the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brazil experienced numerous 
coups and military dictatorships. Its most recent dictatorship began with the coup of 31 March 
1964, which overthrew the democratic government of President João Goulart and established a 
military dictatorship led by General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. He was succeeded 
by a series of military presidents until the election victory of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (MDB) in 1985 when, on March 15, José Sarney took office as the first civilian 
president. Figure 5 shows that this marked the start of significant improvements in Brazil’s 






The PT’s election victory followed an anti-corruption campaign through which it marked a 
difference with traditional party structures although, in 2005, its government was itself badly 
hit by a corruption scandal. Nonetheless, President da Silva was re-elected for a second term in 
October 2006. He was succeeded in 2011 by President Dilma Rousseff, also a member of the 
PT, against whom the Senate opened an impeachment process on 12 May 2016, which ended 
with her replacement by her vice-president, Michel Temer.  
 
At present, both da Silva and Rousseff face criminal charges in corruption cases.    
 
In the case of Argentina, there were six successful coups in the twentieth century: in 1930, 
1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976. While the first four resulted in provisional dictatorships, the 
latter two established permanent dictatorships in line with the bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
model, a type of organisation of the state characterised by the suppression of political and 
democratic mechanisms as a means of returning to a certain social and economic order that had 
been altered by autonomous organisation of the population and, particularly, the workers 
(O’Donnell, 2009). 
 
Democracy was restored in 1983 with the election of President Raúl Alfonsín. Since then, the 
country has enjoyed democratic and institutional stability. In 2001, however, it experienced a 
severe economic crisis that led to a wave of popular protest against the government, culminating 
with the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa in 2001. Although his resignation was 
followed by interim administrations, the armed forces did not take control of executive power 
or intervene in national politics. In contrast to previous periods, the crisis was managed through 
constitutional processes, leading to the democratic election of President Eduardo Duhalde (of 
the Peronist Justicialist Party) in 2002.  
 
At present, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was elected as the successor 
of her husband, President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), and governed from 2007 to 2015 
(having been re-elected in 2011), faces corruption charges.  
 
These cases reveal a common pattern in recent dictatorships in Latin America. However, 
currently most countries, except for Venezuela and Cuba, have now achieved stability under 
democratic regimes. This constitutes a favourable context as regards the stability of political 






Figure 6. Democratisation index: Argentina, 1800-2017 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. Note: The "Polity Score" captures 




iii. Democratisation processes and the relation between legislative and executive powers  
 
Another relevant aspect of the political development of Latin American countries is the quality 
of democracy. Since the time of the Spanish colony, most of the region’s countries have had to 
contend, both politically and economically, with social inequality. Although persisting over 
time, inequality has lessened in most countries, particularly since the democratic transitions of 
the 1980s, thanks to the concern that arose in these countries about the quality of their 
democratisation processes (Garretón, 1995). However, it is important to note that the quality of 
Latin American democratic regimes is quite heterogeneous. When disaggregating by country, 




higher indices of the quality of democracy than other countries (Mainwaring & Scully, 2008, 
p. 118). 
 
Legislative processes and the relationship between the legislature and the executive serve as an 
important indicator of the distribution of political power and, therefore, the quality of 
democratic regimes in Latin America (Alemán & Calvo, 2008). After the consolidation of the 
region’s political transitions, research into this increased significantly as a means of assessing 
the quality of democracies (Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002).  
 
When analysing the evolution of the quality of political regimes in Latin American countries, 
it is also important to look at the relationship between the legislative and executive powers as 
regards the exercise of veto power (García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013; Tsebelis 
& Alemán, 2005). This is a measure of the capacity that the powers of state have to intervene 
in drawing up laws and public policy and in other important matters of public interest. This is 
a key factor in the way in which the political elites operate as well as in the distribution of 
political power in a society.   
 
Figure 7 shows the relation between presidents’ legislative powers and their success in passing 
legislation, measured as the percentage of the president’s bills that obtain parliamentary 
approval. It shows the dispersion of the executive’s legislative powers and success in recent 
years in Latin America. It is important to note that, until the first decade of this century, Mexico 
stood out for the executive’s legislative success, despite having less legislative powers 
compared to the other countries in the sample. Chile and Brazil are similar in that, although 
their presidents have greater legislative powers, they tend to be less successful than in Mexico, 
Paraguay and Honduras, whose presidents have fewer powers. The most striking case, however, 
is Ecuador where the executive has great legislative powers but a very low level of success 
compared to the other countries of the region.  
 
In Figure 7, it can be seen that countries where the executive has a lower level of legislative 
success tend to be those where the parliament has a greater capacity to block the executive’s 
bills or, in other words, exercises greater veto power. However, it also shows that, in most Latin 
American countries, the president has an important power of veto and, in some cases, even 
constitutional powers to intervene in parliamentary debate as, for example, in Chile and Brazil 






Figure 7. Dispersion of the executive’s legislative powers and success 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013. 
 
Table 4 shows the way in which the legislative and executive branches relate, depending on 
their power and capacity to exercise a veto. This is an important indicator of the context in 
which Latin American democracies have developed since most countries have a strongly 
presidential system, with impacts of different magnitudes on the distribution of political power 
(Marsteintredet & Berntzen, 2008). 
 
The first case corresponds to that of an executive which manages to pass almost all the bills it 
presents (high legislative success) and is the origin of the vast majority of the laws approved 
(high legislative participation). This was the case of Honduras in 1990-2002. The executive 
dominates over the legislature, which can only react to the bills presented by the executive and 
has little impact on the development of legislation.  
 
A second case shown in Table 4 is that of countries where the executive’s veto powers allow it 
to achieve a high level of legislative success, but it is not dominant as in the case of Honduras. 
In this context, the legislature also plays a reactive role. This is the case of Mexico (1982-2003),  
Chile (1994-2004)6, Bolivia (1997-2001), Uruguay (1995-2002) and Panama (1994-2002). 
 
6 Chile has a presidential system, which corresponds to the institutional form in which the Political 
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A third case corresponds to those countries where the executive has fewer powers to achieve 
the level of legislative success seen in the previous case. In this context, there is a dynamic of 
negotiation between the two branches and Congress plays a proactive role in the generation of 
laws. The countries in this situation are Argentina (1983-2004), Costa Rica (1995-2004) and 
Paraguay (1989-2002). 
 
A fourth case is that of countries whose president must deal with particularly proactive 
parliaments in order to pass bills. García Montero (2007) describes the legislative power of 
these presidents as that of a collaborator and the parliament as “proactive”. This is the case of 
Peru (1995-2003) and Venezuela (1959-1989). Finally, Ecuador is the only case with a weak 
executive power, with limited success in approving bills, and a legislature that has played a 
particularly proactive role, acting as the main driver of the legislation passed there between 


















serves as head of state and head of government. The president has co-legislative powers with the 
parliament in areas that include the presentation of bills, control of the order paper, participation in 
parliamentary debate through ministers and partial veto powers. In Chile, these special powers are 
established in the Political Constitution of the Republic. 
Presidents hold office for a set period (four years) and cannot be removed as in parliamentary systems. 
There is also a rigid division of power between the three branches: legislature, executive and judiciary, 
which is underpinned by checks and balances, that is, they control each other. Examples of this are the 
president’s powers to veto laws, the need for parliamentary approval of some of the president’s 
appointments and the judiciary’s power to declare some norms unconstitutional.  
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Source: García Montero (2007) in García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013, p.65. 
 
Using the classification of García Montero, the parliaments of these 12 Latin American 
countries can, therefore, be separated into two groups. Six have “reactive” legislatures, with a 
limited capacity to influence approval of bills presented by executives that have played a 
“dominant” role in some cases (Honduras) and a “predominant” role in others (Mexico, Chile, 
Bolivia, Uruguay and Panama). The other six parliaments have had “proactive” legislative 
powers, particularly in the cases of Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador. 
 
 
iv. Economic changes and the social structure  
 
Throughout their history, Latin American countries have faced the complex challenge of 
inequality. After the political transitions of the 1980s, most governments introduced economic 
reforms, albeit differing in their emphasis. In general, they sought to reduce social inequality 
and boost economic development as a means of generating growth and jobs. However, not all 




compared to the United States and the Gini index for 2000-2010, revealing that over half the 
region’s countries failed to increase their average income during this period.  
 
Figure 8. Latin America: Average income and inequality, 2000-2010 
 
 
NOTE:  The orange bars plot the relative value of gross national income per capita in a particular country 
relative to that in the US, adjusting for purchasing power parity.  The blue bars plot the Gini index where 
0 indicates perfect income equality (all people have an equal share of national income) and 100 indicates 
perfect inequality (all national income goes to one individual). The Gini coefficient for the US is 40.8. 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Monge-Naranjo, 2014.  
 
This acquires greater importance in the light of the contrast between income and the Gini index 
in 2000-2010. In countries like Haiti, Honduras and Bolivia, income is low and inequality is 
high. Nicaragua, on the other hand, stands out as the country with the lowest level of inequality 
during this period. The case of Chile is also striking since, although it achieved the region’s 
highest per capita income, social inequality remained high. This has been widely debated in the 
literature (Gwynne & Cristobal, 2014) since the persistence of social inequality has proved a 
difficult issue for democratic governments in most countries. In this context, the elites have 
maintained their position of privilege even though social mobility has generally increased, 
thanks to an increase in access to higher education.   
 
The mechanisms of social closure that have characterised the region’s elites have led some 
authors to refer to their effectiveness in maintaining control of the state and the political system. 


















elites and, indeed, due to the historical concentration of power and wealth in the region, one 
broad elite often dominates the political and economic system (Birle, Hofmeister, Maihold, & 
Potthast, 2007).  
 
In most countries, the end of a dictatorial regime triggered a rearticulation of the elites because 
it permitted the re-emergence of the political opposition (mostly on the left). This resulted in a 
diversification of the political elites as new forces appeared and competed to govern. In this 
context, Chile is an exception since its Concertación coalition governed the country for two 
decades, winning four consecutive terms in office. In Argentina, the coalition formed by the 
Front for Victory and the Justicialist Party won three consecutive elections under Néstor 
Kirchner (2003-2007) and then his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015).  
 
 A key factor behind this was the political parties’ professionalisation and bureaucratisation (in 
line with the thesis of Michels, 1915), enabling them to maintain structures that concentrated 
power and, in many cases, favoured the maintenance and reproduction of the elites over time.   
 
Finally, analysis of the evolution of the quality of institutions in the region between 1984 and 
2004 (figure 9) shows that it was, on average, lower in Latin America than in emerging Asian 
countries and OECD member states. However, within Latin America, there are wide differences 
between countries and, for example, Chile and Colombia were able to meet the standards of the 



















Figure 9. Indicators of the quality of institutions in Latin America, 1984-2004 
 
 





This chapter has briefly described the context of Latin America’s recent political history during 
which most countries suffered military interventions that led to the establishment of 
authoritarian regimes. Starting in the 1980s, however, these were followed by democratic 
transitions, raising the question of the development and quality of the resulting processes of 
democratisation. In this context, although the political-economic paths of the different countries 
varied, most adopted democratic institutional designs based on the model of a presidential 
republic, albeit with different nuances (Figure 3).   
 
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that the course and quality of the region’s 
processes of democratisation have been quite heterogeneous. Some countries have achieved 
stable indicators of political development, related to the quality of democracy, but, in most 
others, the results have been poor. Indeed, the average quality of institutions in the region falls 





















































In general, Latin America’s political elites have historically acted as closed groups with little 
interest in opening spaces for cooperation or the incorporation of other social groups. This has, 
however, been changing, thanks to a significant increase in the coverage and quality of 
secondary and higher education and, as a result, an unprecedented increase in social mobility. 
Despite this, mechanisms of social closure persist in the elites (Aguilar, 2011), which is only 
to be expected in a region where poverty and social inequality remain high. The elites have 
conserved spaces of social interaction that permit their reproduction and maintenance over time. 
The family, education and access to certain goods and spaces of socialisation (social clubs) 
mean that they continue to have a privileged social status as compared to other groups.  
 
The results of the development of Latin American democracies raise numerous questions about 
the role played by the region’s elites, both locally and across countries (Birle, Hofmeister, 
Maihold, & Potthast, 2007). In this context, a research agenda that seeks to provide a deeper 
understanding of these issues, both at the level of individual cases and in the aggregate, has 
particular relevance. One of the difficulties inherent in such an agenda is access to information 
since, in order to obtain this, it is necessary to overcome the obstacle of the political elites’ 
social closure mechanisms, gaining entry to a space that is based on trust. In addition, in the 
case of the political elites, there is an added complexity that has to do with the way in which 
they take decisions and the dominant ideologies with respect to political parties (Alcántara & 
Luna, 2004). 
 
The objective of this chapter was to examine the recent political and economic context in Latin 
America. The data presented, both of an historical nature and as measurements of trends, shows 
that most countries have experienced difficulties in achieving sustained democratic 
development and economic progress. The data on the relationship between the legislative and 
executive branches shows that presidential regimes have prevailed in most countries and 
maintain strong control of political and legislative power. 
 
The paradox that arises is with stability because, on average, the countries where the executive 
intervenes more also have more stable democracies. This is vital for understanding the context 







CHAPTER III. END OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND 





In the 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries initiated political transitions from 
authoritarian to competitive electoral regimes (O´Donnell & Schmitter, 2013). As shown in the 
previous chapter (Figure 3), most countries began to experience improvements in their indices 
of democratisation in the 1990s, which marked the end of the region’s military regimes. In 
virtually all these changeovers of power, the political elites played a significant role in both 
establishing and sustaining democratic regimes (Espinoza, 2010; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; 
Mainwaring, 1989; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Stepan & Linz, 1996). Most of these 
transformations sought to eliminate the authoritarian legacy of former dictators, after a long 
period of military rule (Silva, 2001). The legitimacy provided by consensus within the political 
elites on the establishment of institutions and electoral rules became a sine qua non for the 
consolidation and expansion of democratic regimes in the region (Higley & Gunther, 1992). 
 
However, after the establishment of democratic regimes, political democratisation emerged as 
a difficult and controversial issue for Latin American countries and, particularly, Chile 
(Garretón, 1995). While the Chilean political transition from authoritarianism to democracy 
successfully put an end to 17 years of dictatorship, the new democratic regime incorporated a 
wide range of authoritarian enclaves created by Pinochet’s military regime, implying a number 
of contradictions as regards the democratic regime’s consolidation. These inconsistencies 
survived for quite a long time, affecting democratic consolidation in the post-transitional setting 
(Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). 
 
Among these contradictions, various scholars have underscored the prevalence of a complex 
party elite power-sharing arrangement between the centre-left ruling coalition (Concertación) 
and a centre-right opposition alliance (Alianza). Between 1990 and 2010, these two coalitions 
led a successful democratic transition and went on to provide stability, consistency and 
efficiency in governance. However, the consolidation and prevalence of a polity characterised 
by political party domination - or partyarchy - hampered the full functioning of Chilean 




alternation of power (Menéndez-Carrión, Joignant, & Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009; Siavelis 
& Valenzuela, 1996; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).7  
 
This chapter describes the political process that led to the end of the military dictatorship and 
marked the rearticulation of Chile’s political party elites as two large political coalitions that 
defined the post-Pinochet process of democratisation: the Concertación and the Alianza. This 
is important in order to understand the research object of this thesis because the list of members 
of the political elite used here is drawn from a universe of individuals belonging to one of these 
two coalitions.    
 
 
 ii. Origins of the party elites after the political transition 
 
 
ii.i. 1980 Constitution 
 
After the coup that put an end to the government of President Salvador Allende and his socialist 
revolution, the military junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, indefinitely suspended the 
country’s 1925 Constitution and, following the dissolution of Congress on 14 September 1973, 
convened a committee to draw up a new constitution in a bid to legitimise the new de facto 
government. Known as the Ortúzar Commission after its president, Enrique Ortúzar Escobar, a 
former minister of right-wing President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), it presented a first draft 
of the proposed new constitution in October 1978.  
 
This was then reviewed by the Council of State, an independent body created to assist in writing 
the new constitution which, in July 1980, presented its recommendations to Pinochet and the 
members of the Junta for their final decision. In August 1980, the new constitution was 
presented, along with the announcement that it would be put to a plebiscite on September 11, 
the seventh anniversary of the coup.  
 
This strategy gave the political opposition to Pinochet and other anti-government forces little 
time to organise and debate such an important document (Hawkins, 2002, p. 158). In the 
plebiscite, the new constitution was allegedly approved by a 67% majority. However, the 
 
7 This is also related to the ongoing existence, after the democratic transition, of enclaves, authoritarian 





plebiscite did not meet minimum conditions for a free, competitive and fair election (Altman, 
Piñeiro, & Toro, 2013) and was widely criticised by most opposition leaders, who nevertheless 
“were resigned to playing by the military’s rules and timetable if they ever hoped to see them 
return to barracks” (Morley & McGillion, 2015, p. 200). Moreover, as most of Pinochet’s 
detractors were declared illegal by the military regime, he had no major difficulty in being 
sworn in as President of the Republic after the plebiscite or in implementing this new 
institutional design on 11 March 1981.  
 
The 1980 Constitution, imposed through a plebiscite without any minimum democratic guarantee, 
not only allowed Pinochet to remain in power but also gave continuity to the authoritarian regime 
and the new economic order that arose from his plan for significant reform of the Chilean 
economy.8  
 
The new constitution granted the president significant new powers. In addition, it created the 
National Security Council (COSENA) and re-established the Constitutional Tribunal. As well 
as conferring specific power on the executive branch, it established that Pinochet would remain 
president as from its introduction for eight years after which another plebiscite would be held 
on whether he should stay on for a further eight years. In this way, the regime attempted to 
design an institutional system that would extend his rule indefinitely. However, as some 
scholars have argued, the architects of Pinochet’s electoral system fell short of using electoral 
rules to guarantee his victory (Barros, 2005; Navia, 2003). Given Pinochet’s personal power, 
no-one anticipated that the centre and left-wing opposition would defeat him in the 1988 
plebiscite: “the victory in the 1988 plebiscite was a pleasant surprise. Many of us feared two 
things: the first was to lose the plebiscite for reasons similar to what happened in the 1980 
plebiscite (which Pinochet and his advisers manipulated in their favour), and the other, far 
more complex and likely, was that the regime would not recognise its defeat. In this context, it 
was not only a pleasant surprise when we won, but also when Pinochet himself issued an official 
statement admitting defeat.”9 
 
 
ii.ii. 1988 plebiscite and a new political system 
 
As some scholars have argued, the 1980 Constitution laid the foundation for a democratisation 
process by establishing a plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuance in power. “It is unusual for an 
authoritarian regime to write a constitution which then becomes, against the ruler’s wishes, 
the vehicle for a transition to democracy. And yet this is precisely what occurred in Chile” 
 
8 Personal interview with J. M. Insulza. My translation. See appendix III. 




(Valenzuela, 1997, p. 2). This peculiarity of Chilean history is paradoxical given that Pinochet 
and his advisers were looking to design a system that would make it easier for him to stay in 
power (Garretón, 1987; Navia, 2003; Valenzuela, 1997). 
 
The second plebiscite took place on 5 October 1988, but in a very different context from the 
1980 plebiscite. In 1987, the regime had approved the existence of political parties and opened 
the national voter register. In addition, the Junta had agreed to re-open Congress, regardless of 
the plebiscite’s results.10 This favoured the opposition since, as well as being allowed to 
participate in public debates, it could compete in the plebiscite as an official alternative to 
Pinochet’s rule. The options were Sí (Yes) or No. Whereas the right-wing parties and other 
supporters of Pinochet were in favour of the Yes option, the political opposition supported the 
No option, which won with almost 56% of the vote (INDAI, 1989, p. 62). In 1989, three months 
before Pinochet’s term expired, presidential and congressional elections were held.  
 
After the restoration of democracy, a two-party political system emerged and continued to exist 
for the next 20 years. During this period, Chilean politics was dominated by two coalitions: the 
left-wing Concertación and the right-wing Alianza. This represented a major change on the pre-
1973 situation when politics had traditionally been ordered around three major ideological axes 
(right, centre and left) (Scully, 1992; Siavelis, 2009; Valenzuela, 1997).  
 
The consolidation of a highly institutionalised political system based on these two coalitions 
was decisive in providing stability, consistency and efficiency to governance in Chile (Siavelis 
& Valenzuela, 1996; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002). However, because it hampered political 
participation and alternation in power, this new party system also played a key role in the 
maintenance of a limited democracy. In addition, the system remained confined to the elite 
level and became increasingly disconnected from civil society (Luna & Altman, 2011). 
 
 
ii.iii. Chile in 1988: the transition as a “transaction” 
 
The political negotiations that took place after Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 plebiscite meant 
that the democratic transition took the form of an agreement or, as some scholars have described 
it, a pact between the relevant political actors of both the incoming and outgoing regimes 
(Fuentes, 2012; Godoy, 1999). This not only affected the democratic transition but also, given 
the political hegemony of the two coalitions, its consolidation. Indeed, from 1989 through to 
 




2010, the Concertación and the Alianza held almost all the seats in both chambers of Congress 
and, as shown by a number of scholars, competition between these two multi-party coalitions 
dominated electoral and legislative politics (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Navia, 2008; Siavelis, 
2002). 
  
A constitutional reform introduced in 1989 promoted and contributed to the imminent transition 
to democracy,11 but also gave the outgoing military regime political power by defining the 
armed forces as the guarantors of the institutional order and giving them a very significant 
degree of autonomy. Moreover, Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the Army.12 As 
a result, the military were able to exercise an important veto power on the decisions of the 
incoming democratic governments (Angell, 1993; Garretón, 1986; Heiss & Navia, 2007). This 
situation also favoured the right-wing parties as well as members of the outgoing military 
dictatorship since it meant that, although the Concertación won the presidential election of 
1989 (under Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin) and an overall majority in both chambers of 
Congress, they retained a wide range of political power resources.   
 
The famous phrase of President Aylwin of achieving justice “to the extent possible” epitomises 
one of the main strategies which the Concertación applied both before and after the democratic 
transition: that of governing on the basis of political consensus. It was used first as a means of 
permitting a peaceful transition to democracy after almost 17 years of dictatorship. As a former 
minister, José Miguel Insulza, argues, “One of the main features of the Concertación had to do 
with its articulation, which was based on the struggle against the dictatorship…..”.13 However, 
it subsequently allowed the political elites to achieve stability and an appropriate balance of 
power between these two coalitions. This largely explains why a wide range of constitutional 




11 Law No 18.825, approved through a plebiscite on 30 July 1989, was published on 17 August 1989. It 
included 54 reforms aiming to promote political pluralism and strengthen constitutional rights, 
democracy and the principle of political participation. It also included measures to temper the so-called 
“state of exception”. On the application of this concept, defined by Carl Schmitt, in Latin American 
politics, see (Negretto & Aguilar-Rivera, 2000). 
12 Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the Army until 1998. He then took up a life Senate seat 
from 11 March 1998 to 4 July 2002. The position of life senator was introduced in Chile under the 1980 
Constitution which, in Article 45, stipulated former Presidents of the Republic, who had held office for 
at least six years, would be entitled to a life Senate seat. Only one other former president, Eduardo Frei 
Ruiz-Tagle, who was elected democratically, took up this position. Article 45 was eliminated by a 
constitutional reform in 2005. 




As many scholars have pointed out, the prevalence of this consensus-based strategy meant that 
most of the Concertación’s original ideas and political views evolved from managing the 
restoration of democracy to consolidating economic development through efficient 
technocratic policies. In two decades, the Concertación improved the market-oriented reforms 
that had been introduced in the 1980s and gradually opened up the political system. In this 
period, it won four presidential elections and became the longest-serving and most successful 
democratic coalition in Chilean history. In relation to this, former President Ricardo Lagos 
argues: “What most scholars do not understand is that, in many cases, politics depends on the 
contexts…. The contexts are extremely important because they determine the possible lines of 
political action.”14 This principle largely explains why the Concertación agreed to negotiate a 
transition with the Pinochet regime and, afterwards, to govern with the right-wing parties that 
had supported him. Former President Aylwin has argued that, after the end of the dictatorship, 
it was not possible to prosecute Pinochet for human rights violations because this would have 
had enormous negative consequences for the country’s nascent democratic stability: “It would 
not have been feasible to prosecute Pinochet. It would have terribly divided the country and 
even put at risk the continuity of my government.”15  
 
Understandably, the result of the 1988 plebiscite troubled Chile’s right-wing parties. They were 
afraid of losing political power and, eventually, their chance of becoming an important actor in 
Congress: “It was possible that, with a single-member district system, the right could be 
effectively shut out of Congress” (Siavelis, quoted by Pastor, 2004, p. 48). Moreover, Navia 
(2003) estimated that, with a single-member district system, the Concertación would have won 
almost 90% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and virtually all the Senate seats, giving it 
the special majorities required to reform the authoritarian aspects of the 1980 Constitution.  
 
However, a stable pattern of two-coalition competition emerged, thanks to the implementation 
of a binomial system for congressional elections.16 This “unusual” system was originally 
proposed in 1983 by Arturo Marín Vicuña17 and became law in 1989, just after the 1988 
plebiscite and the beginning of the transition. Based on the D’Hondt method (Bochsler, 2009), 
it divided Chile into districts and constituencies. Each district comprised one or more municipal 
 
14 Personal interview with R. Lagos. My translation. See appendix III. 
15 Patricio Aylwin. El presidente se confiesa. Interview in Spain’s El País newspaper, 27 May 2012. My 
translation. 
16 Although most scholars take the view that the binomial system was a response to Pinochet’s defeat in 
the plebiscite, there are different accounts of the system’s historical evolution in Chile. With regard to 
this discussion, see Pastor, 2004.  
17 A lawyer, Arturo Marín Vicuña served as Chief-of-Staff to Carlos Cáceres, Pinochet’s Interior Minister 
between 1988 and 1990. He was one of the authors of the plan to reform the electoral system, along with 




districts and elected two members to the Chamber of Deputies while constituencies comprised 
two or more districts and each elected two senators. It was based on lists of candidates, rather 
than candidates individually, and tended to return the first majority on each list, which could 
result in over-representation of the second most-voted list (Angell, 2003).  
 
The system was adopted by the military government in response to Pinochet’s defeat in the 
1988 plebiscite in a bid to secure enough representation in Congress to veto the constitutional 
reforms proposed by the Concertación (Pastor, 2004). As Pastor observes, the regime had three 
main incentives for its adoption:  
 
“The military regime and its civilian allies adopted the binomial system with three objectives in 
mind. First and foremost, they wanted to ensure that the Right would be well represented in 
Congress so that it would have a veto over constitutional reforms and policy initiatives proposed 
by the Concertación. Second, the architects of the binomial system wanted to impose a two-party 
political system in Chile in which the Christian Democratic Party (DC) would be forced to align 
itself with the Left or the Right. Third, the authoritarian designers wanted to deprive the 
Communist Party of representation….” (Pastor, 2004, p. 48). 
 
When the Concertación defeated Pinochet and democracy was restored, the Alianza also had 
power in the political system, thanks to these new electoral rules and the institutional 
framework created under the military regime. This institutional design and, particularly, the 
binomial system allowed the Alianza to become an important protagonist in the new 
democracy. As Carey argues: 
 
“The incentive that this electoral system gives to form coalitions has carried over from the electoral 
arena to government, and is so formidable that Chile’s traditional multi-party system now 
performs very much like a two-party system. Although parties remain organizationally distinct 
and candidates bear party labels on ballots, these labels have effectively been superseded by 
coalition labels. Coalition leaders negotiate candidate nominations jointly and can impose 
discipline across all members of the coalition. The result is that the Chilean Congress has come to 
be organized around two major coalitions which are more stable than was previously the case in 
Chile’s fluid multi-party system” (Carey, 1997, p. 94). 
 
Moreover, this new model based on two majorities meant that the number of political parties 
with parliamentary representation decreased significantly after 1989, mostly because a number 
of small parties merged or joined larger parties (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). Navia (2003) points 
out that, even though the post-dictatorship political system was designed mainly by right-wing 
politicians in order to retain power, the Concertación nonetheless succeeded in governing Chile 




constitutional regime established before the political transition, retained legislative influence 
and other spheres of influence over politics.18  
 
 
ii.iv. Enclaves after the democratic transition 
 
Political and institutional transitions often depend on agreements or other forms of consensus 
within the political elite (Hartmann, 2007; Domhoff, 2006). In the case of Latin America in the 
1980s, the political elites played a fundamental role in the civilian-military agreements reached 
in order to end authoritarian regimes and promote democratic transitions.  
 
In Chile, soon after the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuance in power, the Concertación 
started negotiations with members of both the military regime and the right-wing parties for an 
Acuerdo Nacional por la Democracia y el Consenso Constitucional (National Agreement for 
Democracy and Constitutional Consensus) whose aims included reform of 1980 Constitution. 
In a speech broadcast in May 1989, Pinochet presented a final draft of the Agreement, 
comprising 54 reforms to the 1980 Constitution. This document, which met with unanimous 
approval from the Concertación, was put to a plebiscite on 30 July 1989. Both emerging 
coalitions called for its approval while an extremist faction of Socialist Party (which was not a 
member of the Concertación) and the Party of the South (PSUR) advocated its rejection and 
the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR) and the Communist Party called for a boycott 
of the plebiscite.  
 
In the end, after a strong campaign in their favour, the proposed reforms were approved with 
over 90% support. By accepting these new reforms, the Concertación forewent the chance of 
obtaining a working legislative majority in Congress because the absolute majority of the 
members present in each chamber required for approval of ordinary laws was defined as 
including non-elected senators and other authoritarian enclaves. These reforms ensured the 
continuity of a wide range of policies implemented by the military regime, including the 
neoliberal reforms that had transformed the Chilean economy.  
 
Although this agreement involved extensive negotiations between the Concertación and the 
right-wing parties that supported Pinochet, it was reached with the military regime still in 
 
18 The Alianza also maintained forms of political influence through several organisations and members 
of the judiciary and other elites, such as the economic and religious elites. This point has been widely 





power, implying that its political opponents had little bargaining power (Heiss & Navia, 2008). 
Moreover, these imbalances of power were reinforced by the fact that many of the forces 
opposed to the regime, including all those linked to Marxist ideology, had been banned. In 
addition, because of the absence of a Congress, other parties lacked an institutional design for 
operating within the political system. However, the Concertación decided to accept this 
situation as essential to ensure the transfer from military to civilian government. As Edgardo 
Boeninger, a minister in the Aylwin administration, argues: 
 
“A crucial factor in the Concertación’s unanimous approval of the plebiscite was the conviction 
that it was fundamental in order to ensure the transfer of government, although this implied not 
achieving a simultaneous and equivalent transfer of power. There was agreement that the mere 
fact of being elected and taking office in the Presidency of the Republic and having a majority at 
least in the Chamber of Deputies would create a new and different context, which would provoke 
important changes in the power structure and trigger a cumulative process that would produce 
successive alterations in the correlation of political forces in favour of the ruling coalition” 
(Boeninger 1997: 364-365). 
 
Indeed, the Concertación’s victory in both the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential 
election created a new and more democratic context. However, as René Abeliuk, also a minister 
in the Aylwin administration, says:  
 
“We had to accept many things we did not want to, since the possibilities of returning to a new 
military regime were soaring... At that time, Pinochet himself and many of his advisers were not 
fully convinced of relinquishing power... In addition, in numerous unofficial conversations, many 
of my friends from the right warned us that it was not entirely certain that Pinochet would accept 
defeat without considering certain guarantees. Therefore, we had to give in to many of their 
conditions.....” 19  
 
The heterogeneous Concertación remained united in its support for Patricio Aylwin in the 1989 
presidential election. After its victory in the 1988 plebiscite, a much more moderate strategy 
prevailed. Moreover, “the moderation of the Socialists provided the crucial ingredient to 
achieve unity and victory” (Drake, 1997, p. 116). The main aspects of this strategy included 
agreement on maintaining certain essential aspects of the neoliberal economic model, 
acceptance of the authoritarian institutional design, avoidance of any populist discourse and the 
downplaying of the importance of human rights violations as well as agreement on how to 
divide up seats in Congress. This, however, was merely an initial stance and, once in power, 
the coalition implemented many reforms related to these issues (Heiss & Navia, 2008).   
 
As Angell argues, as well as being key for achieving political transition, this strategy also 
provided the military regime with the opportunity to maintain intact much of the institutional 
 




framework it had introduced.  
 
“One plausible explanation of why the Chilean system can be considered a successful transition is 
precisely that it is continuing the policies of a successful authoritarian government. This contrasts 
with the chaos and lack of policy consensus that faced incoming democratic governments in Peru 
or Argentina, for example. Another equally plausible explanation is that essentially what has 
happened in Chile is that a normally viable and legitimate pre-Pinochet democratic political system 
has been restored. Chile did not have to invent a democratic system—it simply returned to the 
past. While there is a degree of truth in both arguments, to accept them at face value would be to 
oversimplify the process and underestimate both the difficulties facing and the achievements of the 
Aylwin government. So to the two original arguments, we must add that of the way in which the 
present government has, to use the fashionable term, crafted democracy” (Angell, 1993, p. 563). 
 
The strategy also permitted the survival of authoritarian enclaves or, in other words, 
authoritarian practices, at odds with the democratic regime’s political norms and rules of the 
game, which continued to exist within the state and the social spaces that the state claims to 
regulate (Gilley, 2010, p. 389). Both formally and informally, these enclaves had a negative 
effect on democratic consolidation (Garretón, 1999) and allowed Pinochet and his collaborators 
to prolong the institutional authoritarian legacy established by the 1980 Constitution. Garretón 
classifies these enclaves into four categories: institutional (constitution and laws), sociocultural 
(such as the prevalence of certain authoritarian values), related to political actors (the armed 
forces or veto players) and of an ethical or symbolical nature (such as human rights issues). 
 
In addition to these authoritarian enclaves, Siavelis (2009) also identifies what he refers to as 
transitional enclaves in the form of institutionalised mechanisms and practices (of both a formal 
and informal nature) that were reproduced by the ruling elite after the end of the military regime 
to the detriment of the development of a high-quality representative democracy. 
 
“First of all, an enclave to be termed as such must have been born of the political dynamics of a 
previous political model. The abrupt end of the Chilean military regime, in the 1988 plebiscite, 
provided a specific end point for the Chilean military regime and a clear delimitation of a political 
period in which the elites could inherit a legacy. Garretón refers to a political artefact inherited 
from the military regime, in temporary terms and clearly delimited. However, for the transitional 
enclaves, a change of political model is less clear and should be defined... The Chilean transition 
begins with the 1988 plebiscite and ends in 2005 with the reform of the Pinochet constitution, 
eliminating most of its non-democratic elements... Therefore, the transitional enclaves were born 
of both political models and interactions consolidated during this period, between 1988 and 2005” 
(Siavelis, 2009b, p. 5). 
 
This approach is important in order to understand the role of party elites in the politics of the 
Chilean transition to democracy and throughout the subsequent process of democratic 
consolidation. Both coalitions, the Concertación and the Alianza, dominated Chilean politics, 
managing these two types of enclaves, which included the constitutional reforms and 




constitution), the elite’s control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party-dominated 
politics, the informal system of  allocation of posts and positions by the political parties 
(referred to in Spanish as cuoteo), elitist and extra-institutional policy-making and the 
continuation of the economic model inherited from the Pinochet regime (Siavelis, 2009b). All 
these practices not only limited but also affected Chile’s re-democratisation process (Garretón, 
1999; Heiss & Navia, 2008). These transitional enclaves persisted until the constitutional 
reform of 2005 which introduced a number of mechanisms for the elimination of the “órganos 
de facto” (de facto bodies) (Linz & Stepan, 1996) inherited from the Pinochet regime and, 





This chapter has examined the political process that brought an end to the military dictatorship 
and marked the rearticulation of Chile’s political party elites as two broad coalitions: the 
Concertación and the Alianza. After the restoration of democracy, the Chilean party system 
experienced significant changes, due mainly to the appearance of a new division between 
supporters and opponents of the military regime. In the wake of the 1988 plebiscite, a new 
political landscape emerged, defined by the dichotomy between authoritarianism and 
democracy and the political loyalties formed under Pinochet. This situation, combined with the 
binomial system for congressional elections, led to the formation of two main coalitions, 
including most of the country’s political parties, whose purpose was, for the right, to defend 
part of the structures inherited from the dictatorship and, for the centre and left, to promote 
return to a democratic system of popular representation (Luna & Altman, 2011; Torcal & 
Mainwaring, 2002). 
 
The extensive literature on the Chilean binomial system emphasises precisely the incentives it 
implied for the creation of two broad coalitions (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Carey, 2006; 1997; 
Navia, 2008; 2000; Siavelis, 2009). This is also reflected in the results of congressional, 
municipal and presidential elections between 1989 and 2009 in which the two coalitions 
obtained the majority of votes. However, the consolidation of this system also meant that 
Chilean politics remained highly concentrated at the elite level and, therefore, increasingly 
remote from civil society (Luna & Altman, 2011). Finally, another key aspect of this period 
was the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves and their role in a democratisation process 
with numerous institutional limitations that were, nevertheless, accepted by the Concertación 





CHAPTER IV. TWO NEW COALITIONS IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE:  





This chapter describes and explains the principal characteristics of the two main coalitions that 
emerged from the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 congressional and presidential elections. A 
political transition based on agreement across much of the political spectrum (Godoy, 1999) 
and the consolidation of a binomial system for congressional elections favoured, among other 
things, the creation and maintenance of two broad coalitions that dominated political power for 
more than two decades.  
 
The Concertación brought together the parties and supporters of the centre-left and went on to 
win four consecutive presidential elections before its dissolution in 2013. The other coalition, 
the Alianza por Chile, was formed by the principal liberal right-wing and traditional 
conservative forces and continued to exist until 2015. The political elite that governed Chile 
during the period studied here (1990-2010) came from these two coalitions.  
 
 
ii. The Concertación 
 
The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia was a political coalition that governed Chile 
from 11 March 1990 to 11 March 2010. It comprised the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), the 
Radical Party (PRSD), the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Socialist Party (PS). It was born 
on 2 January 1988 when the Pact of Political Parties for the No was created in the run-up to the 
1988 plebiscite, as a democratic alternative to Augusto Pinochet’s 15 year-dictatorship. After 
winning the plebiscite with 55.99% of the vote, it became a political coalition and competed in 
the 1989 presidential and legislative elections. It went on to win all presidential, legislative and 
municipal elections until the 2008 municipal elections. In 2009, Sebastián Piñera, the 
presidential candidate of the right-wing Alianza por Chile coalition, defeated the 
Concertación’s Eduardo Frei in the run-off ballot.    
 
Scholarly studies have argued that the Concertación embraced neoliberalism. During PDC 
Patricio Aylwin’s presidency (1990-1994), an important set of social, political and economic 




in public spending on education and health as well as other important measures aiming to 
promote sustainable growth and reduce poverty. In addition, his administration introduced 
direct municipal elections. The presidency of PDC Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) went on to 
establish new priorities, focusing on international economic relations, with an emphasis on the 
negotiation of free trade agreements. PPD/PS President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) continued 
to pursue neoliberal policies, signing free trade agreements with the United States and the 
European Union. His administration adopted a fiscal rule mandating a cyclically-adjusted 
budget surplus of 1% of GDP in order to protect public spending and saving. Policies on health 
and education, as well as modernisation of the state and infrastructure development, benefitted 
the coalition’s popularity, allowing PS Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) to become the country’s 
first woman president. She represented a continuity of the Concertación’s neoliberal policies, 
but with an emphasis on strengthening the social safety net.   
 
The Concertación was formed by four centre-left parties and existed from 1988 until 2013 
when it was replaced by a new pact called La Nueva Mayoría (New Majority). It emerged in 
the context of the 1988 plebiscite and, after democracy was restored in 1990, not only won four 
successive presidential elections but also obtained a majority in all municipal and congressional 
elections until 2008 when it was defeated by the Alianza in that year’s municipal elections. 
 
From the beginning, the Concertación comprised a wide range of centre-left parties that were 
opposed to military rule and demanded the restoration of democracy (Figures 10 and 11). A 
very important event that contributed to its formation was Pinochet’s decision to permit a legal 
political opposition and to end “forced exile” in the run-up to the 1988 plebiscite.20 This enabled 
the coalition to incorporate several leaders who had supported and participated in Salvador 
Allende’s Popular Unity government.  
 
Sergio Bitar, one of the coalition’s leaders and a minister in the governments of Allende, Lagos 
and Bachelet, argues that the Concertación’s has its roots not only in the neoliberal, 
authoritarian and anti-democratic reforms implemented by the military regime, but also in the 
social, political and economic transformations promoted by the government of President 
Eduardo Frei Montalva and, afterwards, that of Allende:    
 
 
20 In an attempt to depict the October 1988 plebiscite as legitimate and fair, the government announced 
the end of forced exile on 1 September 1988. However, a considerable number of exiles who had taken 
foreign citizenship were still banned from returning (Wright & Oñate, 2007, p. 45). Forced exile was 
central to the Pinochet dictatorship’s strategy for consolidating and maintaining absolute control of Chile. 




“The Concertación is the daughter of the Popular Unity, but its origins were also determined by 
the subsequent crisis. You cannot understand it except in the historical context in Chile: from 
Frei’s and Allende’s attempts to provoke structural changes within Chilean society through to the 
radical transformations promoted by the military dictatorship….”.21  
 
As widely discussed in the literature, two issues played a crucial role in creating consensus and 
unity between centre and left-wing parties: opposition to the military regime and the aim of 
achieving a successful transition to democracy (Altman, Piñeiro, & Toro, 2013; Siavelis, 2009). 
Moreover, the overthrow of Allende in 1973, the failure of socialismo a la chilena (Chilean 
Socialism), the traumatic experience of exile and the crisis of Socialist governments in Eastern 
Europe (Lane, 2007b) produced a shift towards ideological moderation in most of the left-wing 
parties, especially some factions of the Socialist Party, contributing to a rapprochement with 
centre parties, particularly the Christian Democrat Party (PDC). After being adversaries during 
the Allende government, these two parties became allies:  
 
“For the PDC and even for moderate Socialists, the Communists’ strategy could not be considered. 
They realized that they must accept Pinochet’s institutional schedule and try and reform it 
(Garretón, 1991). The more radical Left, MIR and the Communists rejected this idea. Meanwhile, 
PDC leaders promoted the need to register in the recently created new electoral register…… After 
this, several political events helped make sense of the opposition’s political organization. Firstly, 
in 1987, the Socialists - Núñez and smaller Left groups - formed the Party for Democracy (PPD in 
Spanish) in 1987 as a catch-all electoral instrument to field legislative candidates. Its founder, 
Ricardo Lagos, had belonged to the modern Center-Left, a moderate party more open to new ideas 
than the Socialist party” (Dávila, 2011, pp. 117-118). 
 
In 1982, Chile was plunged into a deep economic and financial crisis (Ffrench-Davis, 2017; 
1999). In two consecutive years, 1982 and 1983, GDP contracted by more than 15% 
(Barandiarán & Hernández, 1999, p. 3). Although the economy recovered relatively quickly, 
the crisis had important political consequences for Pinochet’s rule because the resulting protests 
provoked social instability. In an attempt to control this, Pinochet appointed Sergio Onofre 
Jarpa as Minister of the Interior. Unlike his predecessor, Enrique Montero Marx, he was a 
civilian. Nonetheless, the political landscape began to change dramatically because, while a 
number of parties and other social organisations joined forces in a bid to create a common 
political project to promote a democratic transition, the regime’s supporters splintered into 
those who wanted to continue with authoritarian rule and those who favoured a return to 
democracy (Garretón, 1987).  
 
In 1983, in the midst of protests by trade unions and other social organisations, the opposition 
to the regime created the Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance), a pseudo-coalition22 to 
 
21 Personal interview with S. Bitar. My translation. See appendix III. 
22 It is referred to as a pseudo-coalition because, during the military regime in which Pinochet held 
executive power (1973-1989), Congress was closed, left-wing parties were declared illegal and other 




work for the restoration of democracy. Although including some members of right-wing 
parties, it mainly consisted of Christian Democrats and some factions of the Socialist Party. 
This alliance, which was eventually dissolved in 1988, was the first attempt to build a 
democratic alternative to the military regime. The Concertación emerged from this alliance, 
first as the Concertación de Partidos por el No (Coalition of Parties for the No), which 
supported the No option in the 1988 plebiscite. As former President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994–2000), son of President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), argues, the Concertación 
created a political project that sought first to compete against Pinochet in the plebiscite and then 
against the right-wing parties in democratic elections: 
 
“Undoubtedly, the main reason is that the majority of Chileans did not want to continue living 
under dictatorship but under a democratic regime, despite the fact that, at that time, a democratic 
system was far from being optimal….. During that period, the only political sector that could offer 
a peaceful transition to democracy was the Coalition of Parties for the No. It was the only coalition, 
as evidenced by the facts, that guaranteed the rule of law, respect for freedoms and other basic 
rights of people, such as social peace. Moreover, the Concertación had a strong commitment to 
promoting economic growth and social development. The objective was to benefit all Chileans, 
especially the poorest, who, at that time, represented almost half of the country’s population…. 
Clearly, the right-wing parties were not a better option, as they had not only been the political 
support of the military government and Pinochet himself, but had also supported him 
enthusiastically in the 1988 plebiscite with the Yes option, which would have meant extending 
Pinochet’s rule for eight years more.”23 
 
Figure 10 shows two main phases of the political history of the Concertación: the 1988 
plebiscite and the period between 1990 and 2013. On 2 February 1988, 14 political parties 
signed the pact that created the Coalition of Parties for the No (initially there were 13 but the 
Green Party was subsequently incorporated). However, after the democratic transition in 1990, 
only four parties remained in the coalition through to 2010: the Christian Democrat Party 
(PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), the Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD) and the Party for 
Democracy (PPD). Despite its origin in a wide range of centre and left-wing parties, the 
Concertación was essentially the union of two parties: the PDC and the PS, the main centre and 
left-wing party, respectively. As Bitar points out: 
 
“The 1988 plebiscite to decide on whether Pinochet would be given an additional term marked a 
tremendous historical change. We took on the enormous task of reconstructing the institutional 
democratic foundations, neutralizing hatred and seeking unity among Chileans.  The Concertación 
(a coalition based mainly on Christian Democrats and Social Democrats) acted with the conviction 
of re-establishing the authority of the civilian government over the military, showing respect for 
human rights, seek justice, and focus on reducing poverty” (Bitar, 2013, p. 5).  
 
As a coalition, the Concertación was born out of a heterogeneous group of politicians and 
activists from a political elite that already existed before the 1973 coup. Most of its key 
 




members had been active participants in politics before the coup, either in the executive or 
legislative branch. As had previously occurred during the Popular Front under President Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda (1938-1944), these actors were ready to set aside their differences and start to 
govern Chile (Navia, 2000). However, although Pinochet had introduced a law in 1987 that 
allowed some political parties to regain their legality (i.e. the PDC), the 1980 Constitution still 
banned Marxist parties. Therefore, neither the PS nor the Communist Party could exist legally. 
This led various factions and leftist groups to create the Party for Democracy (PPD), which was 
instrumental in the 1988 plebiscite (Angell, 2003; Lagos, 2013; Otano, 1995). 
 
The PPD served as a vehicle for a legal socialist party, inspired by social, liberal, progressive 
and democratic values, within the nascent Concertación. Several members of the PS joined the 
PPD. This is why, after the restoration of democracy, dual membership of both the PPD and 
the PS was permitted (until 1997). As an instrumental party, the main aim of the PPD was to 
contribute to the unified political force (the Concertación) that sought to re-establish 
democracy in Chile by peaceful and political means. It worked actively to achieve the triumph 
of the No option in the 1988 plebiscite. As former President Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the main 
leader and co-founder of this party, indicated on the day of its creation in 1987, it was 
compulsory for members of the coalition and, therefore, the PPD to register to vote in the 
plebiscite and work to prevent fraud (as had been the case in the 1980 plebiscite on the 
constitution):  
 
“If each party or each of us puts forward our respective projects, we are jumping into a subsequent 
stage, which is the post-military regime transition. The situation now obliges us to set a different 
programme. It is much easier to achieve consensus among very dissimilar communities for a 
transition project... The only dilemma in Chile today is dictatorship or democracy: to address this 
dilemma, those of who are for democracy will make this party an instrument through which to 
conquer it... We are here, Chilean men and women, from the right, centre and left, as citizens 
whose sole purpose is to win democracy... The way to win democracy is clear: register in the 
electoral registers and organise ourselves through the PPD to prevent fraud, to act on behalf of 
Chile and defend our vote” (Lagos, 1987, pp. 4-5). 
 
On the 1988 plebiscite, there were two different views within the Concertación. Some of its 
members were uncertain about the political consequences of a new plebiscite on the grounds 
that Pinochet had committed fraud in the 1980 plebiscite and was, therefore, likely to do so 
again. They, therefore, urged the need to reconsider participating and competing in the 
plebiscite. However, most of the coalition’s leaders argued that this was a new moment in 
Chilean political history and, unlike 1980, international pressure24 now demanded 
 
24 The military regime progressively lost the support of the United States as from 1986 and the 
assassination of the photographer Rodrigo Rojas de Negri who, along with Carmen Gloria Quintana, was 




accountability, making electoral fraud more difficult. As Lagos argues: “for Pinochet, the 
plebiscite was a tremendously negative process because, if he won, only a few would believe in 
a legitimate victory, especially considering opinion poll results” (Lagos, 2013, p. 602).  
 
Most of the Concertación leaders were convinced that this was the moment to defeat Pinochet 
and the military dictatorship and this view prevailed. After winning the plebiscite, the aim of 
this nascent coalition was then to win the 1989 presidential election. The Concertación de 
Partidos por el No became the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Concertation of 
Parties for Democracy), a new coalition comprising the PDC, the PS (now with legal existence), 
the PPD and the PRSD. Most of the other parties either disappeared or became part of these 











President Ronald Reagan of the regime’s abuses and led many of his advisers to suggest the need to 

























Source: Compiled by author with data from the Library of the National Congress (BCN), 2015. 
 
Figure 11. The Concertación parties. Chile: 1988-2010  
 




On 14 December 1989, Patricio Aylwin (PDC), the Concertación’s candidate, was elected 
president with 55.17% of the vote (SERVEL, 2014), similar to the percentage obtained by the 
No in the 1988 plebiscite. The Concertación remained in power until 2010 when Sebastián 
Piñera, the candidate of the Alianza, defeated Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in the run-off ballot of 
the presidential election. With its ability to develop a strategy for governing based on political 
consensus within and beyond the coalition, the Concertación provided a remarkable example 
of Latin American democratic transitions (Sehnbruch & Siavelis, 2014). From the beginning of 
the transition, it negotiated reforms with powerful players such as the ‘traditional’ right-wing 
parties as well as with the business elite (most of which supported Pinochet), the Pinochetistas 
(politicians and other ardent followers of Pinochet) and the military. This formula “ushered in 
high levels of economic growth, impressive strides in eliminating poverty and remarkable 
political stability, a model example for democratic transition around the hemisphere” (Siavelis, 
2010). 
 
During the 20 years under the Concertación, Chileans witnessed a remarkable decline in the 
poverty rate from 40% in 1990 to 15% in 2009. Extreme poverty, a condition characterised “by 
severe deprivation of basic human needs” (United-Nations, 1995), was also reduced from 15% 
to just 3% in the same period (Brandt, 2012, p. 6). In addition, significant reductions in illiteracy 
and mortality rates were achieved, education improved (principally school enrolment), life 
expectancy increased and infant mortality dropped. The economy also performed strongly and, 
as Aninat argued, “Overall, the 1990s were a period of vigorous and unprecedented expansion, 
with average annual GDP growth of 6.5 percent. While 1999 was a time of economic 
adjustment after the fallout of the Asian crisis, Chile is now ready to resume healthy growth in 
2000 and beyond” (Aninat, 2000, p. 1).  
 
However, by the mid-1990s, the Concertación began to face vociferous criticism from some 
political parties (such as the Communists), social movements, intellectuals, academics and 
some of its own members. They complained about its constant pacts and agreements (formal 
and informal) with power groups (mostly, the economic elites and the right) in order to maintain 
positions of privilege at both the economic and political levels. Within the coalition, these 
groups were known as the autoflagelantes (the self-flagellators) while those members of the 
coalition who justified and defended its decisions were known as the autocomplacientes (the 
self-satisfied).  
 
This period saw growing divisions within the coalition. The debate between the ‘self-satisfied’ 




Whereas the first group argued, based on economic and political results, that the Concertación 
governments had been successful, the latter countered that it had not accomplished a wide array 
of tasks that were essential to consolidate the democratic transition. These were defined as 
promesas incumplidas, or broken promises (Ominami, 2011; 2009) and included the ongoing 
prevalence of socioeconomic inequities, excessive privatisations and the maintenance of a 
number of institutions created under Pinochet. 
 
In addition to these broken promises, some scholars claimed that some of the agreements which 
the coalition had reached with power groups were designed to protect its own interests, which 
also called into question the democratic consolidation:  
 
“Agreement was reached on only adaptive and pragmatic matters, while the greater issues were 
obscure or simply excluded from the debate. The big issues were plentiful and pressing: the 
constitutional issue, human rights, politics and armed forces, the authoritarian enclaves……, the 
reduction of the leading role of the state and the weakness of the decentralization, regionalization 
and local democratization processes, labor relations, the sustainability of the development model. 
While these matters remained unaddressed, there could hardly be any credible talk of consensus” 
(Garretón, 1999, p. 259).  
 
The Concertación was also criticised for its decision to maintain many of Pinochet’s economic 
and political reforms: “It has already been 21 years since the Concertación, moving away from 
its historical principles, began to manage the inheritance of Pinochet with orthodox neoliberal 
efficiency... Is it not too long?” (Salazar, 2011, p. 7). However, and beyond these criticisms, the 
Concertación fostered discipline among the wide range of centre-left political parties that had 
opposed the military government and negotiated many important reforms with the right-wing 
parties before and during the plebiscite and after the democratic transition.  
 
After the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the Alianza and the Concertación exercised control 
over politics and brought institutional and political stability. The latter not only won four 
successive presidential elections but also led most social transformations in the post-Pinochet 
period. Some of the Concertación’s leading members have highlighted its success as compared 
to other Latin American countries. The Pinochet dictatorship was one of the longest in the 
region, but the political stability achieved as a result of the Concertación’s project is also among 








ii. The Alianza 
 
The Alianza (Alliance) was created in August 1989, after the 1988 plebiscite by two parties:  
the Union Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union - UDI) and Renovación 
Nacional (National Renewal - RN). The coalition was originally named Democracia y 
Progreso (Democracy and Progress) but changed its name several times in the 1990s (Figure 
3) until becoming the Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile) in 2000. This name was used until 
the presidential election of 2009-2010 when its candidate, Sebastián Piñera, defeated the 
Concertación’s Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle25 and it was renamed Alianza por el Cambio (Alliance 
for Change). 
 
The UDI has been historically the coalition’s largest party. Although founded 1983, its origins 
date back to 1967 and gremialismo (guildism), a movement inspired by the ideas of Jaime 
Guzmán Errázuriz. At that time, Guzmán was president of the student union of the Catholic 
University’s Law Faculty and led opposition to a proposed national reform of universities that 
sought to establish a new institutional framework to promote university autonomy and power-
sharing with students and broaden social access to higher education. Guzmán used the word 
gremio (guild) to define the opposition to these reforms: “The Gremialistas felt student politics 
should not concern themselves with the opening up of education and broader social demands. 
Instead they argued they should restrict their focus to the narrowest issues of student welfare 
(in other words to union or guild demands or ‘demandas gremiales’)” (Akram, 2014, p. 30). 
 
Although the reform was eventually approved, Guzmán’s ideas led to the formation of the 
gremialista movement, which defines itself as a school of thought or intellectual tradition 
inspired by Catholic social teaching. Its main beliefs have their root in the principle that any 
correct social order must be based on intermediate societies between the person and the state, 
which are created and managed in freedom by its members and should achieve the purposes for 
which they were created and no others (Moyano, 2017). In 1969, after Ernesto Illanes, the 
movement’s candidate, became president of the Catholic University’s Student Federation 
(FEUC), the gremialista movement triumphed in many successive student elections in that 
university and quickly expanded its ideology to other Chilean universities. In 1975, Guzmán 
went on to found the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional (Youth National Unity Front), and, in 
1983, after the 1982 economic crisis, the Movimiento Unión Demócrata Independiente 
(Independent Democratic Union Movement), the UDI party.  
 
25 For the presidential election of 2013, after the period covered by this research, the UDI and the RN 




From its creation, the UDI vigorously supported the military regime. Soon after Allende’s 
overthrow in 1973, Guzmán became Pinochet’s closest adviser and played a key role in drafting 
his 1977 Chacarillas speech26 as well as in the Ortúzar Commission on a new constitution. 
Although never taking an official position, Guzmán continued as a collaborator, mostly writing 
Pinochet’s important speeches and providing political advice. During this period, he became 
close to Sergio Fernández, the Minister of the Interior, and the so-called Chicago Boys’ 
neoliberal doctrine.27 As Correa (2005) argues, the right’s support for Pinochet was absolute 
and decisive in promoting a new political regime in Chile: 
 
“The support that the right wing – through the parties, businessmen and the press – gave to the 
military dictatorship was total. Although some members tried to keep their distance from Pinochet 
and the regime itself, with attempts to create political parties in opposition to the dictatorship, they 
did not succeed in gaining electoral support. The right wing was Pinochetista. Indeed, its members 
established the military regime’s substantive ideological principles and policy, which still prevail 
with regard to their economic and social transformations as well as the new political institutions 
established in recent years” (Correa, 2005, p. 269). 
 
The UDI was founded, as a political movement, on 24 September 1983 by Jaime Guzmán, 
Pablo Longueira, Javier Leturia, Guillermo Elton and Luis Cordero. Afterwards, in 1987, 
considering the gremialista movement’s popularity and the fact that the Pinochet regime had 
authorised the creation of political parties and opened the national voting register, the UDI 
decided, along with other social and political groups such as the Unión Nacional (National 
Union) and the Frente Nacional del Trabajo (National Workers’ Front), to create the 
Renovación Nacional party (National Renewal - RN). The idea was that RN would be the only 
right-wing party to support Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite.   
 
However, after irreconcilable differences with Andrés Allamand (of the National Union) and 
Sergio Onofre Jarpa (of the National Workers’ Front), Jaime Guzmán was expelled from the 
RN on 20 April 1988, six months before the plebiscite.28 In response, he decided, along with 
 
26 The Chacarillas speech was given at an event held by the Youth National Unity Front to commemorate 
the second anniversary of its foundation and the anniversary of the battle of La Concepción between 
Chile and Peru in 1882. The event took place on top of the Chacarillas Hill in Santiago on 9 July 1977 
and was organised by 77 members of the Front (most of whom became politicians after the return of 
democracy). Pinochet’s speech is considered a declaration of principles by the military government. That 
night, surrounded by flame torches, he declared: “It is convenient to reiterate once again that September 
11 did not represent just the overthrow of an illegitimate and failed government, but the end of an 
exhausted institutional regime, and the consequent imperative to build a new one” (Pinochet, 1977, p. 
13). 
27 Under Pinochet, the so-called Chicago Boys, a group of right-wing economists who had studied in 
Chicago with Milton Friedman, worked seamlessly together with the gremialistas because they needed 
a firm authoritarian political base in order to implement their economic reforms (Akram, 2013; Huneeus, 
2006; Boeninger, 1998).    
28 Internal party elections were due to be held in March 1988. However, Jaime Guzmán reported 
irregularities in the election of its leadership, resulting in irreconcilable differences with Sergio Onofre 




Pablo Longueira, to create ‘la UDI por el Sí’ (the UDI for the Yes) to support Pinochet. In April 
1989, they went on to found the UDI party. Subsequently, as shown in Figure 12, from the 
return to democracy through to 2010, the UDI and the RN were the main parties within the 
Alianza.  
 
The National Party, one of the most important right-wing parties in the 1960s and 1970s, was 
a member of the Alianza from 1992 until 1994 when it merged with the Union of the Centrist 
Centre (UCC), which remained in the coalition until 1996. The Party of the South (PSUR), a 
party created in order to promote the interests of southern Chile, also participated from 1993 
until its dissolution in 1998, when most of its members joined the UDI. From 1999 onwards, 
the Alianza comprised only the RN and the UDI.  
 
Although the Alianza failed to win any presidential election between 1990 and 2010, it did play 
an active role in Congress, due to the existence of the binomial electoral system. This meant 
that the Concertación constantly had to negotiate numerous aspects of its reform agenda with 
the Alianza. In this context, although the two coalitions maintained a certain ideological 
distance (Gamboa, López & Baeza, 2013), they were able to reach important agreements on 
constitutional reform, public policies and the consolidation of a development agenda for the 
country, despite this causing divisions in the Concertación between the so-called 
autocomplacientes (the self-satisfied) and the autoflagelantes (the self-flagellators). This 
situation meant that both coalitions evolved from confrontation to consensus (Waissbluth, 
2006). 
 
A key example from this period is the agreement reached by the two coalitions in the face of 
the political crisis triggered by a high-profile corruption scandal involving the Public Works 
Ministry (MOP) and the company, GATE S.A., in 2000.29 This led to a national agreement on 
modernisation of the state, which not only resolved the crisis but also opened the way to greater 




from the party and his supporters decided to resign from the RN and refound the original gremialista 
movement as the UDI por el Sí. It is important to note that the members of the UDI who belonged to the 
RN always sought to conserve their own identity (Muñoz, 2016). 
29 The MOP-GATE case was at the centre of the largest corruption scandal to occur during the 
government of President Ricardo Lagos. It involved principally officials at the Public Works Ministry 
(MOP) and the company, Gestión Ambiental y Territorial Sociedad Anónima (GATE S.A.). It was 
revealed that, since 1997, the MOP had been paying 129 employees wage top-ups for work they had not 





Figure 12. The Alianza. Chile: 1988-2010  
Source: Compiled by author with data from the Library of the National Congress (BCN), 2015. 
 
Figure 13. The Alianza parties. Chile: 1988-2010  
 





This chapter has analysed the formation and evolution of the two political coalitions that have 
dominated Chile’s recent history, leading the process that put an end to the military regime and 
the subsequent process of re-democratisation that began with the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 
congressional and presidential elections. Both coalitions were characterised by large-scale 




taking power, their projects shifted towards the parties with greater political representation and 
a larger social base.   
 
In the case of the Concertación, the four largest parties (PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD) endured 
over time. Indeed, the coalition’s first two governments were led by the PDC and the third and 
fourth by the PS. The Concertación won four successive presidential elections and won a 
majority in all congressional and municipal elections through to 2008, making it the most 
successful coalition in the recent history of Latin America. As a governing coalition, it showed 
pragmatism in the management of public policy and its adoption of the economic development 
strategy implemented by the Chicago Boys under the military regime (Navia, 2009). This led 
to debate and divisions within the coalition, which became more marked after its defeat in the 
run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential election.  
 
Thanks to the binomial system for congressional elections, the Alianza played an active role as 
opposition. Like the Concertación, it attempted to attract centre-right political forces after the 
restoration of democracy, but finally consisted of the two parties with the greatest political 
impact and largest social base (RN and UDI). As a political force, the Alianza grew significantly 
after its victory in the 2008 municipal elections and the run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential 
election. However, the incorporation of more progressive centre-right forces marked its end in 
2015.   
 
Much of the stability of the agreements reached by the political elite, as expressed in these two 
coalitions, can be attributed to their social origins. The vast majority of their members came 
from similar social circles in terms of characteristics such as their socioeconomic origin (high 
socioeconomic strata), family relationships in common and elite schools. This permitted 
interaction and negotiation through intermediaries within these elite groups (Espinoza & 
Madrid, 2010). This is important in explaining the logic of social closure and the low turnover 
seen in the Chilean post-transition political elite (Davis, 2012). This is discussed in greater 
















This chapter describes and analyses the electoral evolution of the Chilean party elite between 
1990 and 2010. After the end of the dictatorship and the subsequent return to democratic 
elections in the late 1980s, the centre-left Concertación and the right-wing Alianza por Chile 
coalitions established a partyarchy (Siavelis, 2009). As shown by various scholars, competition 
between these two multi-party coalitions dominated electoral and legislative politics between 
1990 and 2010 (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Navia, 2008). They exercised control over the 
political system and held almost all the seats in both chambers of Congress.  
 
During the democratic transition, the political elite established agreements on certain political 
matters and policy issues, allowing them to maintain institutional stability and consolidate a 
successful democratic transition (Angell & Pollack, 1995; Fuentes, 2012; Godoy, 1999). 
However, this approach favoured the concentration of power in the two coalitions, the 
incumbent party elites, and affected democratic consolidation. As noted by Sehnbruch and 
Siavelis, this emerged as one of the main weaknesses of the post-transition period in Chile: 
  
“Politics in most countries is necessarily and by definition dominated by elites. The problem in 
Chile, however, is that the deal-making at first necessary to maintain the democratic transition, 
and now essential to maintaining the Concertación coalition, has undermined democratic 
responsiveness, accountability and legitimacy. This means that the very strengths of Chile’s 
transition have now turned into the weaknesses of the post-transition” (Sehnbruch & Siavelis, 2014, 
p. 4).  
 
After the transition, these party elites maintained the same political strategy, based on 
agreements about important political issues of institutional and economic development. This 
allowed them to preserve some original aspects of Pinochet’s institutional design and favoured 
their permanence in power as incumbents (Tables 5, 6 and 7). Moreover, most parties in the 
two coalitions tended to select their candidates for Congress through non-democratic 
mechanisms. For instance, between 1990 and 2010, only the PDC, and only since 2001, 
promoted open primaries (Table 8) while other parties continued to control the selection 
mechanism at the national and, in some instances, local level.  
 
As Navia argues, the failure to adopt open primaries was due, among other factors, to the 




“Thus, although the adoption of reforms that promote the use of open primaries might be 
desirable, a unilateral adoption of open primaries by a party might not produce positive results 
for that party. Moreover, given that the final decision over which parties will have candidates in 
which districts depends on the intracoalition negotiations, the adoption of open primaries will not 
automatically result in the nomination of candidates who win their party primaries. Unless 
primaries are held at the coalition level rather than the party level, the adoption of open or closed 
primaries will not limit the existing power of party elites to influence the candidate selection 
process in Chile. If primaries are eventually held at the coalition level, then the presence of party 
loyalists will be significantly hindered, since voters –rather than party elites- will make the decision 
as to who actually makes it on the ballot” (Navia, 2008, p. 112).   
 
This is also borne out by the electoral results of the PDC which deteriorated after it adopted 
open primaries. It lost seats in Congress in the elections held in 2001, 2005 and 2009 (Tables 6 
and 7).  
 
As Sehnbruch and Siavelis (2014) argue, the strengths of the transition eventually turned into 
the weakness of the post-transition period. The strategy of consensus and the binomial electoral 
system led to a highly centralised political system, playing a decisive role in the formation of 
this partyarchy between 1990 and 2010.  
 
 
ii. Transformation of the Chilean party system 
 
Along with other independent variables, such as elite preferences, electoral institutions affect 
the existence and performance of political parties, (Cox, 1997, p.5). When their political 
transitions took place, most Latin American countries decided either to adopt the same electoral 
system that existed before the authoritarian regime or to reform them in the direction of greater 
proportional representation. Chile took a different path and is quite unique in that the party 
elites agreed to replace an historical proportional system with a majoritarian one (Navia & 
Sandoval, 1998; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). 
 
Before the 1973 coup, Chile had a multi-party system, organised around right, centre and left 
axes, in which five parties were the most important at the national level: the National Party 
(PN), which was the result of the merger of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, on the right, 
the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD) in the centre 
and the Socialist Party (PS) and Communist Party (PC) on the left (Valenzuela, 1995, pp. 40-
41). From Arturo Alessandri Palma’s election as president (PL-PR) in 1932 through to Salvador 
Allende’s overthrow in 1973, this system remained relatively unchanged. During that period, 





In 1936, the Radical, Socialist and Communist parties created the Frente Popular (Popular 
Front) which, due to internal conflicts, came to an end in 1941. However, its creation allowed 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PR) to win the 1938 presidential election. This was followed by the 
governments of Juan Antonio Ríos (PR, 1942-1946) and Gabriel González Videla (PR, 1946-
1952), completing a period known as the “Radical era”. In 1952, General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo, who had already been president between 1927 and 1931, won the presidential election, 
supported mainly by the Partido Agrario Laborista (Agrarian Labour Party) and a faction of 
the Socialist Party. However, the Agrarian Labour Party was dissolved after the end of Ibáñez’s 
term in 1958. In that year, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, son of former President Arturo 
Alessandri Palma, was elected. Supported by the Liberal and Conservative parties, he tried to 
implement a model of “gerentes para Chile” (managers for Chile). However, it did not produce 
the expected results and, in the 1964 presidential election, the right-wing parties decided to 
support Eduardo Frei Montalva (PDC) in order to prevent the election of Salvador Allende 
(PS). The three-way right-centre-left divide of Chilean politics then again reappeared in the 
1970 election won by Allende (Navia, 2000). 
 
Electoral participation was given a considerable boost by the inclusion of women in political 
life. In 1935, National Decree Nº 5.357 gave women the right to vote in municipal elections 
and, as from 1949, with the modification of the Law N° 4.554, they were also allowed to vote 
in presidential and congressional elections. Subsequently, as the electorate expanded, the 
political parties evolved to mobilise the growing mass of voters as the means of political control 
(Valenzuela, 1995). Moreover, the creation of the cédula única electoral (electoral card) in 
1958 put an end to vote-buying. In 1969, blind and otherwise visually impaired people were 
allowed to vote, followed in 1972 by illiterate people. All these measures led to a significant 
increase in the electorate from 7.8% of the population in 1932 to almost 37% in the 1973 
elections (Cruz-Coke R. , 1984). Although the expansion of suffrage strengthened democratic 
institutions and fostered electoral support for left-wing parties (Toro, Morales, & Piñeiro, El 
efecto de las leyes electorales sobre la fragmentación partidaria en Chile, 1999-2008: Voto 
estratégico, barreras de entrada e información, 2011), it coincided with the growth of the 
political and social tensions and polarisations that led to the breakdown of democracy (Torcal 
& Mainwaring, 2002). 
 
Shortly before the 1973 coup, although the number of political parties with parliamentary 
representation had increased, the share of votes obtained by the four largest parties (PN, PDC, 
PS and PC) was larger than in any of the previous elections held in 1961, 1965, and 1969 (Navia 






However, this stability came to an end after the 1973 coup, after which the military junta closed 
Congress and ordered an indefinite political recess. Whereas the PS, PC and other leftist 
factions were targeted by the dictatorship’s repressive security forces and most of their 
members were arrested, tortured, exiled and/or killed, the PN and the PDC welcomed the 
military intervention. However, while the PN voluntarily joined the military government, only 
a few members of the PDC actively supported Pinochet’s rule. In fact, as Pinochet and his 
regime decided to stay on in power, rather than calling early elections, the PDC opted to join 
the opposition to the regime. 
 
In spite of being officially banned, political activity continued under Pinochet and, after the 
1982 crisis and the resulting protests, the political parties gained in importance. The protests 
triggered by the crisis took the form of demonstrations on the main streets of the country’s 
principal cities. They also included strikes by workers and at schools and universities and 
clashes with the security forces in poorer peripheral neighbourhoods. The regime’s response 
was always violent, leaving dozens of people dead or injured. These protests continued through 
to the 1988 plebiscite (Huneeus, 2006).  
 
The crisis and the protests led to the emergence of new political leaders within the opposition 
to the regime. The PDC, which had been able to maintain its internal organisation, played an 
important leadership role during this period (Dávila, 2011; Scully, 1992). In obedience to the 
regime’s orders, most right-wing parties had ceased to be active but, in the early 1980s, two 
parties - the RN and, subsequently, the UDI - were founded. The former brought together 
traditional right-wing leaders while the UDI was formed principally by Pinochetistas or, in 
other words, people whose primary loyalty was to Pinochet and his regime (Huneeus, 2006). 
 
The left was definitely the most damaged political force during this period. The PS and the PC 
continued functioning abroad in exile. While the PS split into multiple factions, the PC retained 
important influence in trade unions and student organisations. In this context, the Concertación 
and the Alianza were created and participated in the 1988 plebiscite. “By the time the plebiscite 
was held, more than 30 political parties and groups were operating in the country, excluding 
the officially illegal Socialist Party, Communist Party and other Marxist and leftist groups. 
Altogether, Socialists, Communists and other leftist groups were divided into at least 7 parties 





In 1987, the military junta decreed that all political parties must register with the Electoral 
Registry, with the exception of Marxist parties (which continued to be banned until 1989). Most 
parties formed part of either the Concertación or the Alianza (Huneeus, 2006). This form of 
political organisation persisted after the democratic transition, due to the binomial system 
which had replaced the proportional representation system established under the 1925 
Constitution: 
 
“The historical antecedents of the binomial system date back to the creation of the Commission for 
the Study of a New Constitution by the newly ensconced military government in the waning months 
of 1973. The Junta believed that the proportional representation (PR) system established by the 
1925 Constitution had led to a proliferation in the number of political parties. The intensity of the 
resulting electoral competition was, in the Junta’s view, a leading cause of the political 
fragmentation and polarization that preceded the election of Allende in 1970 and eventually 
resulted in the military coup of 11 September 1973” (Pastor, 2004, p. 48). 
 
When President Aylwin took office in 1990, most of his appointments for positions of trust 
went to members of the PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD (Dávila, 2011; Navia & Sandoval, 1998; 
Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). Moreover, a wide range of characteristics of Chilean electoral 
preferences and the political party structure before 1973 continued to exist after 1989 (Scully, 
1992; Valenzuela & Scully, 1997).  
 
The ability of the elites to maintain their power resources plays an essential role in determining 
the functioning of a political system. As most elites and their members boast multiple resources 
of power within society, institutions and other legal mechanisms are necessary to regulate their 
interactions in order to avoid or reduce political crises (Pareto, 1901). In Chile, despite the 1973 
coup and an authoritarian regime that lasted nearly two decades, the political elite was able to 
reach a wide range of agreements that favoured a democratic transition and the country’s stable 
institutional development.  
 
However, as explained in Chapter III, the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves resulted 
in a paradox between a successful democratic transition and the process of democratic 
consolidation. While the first refers to the transformation of a government regime, the second 
is the process whereby a newly established democratic regime acquires the robustness that 
makes a return to non-democratic rule unlikely (Gasiorowski & Power, 1998, p.740). Although 
the agreement reached by the governing coalitions on maintaining the Pinochet regime’s 
institutional and economic legacy gave the post-dictatorship political process institutional and 
political stability, it constrained its democratic consolidation (Garretón, 2012). 
 




the institutional framework for the new limited democracy. However, as Pinochet’s supporters 
were able to exercise a greater capacity for negotiation during the beginning of the transition, 
the Concertación had to accept a wide range of “conditions” in order to avoid a new 
authoritarian regime. This was a decisive factor in the definition of the post-authoritarian 
institutional design (Heiss & Navia, 2008). However, after the transition, this coalition won 
four successive presidential elections and all legislative and municipal elections until 2008 
while, thanks to the binomial system, the Alianza maintained the second majority. As Ominami 
argues, nobody in the coalition could ever have imagined this political outcome:  
 
“I think it is very important to separate things... Because the Concertación was created with the 
aim of confronting Pinochet's dictatorship and of consolidating the political transition, nobody, 
but nobody, thought that the Concertación would stay in power for 20 years. What brought us 
together at that time? The dictatorship. The idea was that we would generate a mobilisation of the 
masses, a strike, which would finally end the dictatorship... But this option became unviable. Then, 
in the coalition’s member parties, we knew we had to learn from previous mistakes and generate 
a common force in order to achieve a transition from authoritarianism to a new democratic regime 
that did not have the shortcomings of the previous one”.30 
 
This Concertación’s idea of “transar en la medida de lo possible” (to compromise as far as 
possible) was conceived as a strategic principle of political action, with the clear aim of 
achieving acceptance of the rules of the game for governing under a more democratic system. 
However, some politicians and other intellectuals argued that, over the years, the strategy 
became one of “transar sin parar” (constant compromise) (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998, p.231). This 
argument had weight in that some members of the Concertación had supported Allende and his 
slogan of “avanzar sin transar” (advance without compromise) but were now advocating a 
strategy that implied reaching agreements with Pinochet’s supporters. 
 
During the post-authoritarian period, some members of the Concertación argued for a change 
of approach, mostly because of the maintenance of Pinochet’s neoliberal transformations. This 
prompted debate between the autocomplacientes (the self-satisfied), who justified and defended 
coalition’s decisions, and the autoflagelantes (the self-flagellators), who were critical of its 
performance (see Chapter IV). While the former pointed to the country’s economic 
performance and the institutional stability achieved by the Concertación governments, the latter 
complained of a lack of political will for more radical reforms to eliminate the vestiges of the 
military dictatorship, including the authoritarian enclaves (Navia, 2009; Silva, 2007). When the 
Concertación lost the 2009 presidential election, the self-satisfied lost spaces of influence. 
 
The decision not to eliminate the enclaves, including particularly the binomial system, was not 
 




only decisive in the establishment of democracy, but also enabled the party elites to retain their 
political power under a balanced system dominated by two coalitions, or a partyarchy (Siavelis, 
2009). In this context, an underlying question about the post-authoritarian period has to do with 
the form in which these party elites were created and reproduced between 1990 and 2010. 
 
 
iii. A political elite “a la chilena” 
 
In Chile, the elites have historically played an important role in maintaining structures of 
dominance at odds with egalitarian principles. This form of elitism dates back to the Spanish 
colonisation in the seventeenth century when an “orden señorial” (stately order) was 
established (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998). Albeit evolving constantly, this order persisted with the same 
ruling class, which maintained its pre-eminence. The agrarian reform, initiated by the 
government of Frei Montalva and deepened during the government of Allende, marked an 
important milestone in the redefinition of this structure of domination. However, this ambitious 
policy ended in an unprecedented political crisis and an imbalance between stability and forms 
of political integration within Chilean society (Bengoa, 2015; Lehmann, 1992; 1971). 
 
The institutional, economic and political crisis suffered by Allende’s Chile, and, therefore, his 
road to socialism deepened when the PDC ceased to act as a political centre and decided to 
support military intervention. This broke the equilibrium within the political elite and, added to 
the mistakes, gaps and contradictions of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), aggravated an 
unprecedented democratic crisis, leading to the 1973 coup (Garretón & Moulian, 1983). The 
coup resulted in an important transformation of the forms of political domination. While the 
right-wing parties supported Pinochet and contributed significantly to the design of the new 
institutional framework and the 1980 Constitution, the centre-left parties were displaced from 
political power.  
 
In sociopolitical terms, one of the key aspects of this period is the role played by the ruling 
classes. Moulian argues that their attitude was closer to containment, rather than modernisation, 
with the right (historically linked to the country’s wealthy classes) always playing a 
traditionalist-oligarchic role linked to the institution of the “hacienda” (agricultural estate), 
instead of devising a capitalist modernisation project. For this reason, Moulian asserts that the 
Chilean right suffered an historic split between the so-called “state of commitment” period and 





Moulian’s thesis contrasts with that of Correa (2005), who concludes that what happened within 
the Chilean right was, in fact, a silent dispute between a social Christian project, linked to the 
old agrarian order, and a capitalist modernisation project, with the latter becoming the national 
project finally implemented by the military regime with the assistance of the “gremialistas” and 
the Chicago Boys (Akram, 2014; Correa, 2005). Despite this difference, Correa and Moulian, 
however, agree that the left also ended up being part of this capitalist modernisation project: 
 
“There is something on which both Tomás Moulian’s and Sofía Correa’s theses agree. The Chilean 
modernisation is the result of a rare fusion between a right wing that endorses the modernisation 
project (quite late, according to Moulian, and quite early, according to Correa) and a left wing 
that is hegemonised by it. In other words, despite appearances and the fact that Moulian argues 
that the right wing had a strategy of containment while Correa claims that it possessed a 
modernising spirit that defeated the social Christian doctrine, both authors agree that the 
modernising project ended up hegemonising the left-wing parties” (Peña, 2007, p. 161). 
 
A key feature of this capitalist modernisation in Chile was the lack of inclusive institutions. 
This was the principal cause of an excessive concentration of power at the economic and 
political levels. Throughout this period, the Chilean elites developed a number of networks that 
contributed to the maintenance of this concentration which, as discussed above, already existed 
before the governments of Frei and Allende. In other words, this form of inequity in the 
distribution of power not only existed in the past, but also persisted during the military regime 
and after the democratic transition (Baland & Robinson, 2008; Robinson, 2013). 
 
After the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, political concentration was strengthened mainly due 
to the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves, particularly the binomial electoral system, 
which favoured the continuity in power of the Chilean political party elites (Navia, 2000). This 
is a key focus of this research since its purpose is to analyse the type of social resources that 
are decisive in both the creation and reproduction of the political elite during the period between 
the return of democracy and the end of the first Bachelet administration in 2010. 
 
 
iv. Electoral performance of the Chilean political elites, 1990-2010 
 
In the wake of the success of the end of the dictatorship, few Chileans were aware that much 
of its authoritarian institutional design remained in place. Instead of retreating from public life, 
Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the Army, a clear sign of the military’s ongoing 
importance in post-transitional Chile: “While in many countries former dictators board a plane 
for Miami or Paris when their regimes come to an end, Pinochet packed his desk at La Moneda 




Siavelis, 2009, p.17). This was the result of the agreement established between the 
Concertación and the Alianza to foster a peaceful political transition to democracy. 
 
The Concertación’s political formula was successful, but projected an image of elitism and 
excessive party dominance. The same was true of the Alianza. After the end of Pinochet’s 
regime, both coalitions established a partyarchy or a “polity characterized by political party 
domination” (Siavelis, 2009, p.3). This brought with it practices such as the elite’s control of 
candidate selection and electoral politics, party-dominated politics, the informal political party 
quota system (“cuoteo”) and elitist and extra-institutional policy-making, which Siavelis 
defines as post-authoritarian enclaves (Siavelis, 2009b). In the case of the informal political 
party quota system, many studies have underscored the importance of the relative strength of 
each coalition’s member parties in the allocation of senior positions (González-Bustamante & 
Garrido-Vergara, 2018; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016; González-Bustamante, 2013). 
 
A wide variety of data illustrates the way in which the Concertación and the Alianza dominated 
Chilean politics between 1990 and 2010. Table 5 shows the results of presidential elections 
between 1989 and 2005 when the Concertación won four successive elections while the Alianza 
took second place in all of them and consistently obtained a high vote. Indeed, in 1999, since 
no candidate received more than 50% of the vote, a second-round run-off was held on 16 
January 2000 in which Ricardo Lagos, the Concertación’s candidate, defeated the Alianza’s 
Joaquín Lavín by a margin of barely 3%. Again, in 2005, no candidate obtained more than 50% 
in the first round, although, in this case, Michelle Bachelet defeated Sebastián Piñera by a 
higher margin (7%). 
 
Table 5 also shows each coalition’s mechanism for selecting its presidential candidate. In the 
case of the Alianza, the selection method used in all the elections was “elite-centred”. In other 
words, a select group of members of the right-wing political elite nominated its candidate in all 
presidential elections between 1990 and 2010. By contrast, in the case of the Concertación, 
only Patricio Aylwin, the first president elected after Pinochet, was nominated in this way. For 
the 1993 presidential election, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, son of former President Eduardo Frei 
Montalva, was selected through a closed primary (only members of the Concertación parties 
could vote) and, in 1999, Ricardo Lagos was selected through an open primary. In 2005, 
Michelle Bachelet became the Concertación’s candidate after the PDC’s Soledad Alvear 
withdrew ahead of an open primary. These elite power mechanisms in the selection of 
candidates can also be seen in the case of congressional elections where there is abundant 




Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013; Navia, 2008; Toro & García-Grandón, 2008). 
 
Table 5. Presidential candidates, Concertación and Alianza, 1990-2005  
 









     
Concertación 
Patricio Aylwin 1989 Elite-centred Yes 55.17  -- 
Eduardo Frei 1993 Closed 
primary (a) 
Yes 57.98  -- 
Ricardo Lagos 1999 Open coalition 
primary (b) 
Yes 47.96 51.31 
     Michelle Bachelet 2005 Open coalition 
primary (c) 
Yes 45.9 53.49 
Alianza       Hernán Büchi 1989 Elite-centred 
(d) 
No 29.4  -- 
     Arturo Alessandri 1993 Elite-centred 
(d) 
No 24.41  -- 
Joaquín Lavín 1999 Elite-centred No 47.51 48.69 
Joaquín Lavín 2005 Elite-centred 
(e) 
No 23.2  -- 
   Sebastián Piñera 2005 Elite-centred 
(e) 
No 25.4 46.5 
 
(a) Only members of the coalition parties. 
(b) All voters except members of a party other than those in the Concertación. 
(c) Although an open primary was planned, Soledad Alvear, Bachelet’s contender, pulled out before it was held. 
(d) Both Büchi and Alessandri were independent right-wing candidates supported by the Alianza (although it was 
not called that until 1999).  
(e) In 2005, the RN supported Sebastián Piñera and the UDI supported Joaquín Lavín. Afterwards, in the second 
round, both parties supported Sebastián Piñera.   
Source: Compiled by author with data from Altman, 2008, pp. 244-249, and http://elecciones.gov.cl. 
 
Between 1990 and 2010 the Concertación and the Alianza exercised veto power. When 
defining their respective candidates for congressional, presidential and municipal elections, 
these party elites were normally able to block possible candidates from other parties and, 
therefore, promote their own candidates. Navia argues that, during this period, “party elites in 
Chile exercise effective veto power in the candidate selection process, but they do not fully 




additional power to block aspirants from other parties and promote candidacies from their 
own. Often the preferences of political parties with respect to candidate selection are trumped 
in the interests of coalition unity” (Navia, 2008, p. 92).  
 
After the end of the political transition, the political parties reacted to the new electoral rules. 
As from the first congressional election in 1989, party nominations started to become 
increasingly embedded in a broader electoral support strategy, thereby enhancing their long-
term impact. Each party sought to nominate popular candidates or, in other words, those 
individuals who would eventually obtain more votes in the district, rather than other members 
of the party. However, because nominations were also negotiated within the coalition (the 
binomial system meant that party elites had to negotiate the nomination of candidates in each 
district), most parties tried to nominate not only popular but also loyalist candidates in order to 
avoid their choices  being blocked by the coalition’s party elites (Luna & Altman, 2011; Navia, 
2008). 
 
In the case of Congress, the Concertación and the Alianza took most of the seats in both houses 
in the elections held between 1989 and 2009 (Tables 6 and 7). In the case of the Chamber of 
Deputies, the Concertación obtained over 50% of the seats in all elections until 2005 while the 
Alianza obtained over 40% in all elections except 1997. As shown in Table 7, the predominance 
of the two coalitions was even greater in the Senate, with the Concertación winning over 50% 
of the available seats in all elections from 1989 to 2009 and the Alianza taking over 40% in 
1989, 1997 and 2005. However, in the 1993, 2001 and 2009 elections, each coalition obtained 
50% of the seats up for election. This predominance is also evident in the case of municipal 
elections (Table 9). However, in this case, the Concertación obtained a majority of the votes in 
all elections except for 2008. 
 
Table 6. Chilean Chamber of Deputies Elections, 1989-2009 
 
  DEPUTIES 
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009(a) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(120) 
Concertación PDC 45 38 84.4 31.7 48 37 77.1 30.8 55 38 69.1 31.7 54 23 42.6 19.2 56 20 35.7 16.7 39 19 48.7 15.8 
PPD 25 16 64.0 13.3 25 15 60.0 12.5 29 16 55.2 13.3 24 20 83.3 16.7 27 21 77.8 17.5 27 18 66.7 15.0 
PS 0 0 0.0 0.0 28 15 53.6 12.5 26 11 42.3 9.2 21 10 47.6 8.3 21 15 71.4 12.5 24 11 45.8 9.2 
PRSD 16 5 31.3 4.2 15 2 13.3 1.7 8 4 50.0 3.3 14 6 42.9 5.0 9 7 77.8 5.8 14 5 35.7 4.2 
Others 30 10 33.3 8.3 4 1 25.0 0.8 2 0 0.0 0.0 7 3 42.9 2.5 7 2 28.6 1.7 16 4 0.0 3.3 
TOTAL 116 69 59.5 57.5 120 70 58.3 58.3 120 69 57.5 57.5 120 62 51.7 51.7 120 65 54.2 54.2 120 57 47.5 47.5 
Alianza RN 66 29 43.9 24.2 41 29 70.7 24.2 52 23 44.2 19.2 45 18 40.0 15.0 50 19 38.0 15.8 51 18 35.3 15.0 
UDI 30 11 36.7 9.2 29 15 51.7 12.5 47 17 36.2 14.2 54 31 57.4 25.8 59 33 55.9 27.5 56 37 66.1 30.8 
Others 23 8 34.8 6.7 50 6 12.0 5.0 20 7 35.0 5.8 20 8 40.0 6.7 11 2 18.2 1.7 13 3 23.1 2.5 
TOTAL 119 48 40.3 40.0 120 50 41.7 41.7 119 47 39.5 39.2 119 57 47.9 47.5 120 54 45.0 45.0 120 58 48.3 48.3 
Others Others 184 3 1.6 2.5 144 0 0.0 0.0 203 4 2.0 3.3 142 1 0.7 0.8 146 1 0.7 0.8 189 5 2.6 4.2 
TOTAL 419 120 28.6 100.0 384 120 31.3 100.0 442 120 27.1 100.0 381 120 31.5 100.0 386 120 31.1 100.0 429 120 28.0 100.0 
N.C.: Number of candidates. 
C.E.: Number of candidates elected. 
P.E.: Percentage of candidates elected. 
P.S.A.: Percentage of seats obtained out of the 120 seats.  
(a) In this election, the Communist Party (included in Others) participated with the Concertación. 
Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 101) and, for the 2005 and 2009 elections, author’s calculations based on data from http://www.elecciones.gov.cl. 
Table 6 uses Navia’s formula (Navia, 2008, p. 100) for estimating parties’ success rates in 
getting their candidates elected (the number of candidates elected divided by the total number 
of candidates, shown as P.E. in the table). Throughout the six elections held during this period, 
the success rates of both the Concertación and the Alianza fluctuated around 50% percent. The 
Alianza’s rate exceeded that of the Concertación only in 2009. This result is quite similar to 
the percentage of seats won (P.S.A.) since it was only in 2009 that the Alianza defeated the 
Concertación. 
 
Although the success rates achieved by both the Alianza and the Concertación were quite high, 
they varied significantly across the parties in each coalition. In the case of the Concertación, 
the PDC’s success rate reached around 77% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, but decreased to an 
average of around 43% between 2001 and 2009. By contrast, the PPD achieved a success rate 
of around 60% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 and this then increased to almost 77% between 2001 
and 2009. The PDC did extraordinarily well in 1989, with a success rate of 84.4%, similar to 
the 83.3% obtained by the PPD in 2001. The PS and PRSD did well in 2005 when, along with 
the PPD, they achieved rates of over 70%.  
 
In the case of the Alianza, the RN’s success rate reached around 53% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, 
but then decreased to an average of around 38%. For the UDI, on the other hand, the success 
rate fluctuated around 41% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 before increasing to almost 60%. The RN 
did extraordinarily well in 1993, with a success rate of 70.7%, while the UDI did well in 2009 
when it achieved a success rate of 66.1%.   
 
As a coalition, the Concertación did remarkably well in the 2001 election when 69 of its 116 
candidates were returned. Similarly, the Alianza performed well in 2009, electing 58 of its 120 
candidates.  
 
Table 7. Chilean Senate Elections, 1989-2009 
 
  SENATORS 
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(38) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(18) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(20) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(18) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(20) 
N.C. C.E. P.E. P.S.A. 
(18) 
Concertación PDC 15 13 86.7 34.2 6 4 66.7 22.2 10 10 100.0 50.0 9 2 22.2 11.1 9 5 55.6 25.0 8 4 50.0 22.2 
PPD 9 4 44.4 10.5 4 2 50.0 11.1 4 0 0.0 0.0 4 4 100.0 22.2 2 1 50.0 5.0 4 3 75.0 16.7 
PS 0 0 0.0 0.0 4 3 75.0 16.7 5 1 20.0 5.0 3 3 100.0 16.7 6 4 66.7 20.0 4 2 50.0 11.1 
PRSD 4 2 50.0 5.3 3 0 0.0 0.0 1 0 0.0 0.0 2 0 0.0 0.0 2 1 50.0 5.0 2 0 0.0 0.0 
Others 8 3 37.5 7.9 1 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 36 22 61.1 57.9 18 9 50.0 50.0 20 11 55.0 55.0 18 9 50.0 50.0 20 11 55.0 55.0 18 9 50.0 50.0 
Alianza RN 15 5 33.3 13.2 6 5 83.3 27.8 8 2 25.0 10.0 6 4 66.7 22.2 6 3 50.0 15.0 8 6 75.0 33.3 
UDI 3 2 66.7 5.3 4 2 50.0 11.1 5 3 60.0 15.0 4 3 75.0 16.7 9 5 55.6 25.0 6 3 50.0 16.7 
Others 20 9 45.0 23.7 8 2 25.0 11.1 6 4 66.7 20.0 4 2 50.0 11.1 4 0 0.0 0.0 3 0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 38 16 42.1 42.1 18 9 50.0 50.0 19 9 47.4 45.0 14 9 64.3 50.0 19 8 42.1 40.0 17 9 52.9 50.0 
Others Others 66 0 0.0 0.0 19 0 0.0 0.0 27 0 0.0 0.0 14 0 0.0 0.0 27 1 3.7 5.0 18 0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 110 38 34.5 100.0 55 18 32.7 100.0 66 20 30.3 100.0 46 18 39.1 100.0 66 20 30.3 100.0 53 18 34.0 100.0 
N.C.: Number of candidates. 
C.E.: Number of candidates elected. 
P.E.: Percentage of candidates elected. 
P.S.A.: Percentage of seats won out of seats up for election.   
Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 104) and, for 2005 and 2009 elections, author’s calculations based on data from http://www.elecciones.gov.cl. 
 
Navia’s formula (Navia, 2008, p. 100) is also used in Table 7 to estimate parties’ success in 
getting their candidates elected. The results show that, similarly to elections for the Chamber 
of Deputies, the success rates of both the Concertación and the Alianza fluctuated around 50%. 
Moreover, in 1993, 2001 and 2009, each coalition obtained the same number of the seats up for 
election (nine out of 18). Whereas the Alianza had a higher success rate than the Concertación 
in 2001 and 2009, the latter was more successful in 1989, 1997 and 2005. 
 
In the case of the Concertación, the PDC did remarkably well in 1997 when all its candidates 
won the seat for which they were competing. The PS and the PPD also obtained a similar result 
in 2001. The PDC’s success rate fluctuated around 85% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, but then 
decreased to an average of just under 43% between 2001 and 2009. In contrast, the PPD saw 
its rate, which fluctuated around 32% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, subsequently rise to almost 75%. 
Similarly, the PS’s rate fluctuated around 32% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 before rising to almost 
57% between 2001 and 2009. The PRSD’s rate was quite low, given that, in 1993, 1997, 2001 
and 2009, none of its candidates were elected.   
 
In the case of the Alianza, the RN’s success rate fluctuated around 48% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 
before increasing to almost 64% between 2001 and 2009 while the UDI’s success rate 
fluctuated around 60% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 and remained at around this level in subsequent 
elections. The RN did extraordinarily well in 1993, with a success rate of 83.3%, while the UDI 
performed very well in 2001, when 75% of its candidates were elected.   
 
As Tables 6 and 7 show, the Concertación and the Alianza dominated and exerted control over 
Chilean congressional elections between 1989 and 2010. The results also demonstrate that, in 
both houses, success rates varied from party to party and across elections. In the case of the 
Concertación, the most important parties were the PDC, PPD and PS. However, as Navia 
argues, there seemed to be a zero-sum game between these parties (Navia, 2008, p.100) 
because, in most cases, the triumph of one was reflected in the defeat of the other. This is 
illustrated by the Senate elections of 1997 and 2001. In 1997, whereas all PDC candidates won 
a seat, no PPD candidate was elected and the PS obtained the election of only one of its five 
candidates. This situation changed drastically in 2001 when only two of the nine PDC 
candidates were returned and the PPD and the PS obtained the election of all their candidates. 
By contrast, in the Alianza, the RN and UDI parties exercised political leadership within the 
coalition and maintained similar success rates throughout the period. 
 
The above results meant that the two coalitions shared control of Congress. A new way of doing 
politics, based on agreements and pacts, emerged and brought political stability (Godoy, 1999; 
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Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Siavelis, 2009) but negatively affected political 
participation. Due to the significant changes that occurred in the social bases of the parties and 
in their political competitiveness, the Chilean political system became progressively more 
remote from civil society, showing little capacity for renovation and a high level of endogamy 
(Luna & Altman, 2011). In other words, the elite co-opted the political system with a negative 
impact on citizen participation and representation.  
 
In addition, the mechanisms used by the leading parties to select their legislative candidates 
depended mostly on intra-coalition negotiation. Table 8 shows that only the PDC tried to 
promote internal democratic selection processes, holding open primaries between 2001 and 
2009. The other parties continued to control their selection mechanisms without considering 
democratising practices, mainly because of the importance of party negotiations in nominating 
the coalition’s candidates.  
 
Table 8. Legislative Candidate Selection Mechanism by Party, 1989-2009  
 
  Party 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 







































































Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 112), and, for 2005 and 2009, compiled by author. 
 
The institutional transformations introduced by the 1980 Constitution certainly contributed to 
the consolidation of this way of doing politics. Studies of political campaigns and elections 
have shown that the existence of a binomial system, along with other independent variables, 
negatively affected electoral competition between challengers and incumbents (Alemán & 
Saiegh, 2007; Altman, Piñeiro, & Toro, 2013; Carey, 2006; 1997; Navia & Sandoval, 1998). 
Designed to provide political stability during the transition (Carey, 2006), the binomial system 
was introduced by Organic Constitutional Law N° 18.799 of 26 May 1989, which modified 
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Organic Constitutional Law N° 18.700 of 6 May 1988. Both laws were enacted under the 
Pinochet regime. The system was first used for the 1989 congressional elections and last used 
in 2013. The limitations it imposed on electoral representation meant that it has been defined 
as an authoritarian enclave (Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009b). 
 
Under the system, based on the D’Hondt method, each district returned two members to the 
Chamber of Deputies and each constituency returned two senators. Candidates were grouped 
in lists (coalitions) and, in general, the most-voted candidate from each of the two lists was 
returned. Indeed, it was possible for the second most-voted list to obtain one of the two seats 
(50% of representation) with just over a third of the vote (Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). 
 
However, if the most-voted list doubled the second list, its two most-voted candidates were 
returned, even if the most-voted candidate of the second list obtained more votes than the 
second most-voted candidate of the first list (Carey, 2006; Siavelis, 2009b). As a result, a 
candidate with a relatively low number of votes could be returned if, as a whole, that candidate’s 
list performed well. 
 
The system favoured the two main coalitions at the expense of individual parties and smaller 
coalitions (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). For instance, in the 2009 election, the Communist Party 
had to compete in the same list as the Concertación to win three seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Table 6). As an authoritarian enclave, the binomial system was key in maintaining 
the status quo in the Chilean political system, favouring the concentration of political power in 
the hands of a minority and depriving the vast majority of effective political representation. 
This was decisive in the increase of distrust in politics and institutions seen over recent decades 















Table 9. Chilean Municipal Elections, 1992-2008 (%)  
 
  Municipalities 
1992(a) 1996(a) 2000(a) 2004(b) 2008(b)(c) 
Concertación PDC 26.33 23.16 19.87 20.11 16.44 
PPD 8.39 10.39 10.49 5.88 6.36 
PS 7.77 9.53 10.36 10.84 8.54 
PRSD 4.47 5.81 4.98 2.81 2.19 
Others 1.57 1.03 2.21 1.51 1.67 
TOTAL 48.53 49.92 47.91 41.15 35.2 
Alianza RN 12.23 12.18 14.29 12.83 12.09 
UDI 9.27 2.99 14.67 17.88 18.33 
Others 5.5 13.77 7.9 4.84 6.75 
TOTAL 27 28.94 36.86 35.55 37.17 
Others 15.49 10.13 7.14 15.12 19.12 
TOTAL 91.02 88.99 91.91 91.82 91.49 
 
(a) Includes both mayors and councillors 
(b) Only mayors. 
(c) In the 2008 election, the Concertación competed divided into two pacts: PPD, PRSD and other independent 
candidates, and PDC, PS and other independent candidates. 
Source: Compiled by author with data from http://elecciones.gov.cl. 
 
The domination of the two main coalitions is also seen in municipal elections. Table 9 shows 
the results of these elections between 1992 and 2008. During this period, the Concertación won 
four of the five elections. Only in 2008 did it obtain less than 40% of the votes cast while the 
Alianza, as in the other types of elections, remained in second place until 2008 when it won 
with 37.17%.   
 
Although Chile is often held up as a successful example of a democratic transition, it is also a 
case in which the elites agreed on a determined order that helped them remain in power. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the consolidation of this partyarchy hampered democratic 
consolidation in terms of legitimacy, accountability and alternation in power, due principally 
to the ongoing existence of the authoritarian enclaves. That was possible because of the 
institutional structure created under the 1980 Constitution (Angell, 2007; Valenzuela & Scully, 
1997) and, throughout the period studied, the party elites played a central role in not only 







The Concertación and the Alianza maintained total control of municipal, congressional and 
presidential elections between 1990 and 2010. Election results demonstrate the Concertación’s 
domination of political power. It won all elections from 1989 through to the 2008 municipal 
elections when the Alianza obtained more votes in the election for mayors. It went on to lose 
the 2009 presidential election when the new Coalición por el Cambio (Coalition for Change), 
which had replaced the Alianza in 2009, was elected under President Sebastián Piñera for 2010-
2014. 
 
The existence of a partyarchy through which the Concertación and the Alianza were able to 
maintain control of congressional elections was possible because of a binomial proportional 
electoral system, which played a fundamental role by excluding other parties. Election results 
speak for themselves: between 1990 and 2010, no party outside these coalitions obtained 
representation in Congress. This was vital in consolidating their leadership of the political 
system and is also important in explaining the consolidation during this period of a closed 
political elite which other parties had little chance of permeating. 
 
From an authoritarian enclave after the political transition, the binomial electoral system 
emerged as a mechanism that generated a dual political elite, represented by the two coalitions, 
with an electoral advantage. It produced a political system that was stable but highly elitist as 
regards changes of government and, therefore, representation of the political diversity of post-
transition Chile. A clear example of this was the Communist Party, which played an extra-
parliamentary role during this period, given its inability to win seats in Congress under the 
binomial system. 
 
Although, in maintaining their spaces of power, the elites employ resources of various types, 
the available information must be examined in detail in order to measure the impact of different 
species of capital (Chapter VII). The next chapter focuses on one of the most traditional 














This chapter describes the methodological design of the research. Studying political elites 
entails a series of complexities associated with their origin and how they function. As select 
groups, political elites employ certain practices in order to maintain a degree of exclusivity with 
respect to the rest of society. It is, therefore, difficult for non-members to access them as objects 
of research (second order research). 
 
Elites have social closure mechanisms (Aguilar, 2011) that are expressed in numerous ways. 
One of the most frequent is when the members of the elite recognise each other through certain 
resources or shared social practices, which are analysed here using the Bourdieusian concept 
of species of capital. In the Chilean case, for example, there is a consensus about the importance 
of schools in the formation and performance of elites (Kosunen & Carrasco, 2016). 
 
A second difficulty of studying political elites is that of knowing how their members relate to 
each other, either at the formal level (for example, negotiations and decision-making by 
ministers) or the informal level (selection of candidates and promotion of new leaders within 
the parties). In the light of these problems, this research used a mixed methodological strategy 
that included in-depth interviews with key members of the elite in order to define the emphasis 
of the statistical analysis of the survey data.  
 
Under the FONDECYT project entitled “Political elites in Chile: Sociology of the 
governmental, parliamentary and party staff (1990-2010)”, 386 important members of the 
Chilean political elite were surveyed (see Appendix II). This was the first time that detailed 
information had been gathered about personal aspects such as their social origin, families, 
education and political preferences. In this context, this chapter describes the foundations of 
the methodological design developed based on the objectives and guiding questions of this 
research. The chapter then goes on to explain the methods and techniques used to gather the 
data obtained after the elite census (survey) and the methodological decisions adopted when 
analysing the information. In addition, it describes the author’s contributions to the 
FONDECYT project as regards the creation of new variables, based on the existing 




The chapter then discusses the prior interviews with key members of the elite as an essential 
part of the process of defining the socio-historical analysis of eight important families in the 
Chilean political elite and the comparative quantitative analysis of the effects of species of 
capital on access to the legislature (deputies) and the executive (ministers). Finally, the 
methodological scope and limitations of the strategy of analysis are discussed. 
 
 
ii. Research strategy 
 
ii.i. Research aims and questions 
 
One of the aspects underlying the definition of this research relates to the use of species of 
capital within the political elite. In this context, a fundamental assumption of the research 
strategy is that species of capital, in their multiple forms, are a decisive resource for obtaining 
access to important positions in the public sector which is, in turn, a key aspect of the 
functioning of the political elite.   
 
The concept of species of capital was extensively developed by Bourdieu (1986; 1984; 1980). 
The different positions that a person, or particular agent in Bourdieusian terms, may occupy in 
the field - or, in other words, the setting in which agents interact and define their social positions 
- are the result of interaction between the field’s institutions (or specific rules) and the agent’s 
habitus and capital. According to Bourdieu, the latter can be classified into three types: “as 
economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on 
certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of 
educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’) 
which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized 
in the form of a title of nobility” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247).   
 
Using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010, this research examines 
and measures the effect of species of capital on access to strategic positions in the political 
field. Although there is extensive literature on the concepts of social, cultural and economic 
capital, there is a lack of empirical research examining comparatively the effects that these three 
forms of capital can have on both the formation of elites and their functioning, which is 
precisely the focus of this research. It attempts to answer two questions:  
 




2) Were the Chilean political party elite’s background and social resources, or species of 
capital, instrumental in allowing its members to access strategic positions in the 
legislative and executive branches between 1990 and 2010? 
 
ii.ii. Research strategy: political elites as an object of study 
 
These questions certainly represent a theoretical and methodological research challenge. The 
theoretical aspects are addressed extensively in Chapter I while the methodological aspects are 
addressed as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Elites as an object of study: Proposal of a research strategy 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Figure 14 sets out a proposal for the study of elites, taking into account all the possible areas 
mentioned in the literature, which is appropriate for the methodological strategy adopted in this 
research. First, the definition of the political elite as the object of study in this case corresponds 
to those groups of individuals who belong to parties and access important positions in the 
powers of state. Then, at the level of analysis, it can be seen that the elites can be studied from 
different dimensions. This research considers the dimensions of institutions, social structure 
and social capital in relation to the objectives defined and discussed in point ii.i. Following on 
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from this, the perspective of analysis employed is geared to analysis of the functioning of 
mechanisms of social differentiation. 
 
The strategy of analysis used in this research comprised three stages: 1) descriptive analysis 
and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey; 2) in-depth interviews with 
members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide additional, more inductive information 
for developing the findings obtained from the survey data; and 3) selection of the variables and 
inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the species of capital on access to key positions in 
the political elite, comparing the executive (ministers) and the legislature (deputies). 
 
 
iii. Research methods, fieldwork and data analysis 
 
 
iii.i. Research design 
 
The methodology for this research has a non-probabilistic (Census) and non-experimental 
quantitative design, comprising three stages. The first consisted in information gathering and 
involved the application of a questionnaire with around 80 variables to members of the elite. It 
was applied to 386 (out of 590) members of the Chilean political elite, who held important 
positions of political power between 1990 and 2010. The fieldwork was accompanied by a 
series of in-depth interviews with important members of the elite (including former Presidents 
Ricardo Lagos Escobar and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle). This information was important for 
defining and operationalising the variables and dimensions of the quantitative analysis. 
 
The third stage consisted in the application of quantitative analysis techniques. First, a 
descriptive analysis of the independent variables was carried out in line with the theoretical 
framework and previous empirical research. Six binary logistic regression models were then 
constructed in order to compare the effect of the variables defined on appointment as minister 
or deputy (binary dependent variable): a logit model for each dependent variable in each of the 
three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. The decision to divide the two decades 
into two separate periods was taken in order to be able to distinguish between two rather 
different periods: a conservative decade characterised by the transition and the Christian 
Democrat governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and the 




iii.ii. The census: Application of the survey 
 
The census of Chile’s political elite was carried out according to specific criteria using a 
positional method (Hoffmann-Lange, 2007)31 in order to identify the population to be surveyed. 
In this case, the universe was defined as those individuals who had held the most important 
positions between 1990 and 2010. For this period, a total of 1,465 individuals were identified 





4) Deputy  
5) Undersecretary 
6) Head of government division/chief of staff  
7) Regional governor 
8) Governor of the Central Bank, superintendent and/or executive director of a state 
company, including Televisión Nacional (TVN), director of the National Healthcare Fund 
(FONASA), vice-president of the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) and president 
of the National Television Council (CNTV) 
9) Members of the leadership of the political parties. 
 
Out of this universe, 590 cases, the so-called “nucleus of the elite” were selected according to 
specific criteria: a) all those individuals who had served as president of Chile; b) all those 
individuals who had served as minister of state; c) all those individuals who had served as 
undersecretary; d) all deputies who had sat for at least two terms; e) all senators who had sat 
for at least two terms; f) all those individuals who had been elected first as deputy and then as 
senator, although they had served only one term in each position; g) all those individuals who 
had been president of a political party with representation in Congress; h) all those individuals 
who had belonged for at least three years to the governing body of a political party with 
representation in Congress; i) all heads of government divisions who had held their post for 
more than one presidential period; j) all those individuals who had served as president or general 
manager of a state company; k) all heads of the government Budget Office; and l) a combination 
of one or more of these criteria.  
 
 
31 Positional method is when members of political elites are defined under specific criteria concerning 
their role (i.e. decision making) or influence on political system. 
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Efforts were made to survey all these 590 individuals without recourse to replacements. As well 
as members of the centre-left parties and independents, a significant number of centre-right 
members of Congress agreed to answer the survey. It was conducted between 1 October 2010 
and 25 April 2012, either online, in print, by telephone or in a personal interview, depending 
on the difficulty of reaching each particular interviewee. These individuals were asked to 
answer a questionnaire about matters that included their political career, personal history and 
perceptions. The 386 replies received represented a response rate of 65.4% (or 68.3% if those 
no longer alive when the survey was applied are excluded). Each individual was classified 
according to the highest position held during his/her career (Table 10). The positions that 
predominate in this nucleus are deputy and minister (123 and 108, respectively, which 
represents almost 60% of the cases). Regional governors and political party leaders account for 
only 1% and 1.6%, respectively. Three of the four presidents of Chile during the period studied 
answered the survey. 
 
Table 10. Composition of the nucleus of the elite in Chile (n = 386) 
Position Cases Percentage 
President of Chile 3 0.8 
Minister 108 28.0 
Senator 26 6.7 
Deputy 123 31.9 
Undersecretary 37 9.6 
Regional governor 4 1.0 
President of Central Bank, superintendent, director of 
state company 
17 4.4 
Head of government division and/or chief of staff 62 16.1 
Member of governing body of a political party 6 1.6 
Total 386 100 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Encuesta de Élites en Chile (1990-2010). Last updated: 
September 24, 2014.  
 
Out of the 204 individuals who did not answer the survey (Table 11), 53 were heads of 
government division and/or chiefs of staff, accounting for 26% of non-responses, while 
deputies accounted for 21.6% and ministers for 10.3%. Out of the 167 deputies considered in 





The principal reasons for not answering the survey include time constraints. Although e-mail, 
letters, the telephone and in-person meetings were used to apply the survey, many of those who 
did not respond had problems allocating the necessary time. Only 46 individuals refused to 
answer the survey, accounting for 22.5% of the total who did not respond. Out of these 46 
individuals, 14 were deputies and five were ministers. 
 
The figures show that, although there is a certain bias associated with the response rate, it 
reached close to 70% and, in the case of ministers and deputies, was higher, reaching over 80% 
for ministers. This is an important result since replacements were not used for those who did 
not respond. Moreover, all the people who answered the survey answered the questions 
considered in the quantitative analysis. 
 
Table 11. Cases that did not respond the survey (n = 204) 
Position Cases Percentage 
President of Chile 1 0.5 
Minister 21 10.3 
Senator 27 13.2 
Deputy 44 21.6 
Undersecretary 26 12.7 
Regional governor 8 3.9 
President of Central Bank, superintendent, director of 
state company 
10 4.9 
Head of government division and/or chief of staff 53 26.0 
Member of governing body of a political party 14 6.9 
Total 204 100 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Encuesta de Élites en Chile (1990-2010). Last updated: 
September 24, 2014.  
 
 
iii.iii. Ethical standards 
 
The database was developed under FONDECYT Project N° 1100877 on political elites in Chile 
(Alfredo Joignant, lead researcher). In line with ethical research standards, the author has due 
authorisation for the data’s use (Appendix I). All survey respondents supplied their full name 
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but, for reasons of privacy, these are not disclosed in the processed data. The survey comprised 
41 questions (Appendix II) that produced some 80 variables. The questionnaire included a letter 
of consent in which the respondent was informed in detail about the uses to which the 
information would be put in line with the research objectives.  
 
The in-depth interviews with key members of the Chilean political elite that were also carried 
out (Table 12) served to complement and enrich the quantitative data according to the objectives 
defined for this research. All interviewees were duly informed about the objectives of this 
research for the University of Cambridge’s PhD in Sociology programme. This information 
was set out in the letter requesting the interview. Once the request had been accepted, a message 
was sent with detailed information about the questions to be asked and my expectations as to 
the interview’s results. In some cases, I have not disclosed the interviewee’s identity. While 
scholars and public institutions are referred to by name, I refer to certain members of the 
political elite in a generic way so as to protect their privacy.    
 
Table 12. Politicians interviewed (in-depth interviews) 




- Minister of Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) under President Patricio Aylwin 
(1992-1994)  




- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999) 





- Head of Citizen Participation and Environmental Education at National Commission for the 
Environment (CONAMA) (1999-2001) 
- Deputy Director of Social Organisations Division (DOS) of Ministry for the Government Office 
(2000-2001) 
- Undersecretary of Ministry for the Government Office (2001-2005) 
- Undersecretary for Culture at National Council for Culture and the Arts and Coordinator of the 
Indigenous Peoples Programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006-x) 
4 Jorge Arrate 
Mac Niven 
- President of PS (1990-1991) 
- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994)  
- Minister of Labour and Social Security under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998) 
- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz- Tagle (1998-1999) 
5 Sergio Bitar 
Chacra 
- Director of Department of Industries and Planning Centre of Faculty of Physical and Mathematical 
Sciences, Universidad de Chile (1968-1973)  
- Minister of Mining under President Salvador Allende (March 1973-July 1973) 
- Minister of Education under President Ricardo Lagos (2003-2005) 
- Minister of Public Works under President Michelle Bachelet (2008-2010) 




- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994- 1998) 
- President of National Television Council (CNTV) (1992-1994) 
- President of National Commission for Accreditation of Undergraduate Programmes (2006) 
- Vice-president of Higher Educational Council (2004) 
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- Member of Council of the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development 
(FONDECYT)  




- President of PDC (1991-1993) 
- President of Chile (1994-2000) 
- President of Senate (2006-2008)  
- Former Senator (2006-2014) 




- Politician, academic and diplomat  
- Undersecretary of War (2000-2006) 
- Undersecretary for the Armed Forces (2014-2015) 
9 José Miguel 
Insulza 
- Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999) 
- Minister Secretary General of the Presidency under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1999-2000) 
- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 
- Secretary General of the Organization of American States (2005-2015) 




- Director of School of Political and Administrative Sciences and Institute of Economy, Universidad 
de Chile (1963-1972) 
- Secretary General, Universidad de Chile (1969) 
- Secretary General, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1973) 
- President of PPD (1987-1990) 
- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992) 
- Minister of Public Works under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998) 




- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-1992) 




- Political analyst and academic 
- Currently Director of Globalisation and Democracy course, Universidad Diego Portales 
- Strategic advisor to President Ricardo Lagos 
13 Andrés 
Solimano 
- Coordinator of Economic Area for presidential campaign of Marco Enríquez-Ominami (2013) 
- Director of FLACSO Chile (2010-2011) 
- Founder and President of International Centre for Globalisation and Development (CIGLOB) 
- Director for Andean Countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela), World Bank  




- President of PDC (1976-1982) 
- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Eduardo Frei 
Montalva (1968) 
- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968-1970) 
- Senator (1973) 
- Senator (1990-2006) 
- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Michelle Bachelet (2006) 
- Senator (2010-2018) 




- Under-Secretary of Regional and Administrative Development (1990-1994) 
- President of PS (2003-2005) 
- Undersecretary of Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency (2002-2003) 




Table 12 shows the members of the political elite who were interviewed for the project. The 
selection of these individuals was based on their credentials considering three dimensions: 
education, party membership (and political trajectory) and key positions held in the political 
system (see Appendix III). Fifteen interviews were conducted with individuals who agreed to 
discuss and explain their experiences and perceptions of how the political elite functions. They 
included former presidents, ministers, undersecretaries, senators, deputies and party leaders. 
 
The interviews consisted in a conversation about relevant topics in recent years, the political 
transition and their current perceptions of politics in Chile. In the case of the latter topic, the 
aim was to learn about the perceptions, practices and processes that shaped the political elite 
between 1990 and 2010. In general terms, this process showed that family capital is very 
important in Chile, that there were few changes in the post-1990 elite as compared to that which 
had existed before 1973 and that many members of the Chilean political elite maintain ties that 
date back to their time at school. 
 
 
iii.iv. Author’s contribution to the FONDECYT project 
 
Work for this research was based on the survey carried out for the FONDECYT project on 
political elites. However, once the data had been obtained and validated, new questions arose 
about how to operationalise certain information.  
 
The in-depth interviews conducted were crucial in defining key analytical strategies and 
incorporating additional information in order to work with the variables considered in line with 
the concept of species of capital. In this context, additional variables were created using the 
available data and other sources of information, as indicated in Chapter VIII where the variables 
analysed are set out according to the models used. Details of the changes incorporated are 
explained in greater detail in Chapter VII (on the analysis of family capital) and Chapter IX (on 
the quantitative analysis of the effects of species of capital on access to key positions, 
comparing the legislature and the executive). 
 
 
iv. Data analysis: validity, coding and analysis 
 
Although the study uses a mixed strategy, its emphasis is quantitative. It, therefore, focused on 
gathering information through the application of questionnaires to members of the nucleus of 
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Chile’s political elite, producing a final number of 386 cases that responded the survey. The 
interviews were also of assistance in defining the study’s hypotheses and methodologies.  
 
The questions included in the survey can be classified as follows: municipal district and/or 
place of residence, party membership, public-private career, political perceptions, familial, 
religious, educational and professional background and information about grandparents, 
parents and children. The questions produced a total of 80 variables of which a pre-selection 
was made for analysis, according to the research objectives. In the case of the independent 
variables, a preliminary selection of those included in the questionnaire was made in line with 
the hypotheses and a review of the literature and these were then subjected to various statistical 
tests of collinearity (Variance Inflation Factor) and significance in accordance with the logit 
models used.   
 
Six binary logit models were then constructed for ministers and deputies and the three periods: 
1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. In this way, it was possible not only to analyse the 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables, but also to compare them across 
the three periods. The latter was important because the first decade was characterised by the 
more conservative policies of the PDC governments of Presidents Aylwin and Frei and the start 
of the political transition while the decade between 2000 and 2010, with its already more 
consolidated democratic system, corresponded to the Socialist governments of Presidents 
Lagos and Bachelet.    
 
The study’s methodological emphasis involves the analysis of networks as a means of studying 
the familial capital of the Chilean elite, followed by binary logistic regression models to study 
the effects of the different species of capital on access to the positions of minister and deputy 
in the periods indicated. The analysis was carried out using STATA and R statistical software.  
This methodological strategy was designed with the aim of contributing to knowledge about 
the Chilean elites and, through the results obtained, to certain lines of historical research about 
their evolution (Gazmuri, 2000; Joignant, 2009;) but, above all, to the work that has revealed 
the positioning of certain forms of capital in the Chilean political elites as in the case of the 
technocrats (Silva, 2009). In this sense, the research reported here seeks to address a key aspect 
of how social resources determine the positioning of certain individuals in important posts 
(Boix and Posner, 1998). In other words, it aims to demonstrate empirically how certain aspects 
of the social structure (species of capital) permit the creation of elites and their stability in 





v. Methodological limitations 
 
This research has some limitations related to the gathering of the information and the statistical 
analysis techniques employed. Firstly, the universe of individuals (1,465) who occupied 
important positions in the elite between 1990 and 2010 was previously identified (non-
probabilistic). Out of this total, 590 cases were identified as corresponding to the “nucleus of 
the elite”, according to specific criteria that indicate the permanence of individuals in important 
positions within the political system. However, out of these 590 cases, it was possible to survey 
386, as explained above, in section iii.ii (Tables 10 and 11).   
 
Another limitation of this research has to do with the logit models for deputies and ministers 
for each period. The population surveyed does not necessarily include the counterfactuals for 
each case and, in other words, does not include all those individuals who may have been 
considered for the positions of minister or deputy. However, the use of regression models is 
also appropriate when there are comparison groups (Kuha & Mills, 2018; Williams, 2009; 
Allison, 1999) and, in this context, the analysis focuses on comparing the effects of specific 
forms of capital on the Chilean political elite and its members’ access to two important positions 





This chapter has presented the methodological design used to measure empirically the effect of 
species of capital on access to key positions in the executive and legislature among the Chilean 
political elite. As shown, the study of elites is complex because their social closure mechanisms 
impede access to them and it is not possible to understand in detail the way in which they make 
formal and informal decisions. 
 
The strategy of analysis adopted here was based on quantitative information obtained in the 
FONDECYT project and on 15 in-depth interviews with key members of the Chilean political 
elite. This information was useful in defining the importance of family capital and identifying 
key family dynasties (Chapter VII) and in providing perspective and determining the emphasis 





As explained in this chapter, the research strategy comprised three stages. The first involved 
descriptive analysis and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey. In-depth 
interviews were then conducted with members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide 
additional, more inductive information for developing the findings obtained from the survey 
data. Finally, the variables were selected for the inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the 
species of capital on access to key positions in the political elite, comparing the executive 
(ministers) and the legislature (deputies). 
 
The response rate to the survey, at an aggregate level of close to 70%, was acceptable, including 
for deputies and ministers, the positions considered in the analysis of logit models (Chapter 
VIII).  
 
The next chapter, which serves as an introduction to the importance of family capital in the 
development of the political elite, analyses eight family dynasties, highlighting family ties 

























“In all societies, the family  
plays a fundamental role as regards that  





Before going on to quantitative analysis of the species of capital, it is important to look at the 
role family capital has played in the development of Chile’s political elite. From the interviews 
conducted, information was obtained about eight families which illustrate the importance of 
this type of capital. Each of the families is identified using its main surnames: the Errázuriz 
family, the Montt family, the Alessandri family, the Pinto-Bulnes family, the Piñera-Chadwick 
family, the Frei-Walker family, the Allende family and the Aylwin family. All these families 
have produced senators, deputies and at least one president.   
 
This chapter seeks to map family ties in Chile’s political elite, looking first at the cases of these 
eight families which have wielded great political influence since the country’s Independence 
from Spanish rule in the early nineteenth century - the so-called traditional families - and then 
as individuals belonging to the nucleus of the party elite that governed Chile between 1990 and 
2015 (including former presidents, ministers, undersecretaries, heads of government divisions 
and chiefs of staff and senior managers of state companies). Starting with 386 cases, numerous 
analyses of family networks and relationships were carried out but, since new individuals were 
included after the tracing ties based on family connections, the numbers of persons considered 
increased to 588 cases as networks of relationship were discovered.  
 
This chapter seeks to provide an empirical insight into how this species of capital operates 
within these select groups. The purpose here is to display a network with all the family ties of 
the members of the political elite that responded the survey. The main goal is to provide a 
schematic model (the network) that serves as an empirical reference for understanding how 
family capital operates within the political elite. A new variable is created (family connections) 
and is used as an independent variable for a set of logit models to measure the effect of these 




A political family dynasty exists when family ties are observed in the political sphere and are 
used by agents as a type of social capital: “When two family ties are present as, for example, 
between a father who is or was a member of the lower house and a son who is a mayor, we will 
refer to this as a dynasty on the assumption that the relationship (by blood or marriage) entails 
advantages for the person who inherits it or receives it as a transfer, particularly when the 
electoral districts coincide” (Joignant, 2014, p. 17).  
 
Within this framework, this chapter seeks first to identify historical patterns in the functioning 
of family capital, taking the case of a set of families traditionally related to political power. 
Then, taking the nucleus of the political elite, it goes on to analyse their family ties in order to 
see whether these same patterns continued to be reproduced after the restoration of democracy. 
The purpose of the study is primarily descriptive in that it attempts to demonstrate the ongoing 
prevalence of a form of capital in the post-transition political party elite. This chapter is divided 
into four sections. The first refers to relevant research about family dynasties in politics while 
the second looks at the way in which family capital has been studied in Chile. It then examines 
eight traditional families that have had an important influence on Chile’s political history and 
analyses family ties in the political elite of post-Pinochet Chile, considering 588 cases. Finally, 
some conclusions of this analysis are set out.   
 
 
ii. The study of family ties within political elites 
 
Family ties are a form of social capital32 since they serve as a mechanism for sociocultural 
reproduction and the formation of elites. One of the pioneering studies of the role of family 
capital in politics is that by Wasby (1960) who, after analysing the family origins of the 
members of the US Congress, concluded that most of them had ties to families involved in 
politics (Wasby, 1966, p. 15). Wasby also asserted that a person from a family group related to 
political activity was highly likely to be involved in politics. This finding is related to 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction according to which the family provides an individual 
not only with the possibility of generating networks and contacts, but also with the cultural 
capital that is crucial for educational and professional success.  
 
 
32 This definition relies on the concept of social capital formulated by Bourdieu: “social capital is the 
sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). 
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A broad range of research has demonstrated the importance of family dynasties and family 
connections in the formation, development and performance of political elites (González-
Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014; Filippi, 2006; Cordero, 2003; de Ramón, 1999a; 1999b; 
1999c; 1999d; Camp, 2013; 2006; Singerman, 1995; Kadushin, 1995; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; 
Gaxie, 1983; Arriagada, 1970; Putnam, 1976; Wasby, 1966; Mosca, 1939; Michels, 1915; 
Pareto, 1901). The familial resource can be put to a variety of uses, ranging from its 
instrumental use to access an elite (Camp, 2013; 2006) to the creation of networks and the 
capacity to influence certain groups of power (Padgett & Ansell, 1993) or to obtain advantages 
of an electoral nature (González-Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014). However, the reproduction 
of family capital tends to reflect informal logics and reproduction strategies that are difficult to 
operationalise and call for specific research approaches (González-Bustamante & Garrido-
Vergara, 2018, p. 52).  
 
Political dynasties are families that are able to position themselves within the political system 
and achieve important spaces of control and domination which they maintain over time. In 
Chile, most studies in this area have focused on the definition of profiles and historical analysis 
(Filippi, 2006; de Ramón, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d). More recent studies have, however, 
sought to measure the effect of such families in terms of level of access and the careers of the 
members of the elite (González-Bustamante, 2014). 
 
 
iii. Chilean political dynasties 
 
This section looks at eight traditional families who have significantly influenced Chile’s 
political history, examining political careers related to positions of great power and family 
relationships (father, mother, grandparents, cousins and uncles and aunts). The eight families 
are the Errázuriz, Montt, Alessandri, Pinto-Bulnes, Piñera-Chadwick, Frei-Walker, Allende and 
Aylwin families. As can be seen in the analysis of networks, more than one member of many 
of these families served as president of Chile. Through numerous ties, these families are also 
“related” to each other as, for example, in the case of the Pinto-Bulnes, Piñera-Chadwick and 
Frei-Walker families.   
 
By analysing the evolution of these families in Chilean politics, this study seeks to identify a 
socio-historical pattern in the evolution of the Chilean political elite that has its root in family 
ties. This pattern is then verified using the information provided by the member of the nucleus 





iii.i. Errázuriz family: 1770-1990 
 
Of Basque origin, this family has been one of the most important in Chilean politics, particularly 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As shown in Table 13, it produced four Chilean 
presidents across three successive generations: Fernando Errázuriz Aldunate (1831), who was 
an uncle of Federico Errázuriz Zañartu (1871-76) who, in turn, was the father of Federico 
Errázuriz Echaurren (1896-1901) and the father-in-law of Germán Riesco Errázuriz (1901-06). 
Moreover, another member of this family, María Errázuriz Echaurren, was a daughter, sister 
and wife of presidents.  
 
As a family, the Errázuriz were characterised principally by the senior positions held by their 
members in the executive and legislative branches. Their direct descendants in the political 
world extend to Hernán Felipe Errázuriz who was a minister (1981-90) during the military 
regime. Historically, the family has been associated with the centre-right. After serving as 
minister of war and the navy, of justice and of education under President José Joaquín Pérez 
(1861 and 1871), Federico Errázuriz Zañartu won the 1870 presidential election with the 
support of the Liberal-Conservative Fusion. Later, his son Federico Errázuriz Echaurren went 
on to win the 1895 presidential election with the support of a coalition dominated by 
conservative parties. Finally, Germán Riesco Errázuriz, with a liberal bent, had to face a period 
of great political and economic instability, which eventually meant his retirement from politics 
















Table 13. Errázuriz family, 1770-1990  
 
(a) Three marriages. 
(b) María Errázuriz Echaurren was a daughter, sister and wife of Chilean presidents.  










iii.ii. Montt family: 1770-2015 
 
The Montt family has its origins in Spain (Catalonia) and Peru. Like the Errázuriz family, it 
played an important role in Chile’s political history, starting in the eighteenth century. With a 
marked republican spirit and a tradition related to the Freemasonry, it maintained an important 
network of influence in the political system. Table 14 shows the family ties within this dynasty, 
beginning with the arrival in Chile of José Esteban de Montt Cabrera in the mid-eighteenth 
century.   
 
Many of its members sat in Congress and, as in the case of the Errázuriz family, three of its 
members were elected president of Chile: Manuel Montt Torres (1851-1861), his son Pedro 
Montt Montt (1906-1910) and his nephew Jorge Montt Álvarez (1891-1896). Manuel Montt 
Torres married his cousin, Rosario Montt Goyenechea. There is also a branch of this dynasty 
in whose case it is not clear exactly how they acquired the surname (starting with Felipe Montt 
and Marcos Montt, see Table 14).  
 
A conservative and Freemason, President Manuel Montt Torres held the presidency between 
1851 and 1856 and, despite the revolution of 1851, was immediately re-elected for a second 
term (1856-1861). In 1891, after the revolution against President Balmaceda, his nephew Jorge 
Montt Álvarez also became president and, only ten years later, was followed by his son Pedro. 
During this period, numerous members of the family also served in Congress and the judiciary. 
Descendants of this family still participate in politics today but, unlike other dynasties, it lost 
















Table 14. Montt family, 1770-2015  
 
 
(a) Two marriages. 










iii.iii. Alessandri family: 1898-2014 
 
The role of the Alessandri family in politics began with the brothers José Pedro and Arturo 
Alessandri Palma. The latter, as well as serving as senator, president of the Senate, deputy and 
minister, was twice president of Chile (1920-1925 and 1932-1938). Similarly, his son Jorge 
Alessandri Rodríguez not only served as senator and minister of finance in the second 
government of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo but was also president of Chile between 1958 and 
1964.  
 
As shown in Table 15, most members of this dynasty have held important political positions, 
particularly in the legislature and executive. The family’s evolution was initially strongly tied 
to the Liberal Party and later, with the election of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez as president, to 
the conservative right. This influence has persisted over time since Magdalena Matte, daughter 
of Arturo Matte Alessandri, is married to Hernán Larraín Fernández, a close collaborator of 
Pinochet and currently one of the leaders of the UDI and a minister in the second government 
of President Sebastián Piñera (2018- ). Another important example of the family’s political role 
is Arturo Alessandri Besa, a deputy and subsequently senator who, in 1993, was the presidential 
candidate of the Union for the Progress of Chile, a centre-right alliance formed by the UDI, the 






















Table 15. Alessandri family, 1915-2014  
 
 
(a) José Pedro Alessandri Palma´s grandson. 
(b) Two marriages.  








iii.iv. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011 
 
The Bulnes dynasty can be traced back to Mateo de Toro-Zambrano and Ureta who, as well as 
being the first count of the Conquest, became president of the First Government Junta of Chile 
on 18 September 1810. Since Chile’s Independence, numerous members of this dynasty have 
held high political positions. As in the case of other families, they include three presidents of 
Chile: Francisco Antonio Pinto (1827-29), his son Aníbal Pinto Garmendia (1876-81) and his 
son-in-law Manuel Bulnes Prieto (1841-51). The family is also related to Juan Luis Sanfuentes 
Andonaegui, who was president between 1915 and 1920 (Tables 16 and 17). 
 
Like María Errázuriz Echaurren, Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia was a daughter, sister and wife of 
presidents. These are the only two cases in Chile with this particular network of family ties. 
The Pinto family also has connections with the Piñera-Chadwick family. Josefina Ariztía Pinto, 
daughter of Luisa Pinto Garmendia, married Nicanor Rozas and their daughter Josefina Rozas 
Ariztía married José Miguel Echenique Correa. In turn, their daughter married José Piñera 
Carvallo and was the mother of the Piñera Echenique brothers: Sebastián, president of Chile 
between 2010 and 2014 and as from 2018, José, a minister under Pinochet between 1978 and 




















Table 16. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011. Part 1 
 
a) Like María Errázuriz Echaurren, Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia was a daughter, sister and wife of Chilean 
presidents. 








Table 17. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011. Part 2 
 
b) Tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
iii.v. Piñera-Chadwick family: 1811-2015 
 
The Piñera-Chadwick family is another important dynasty, due both to its own participation in 
politics and its ties to other important families (Tables 18 and 19). From its origins, it has had 
ties to important families in the Chilean aristocracy (Rozas, Pinto and Echenique). Members of 
the Piñera-Chadwick family came to the fore after the military coup since many of them 
supported the overthrow of Allende and then the dictatorship headed by Pinochet, although 
Sebastián Piñera has maintained a stance closer to the liberal right.  
 
The Piñera-Chadwick family is connected to the Pinto-Bulnes dynasty through Josefina Rozas 
Ariztía. It also has ties to the Frei-Walker dynasty through Cecilia Echenique, the wife of 
Ignacio Walker (see Table 18) and cousin of President Piñera. Despite the Chadwick family’s 
links with the conservative right, some of its members have ties with left-wing parties as, for 
example, in the case of María Teresa Chadwick, who is married to José Antonio Viera-Gallo, 
an influential member of the Socialist Party (a former senator and minister). Similarly, her 
sister, María Paula Chadwick, is the mother of Patricio Fernández Chadwick, an influential 
journalist and founder of The Clinic left-wing newspaper. Finally, this branch of the family also 
has a connection to the Allende family through Jorge Chadwick Pascal, son of Denise Pascal 





Table 18. Piñera-Chadwick family, 1811-2015. Part 1 
 
 
(a) Tie to the Pinto-Bulnes family. 








Table 19. Piñera-Chadwick family, 1811-2015. Part 2 
 










iii.vi. Frei-Walker family: 1870-2015 
 
The Frei and Walker families are linked to an important tradition in Chile’s republican and 
political history through the Christian Democrat Party (PDC). This dynasty’s most important 
member is Eduardo Frei Montalva, president of Chile from 1964 to 1970 and president of the 
Senate in 1973. His son, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, was also president of Chile between 1994 
and 2000 and president of the Senate between 2006 and 2008 (Tables 20 and 21). 
 
Carmen Frei, a daughter and sister of presidents, was a senator between 1990 and 2006 and is, 
moreover, married to Eugenio Ortega Riquelme, who was a deputy between 1990 and 1994. 
Her son, Eugenio Ortega Frei, married Javiera Blanco, who served as minister of labour and 
then of justice between 2014 and 2016, and her brother-in-law, Emiliano Ortega Riquelme, was 
minister of agriculture during her brother’s presidency. In addition, her niece, the daughter of 
her brother Eduardo, Magdalena Frei Larraechea, married Edmundo Pérez Vergara, a son of 
Edmundo Pérez Yoma, who served in the cabinets of both Eduardo Frei-Ruiz Tagle and 
Michelle Bachelet, and is a grandson of Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, who was a minister of 
Eduardo Frei Montalva. 
 
Edmundo Pérez Yoma’s daughter, María Elisa Pérez Vergara, was married to Clemente Pérez 
Errázuriz (former undersecretary of public works and president of Metro S.A., Santiago’s 
underground railway), a nephew of Ignacio Pérez Walker, a former senator and minister during 
the first administration of President Michelle Bachelet. In addition, his grandfather, Clemente 
Pérez Zañartu, an ambassador under Frei Montalva, married Teresa Walker Concha, a brother 
of Ignacio, who married Isabel “Sally” Prieto, the first PDC mayor of the Pirque district of 
Santiago. Their children have also pursued parliamentary careers: Patricio, a former deputy and 
then senator; Matías, a deputy; and Ignacio, a former deputy, minister under President Ricardo 
Lagos and senator. The latter is married to Cecilia Echenique, a cousin of President Sebastián 
Piñera. 
 
The father of Ignacio Walker Concha, Horacio Walker Larraín, was a senator and minister 
under Presidents Carlos Ibáñez del Campo and Gabriel González Videla while his brother, 








Table 20. Frei-Walker family, 1870-2015. Part 1  
 
 








Table 21. Frei-Walker family, 1870-2015. Part 2  
 
 
(a) Divorced.  
(b) Cousin of President Piñera. Tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family. 










iii.vii. Allende family: 1876-2015 
 
The Allende family, with a left-wing tradition, has also played an important role in Chile’s 
republican history. Ramón Allende Padín, who was nicknamed “The Red”, was a leading doctor 
and radical deputy and then senator who also participated in the nineteenth-century War of the 
Pacific. Although his son, Salvador Allende Castro, was also an important intellectual in the 
Radical Party, it is his grandchildren, Salvador and Laura Allende Gossens, who achieved the 
greatest political prominence (Table 22).   
 
In 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens became Latin America’s first democratically elected 
Marxist president. He was supported by the Popular Unity left-wing coalition that lasted until 
the 1973 military coup. Two of Allende’s daughters, Beatriz and Isabel Allende Bussi, had ties 
to politics. Beatriz, a doctor like her father, was one of his principal advisers and, after the 
transition to democracy, Isabel became a deputy and then senator and served as president of the 
Senate between 2014 and 2015. Finally, one of the daughters of Beatriz, Maya Fernández 
Allende, is currently a deputy.   
 
Laura Allende Gossens had four children: Mariana, Pedro Gastón, an adviser to the Housing 
Ministry (1970-1973), Andrés, founder and former member of the Left-Wing Revolutionary 
Movement (MIR), and Denise Pascal Allende, a former governor of the Melipilla Province and 
a former deputy. She is married to Jorge Chadwick Vergara (a member of the Piñera-Chadwick 
family, see Table 19) and has a son, Jorge, who worked in the Ministry of Agriculture’s Institute 
for Agricultural Development (INDAP). Finally, the son of Pedro Gastón, Cristóbal Pascal, 
worked as head of the social division of the Ministry of Justice under President Frei Ruiz-Tagle 











Table 22. Allende family: 1876-2015  
 
 
(a) Jorge Chadwick Pascal is a tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
iii.viii. Aylwin family: 1957-2003 
 
The influence of the Aylwin family is more recent and is related principally to the Christian 
Democrat Party (PDC) and its members’ activities as lawyers (Table 23). Miguel Aylwin 
Gajardo, who was president of the Supreme Court in the 1960s, was the father of the Aylwin 
Azócar brothers: Arturo, a former comptroller general; Andrés, a former deputy; and Patricio, 
who was the first democratically elected president after the end of the Pinochet military regime. 
The latter’s daughter, Mariana, served as minister of education under President Lagos.  
 
The sister of Mercedes Oyarzún, Patricio Aylwin’s wife, married Hugo Trivelli, who was a 
minister under President Frei Montalva. Their son, Marcelo Trivelli Oyarzún, was Governor of 
Santiago during the Lagos administration. An important number of this family’s members have 






Table 23. Aylwin family: 1957-2003  
 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Analysis of these eight families provides an insight into the importance that family ties have 
had throughout Chile’s political history. Most of these families have supplied at least one of 
the country’s presidents and most of their other members have held important positions of 
political power. Moreover, family ties exist not only within these groups but also bridge 




iv. Family connections within the political elite after Pinochet 
 
Certain sociopolitical characteristics specific to Chile have conditioned the formation, structure 
and functioning of the country’s elites since its transition to democracy. After the end of 
authoritarianism, the elites continued to have a highly cohesive structure, with numerous 
mechanisms of social differentiation, shaped by a gradual process of renovation and 
replacement (Huneeus, 2013; Aguilar, 2011). 
 
This occurred because the country’s elites have historically drawn on specific mechanisms of 
social reproduction, either in terms of their religious ethos in the case of the economic elite 
(Thumala, 2007), their habitus as in the case of the aristocratic elites (Stabili, 2003) or their 
mechanisms of social exclusion (Aguilar, 2011). The latter are fundamental since, in practice, 
social exclusion takes the form of the actions of subjects who expand their resources in order 
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to restrict the access of other individuals to a particular social space and their opportunities 
there (Murphy, 1988). In other words, it occurs when, through its actions, a group defines 
certain attributes that constitute a form of social differentiation.   
 
In the case of elites, differentiation of this type tends to be reproduced through the use of 
different forms of social capital that enable them to ensure and maintain certain quotas of power 
over time. Family ties, understood as one form of this type of capital, are one of the important 
mechanisms of social exclusion employed by elites. In this sense, the creation of networks is a 
key mechanism in the way they manage power (Espinoza, 2010) and in how certain family 
groups administer their assets (Núñez & Gutiérrez, 2004). In this context, family capital is also 
relevant and may be used in numerous ways, including marriage strategies, as a reproduction 
mechanism by those who occupy the positions of greatest economic power in Chile (Huneeus, 
2013). 
 
This analysis of family networks reinforces that argument that, although the Chilean elite has 
shown a capacity for adaptation and renewal in the face of political, economic and cultural 
transformations, a stable pattern of homogeneity has persisted due to the prevalence of certain 
family dynasties in the axes of power, with relatively few opportunities for the entry of new 
groups and/or actors (Dézalay & Garth, 2002, p. 21). The distance of the elites from the rest of 
society in terms of social values or social exclusion can be explained partly by their strategic 
use of family networks, particularly considering that, in the Chilean case, some family dynasties 
(such as the eight analysed here) have remained in power since the time of the country’s 
Independence (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998).  
 
As Barozet (2006) points out, this is also linked to a deeply rooted culture of exchange of 
favours based on a common social background: 
 
“In terms of social circles, the groups formed in early stages of life such as family (extensive 
kinship) and based on either schooling or university are the most mentioned by respondents. They 
also mention rituals for maintaining these linkages such as family reunions, regular phone calls, 
emails or Christmas cards…., but, above all, learning constantly about these others’ evolution in 
every social occasion that allows it: it is possible for them to re-activate these links years after the 
last meeting, and it would not be seen as strange to do so, because of the strength of the initial 
socialisation. In other words, the efficiency of the exchange of favours is related to the antiquity, 
and strength, of the social links. Subsequently, professional circles become a great source of 
favours for those who work” (Barozet, 2006, p. 19).  
 
In Chile, the possession of family capital, together with other social resources (education, 
religion, etc.) and the existence of a common space of interaction determined by networks of 
contacts, has tended to reduce ideological differences within the political elites, particularly 
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since the transition to democracy. This has to do with how social circles are formed and operate 
in Chile where how far connections date back is an important factor for the creation of stable 
ties (Barozet, 2006, p. 88). However, the Chilean elite’s high levels of homogeneity is also the 
result of a rationale of action based on social exclusion mechanisms, a key aspect that is seen 
in the way social resources are managed so as to limit new actors’ access to the political system 
and opportunities there and to produce a form of social differentiation.   
 
The evolution of Chile’s political dynasties is an important input for models to measure 
comparatively the impact of different species of capital on access to key positions in the 
legislature and the executive. In this case, taking the initial 386 cases from the nucleus of the 
elite, it was found that over half were the child of a party member and/or had family ties within 
the political field (Table 21). 
 
Table 24. Father or mother as party member and family ties in the political world  
 
  Father/mother as party 
member(s)  
(a) 
Family ties within the 
political world  
(b) 
Cases Percentage  Cases Percentage 
YES 199 51.6 201 52.1 
NO 187 48.4 185 47.9 
Total 386 100 386 100 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
The variable “family ties in political power” was created after reviewing the individual 
biographies of the members of the nucleus that responded the survey, considering their family 
ties within the political system as represented by the positions considered in the definition of 
the nucleus of the  elite as well as those of local councillor, mayor and adviser to a ministry or 
other public service. The results reveal that family name is an important feature of this group 
of cases. Based on this result, it is necessary to examine the types of connection produced by 
family ties in the political elite.  
 
Gephi software was used to map family networks in the political elite. After analysing the 
individual biographies and political careers of the 386 cases, other members of the elite were 
added considering their familial connections, bringing the total to 588 individuals (nodes). In 
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this, 328 family ties were found, with these defined as a connection as grandparent, mother/ 
father, sibling, child, cousin or uncle/aunt.33  
 
The sociogram in Figure 15 represents family ties for the 588 cases. Only individuals with 
family connections were included in the sociogram (see Table 24). It was generated using the 
Force Atlas algorithm iterated 1,000 times in order to improve visualisation and identify the 
types of ties that exist (Jacomy, Venturini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014). This algorithm operates 
expansively. Cases without ties are located in the centre, followed by those with two or three 
ties, while those with multiple ties are towards the outside. The total universe of individuals 
considered comprises over 20 families, illustrating the importance of this type of capital.   
 
Figure 15 shows how family ties are distributed, using a different colour for each political party. 
Yellow is used for the PPD, blue for the DC, red for the PS, orange for the PR and green for 
the right-wing parties of the Alianza coalition (UDI and RN). It is interesting to note that most 
of the family ties correspond to the same party and go beyond a single party only in a few cases 
(8 diagrams). In the networks of one tie (two nodes), most relationships correspond to 




















33 In this case, family ties were considered until 2015. 
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Yellow Democratic Party (PPD) 
Blue Christian Democracy (DC) 
Red Socialist Party (PS) 
Orange Radical Party (PR) 
Green Right-wing parties (National Renewal - RN and Independent Democratic Union - UDI) 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Most cases were found to have more than one family tie and individuals who represent centres 
of power were, therefore, identified since, through their multiplicity of ties (for example, 
through marriage), they bridge different networks. Many of them have names that are connected 
to traditional Chilean families such as Aylwin, Walker, Zaldívar, Velasco, Ruiz-Tagle, 
Chadwick, Piñera, Lagos, Frei, Viera-Gallo, Montt and Girardi. Importantly, this list also 
includes four of the five presidents who governed Chile between 1990 and 2015: Patricio 




Table 25. Family connections in political power: Centres of power 
 
CENTRES 
ID NAME ID NAME ID NAME 
37 PATRICIO AYLWIN AZOCAR 141 EDUARDO FREI RUIZ-TAGLE 555 CRISTINA GIRARDI LAVIN 
238 JULIO MONTT MOMBERG 474 CARMEN FREI RUIZ TAGLE 345 MARCELO TOKMAN RAMOS 
2 RENE ABELIUK MANASEVICH 318 PAULINA SABALL 
ASTABURUAGA 
221 MANUEL ANTONIO MATTA 
7 SERGIO AGUILO MECLO 319 EDUARDO SAFFIRIO ESPINOZA 342 WILLIAM THAYER ARTEAGA 
17 PEDRO ALVAREZ-SALAMANCA 
RAMIREZ 
301 XIMENA RINCON GONZALEZ 317 JORGE SABAG VILLALOBOS 
57 SERGIO BITAR CHACRA 192 RICARDO LAGOS ESCOBAR 275 DENISE PASCAL ALLENDE 
59 VIVIANNE BLANLOT SOZA 236 CARLOS MONTES CISTERNAS 272 ANDRES PALMA IRARRAZAVAL 
185 CARLOS ABEL JARPA WEVAR 383 ANDRES ZALDIVAR LARRAIN 219 GUTENBERG MARTINEZ 
OCAMICA 
341 JORGE TARUD MONTES 384 ADOLFO ZALDIVAR LARRAIN   
183 ENRIQUE JARAMILLO BECKER 155 CAROLINA GOIC BOROEVIC 
117 FIDEL ESPINOZA SANDOVAL 113 RICARDO ESCOBAR CALDERON 
79 ANDRES CHADWICK 123 JAVIER ETCHEBERRY CELHAY 
282 PABLO PINERA ECHENIQUE 502 GABRIEL SILBER 
389 SEBASTIAN PINERA ECHENIQUE 126 ERNESTO EVANS ESPINEIRA 
374 JOSE ANTONIO VIERA-GALLO 278 IGNACIO PEREZ WALKER 
448 JUAN ANTONIO COLOMA ALAMOS 378 IGNACIO WALKER PRIETO 
449 ERNESTO SILVA MENDEZ 379 PATRICIO WALKER PRIETO 
140 ALEJANDRO FOXLEY RIOSECO 286 PATRICIA POBLETE BENNETT 
88 ENRIQUE CORREA RIOS 517 ISABEL ALLENDE BUSSI 
462 ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE 218 JORGE MARSHALL RIVERA 
106 ALFONSO DULANTO RENCORET 97 JOSE DE GREGORIO REBECCO 
109 RODRIGO EGANA BARAHONA 349 SONIA TSCHORNE BERESTESKY 
110 ALVARO ELIZALDE SOTO 377 JORGE VIVES DIBARRAT 
264 CLAUDIO ORREGO LARRAIN 376 EDMUNDO VILLOUTA 
265 EUGENIO ORTEGA FREI 360 FELIPE VALENZUELA 
334 CLAUDIA SERRANO 153 GUIDO GIRARDI LAVIN 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
v. Conclusions  
 
In line with the hypothesis of Wasby for the case of the United States (Wasby, 1966, p. 15), 
this research indicates that family ties are important among those individuals who occupy 
leading positions in Chile’s political elite. This is a fundamental input for the inferential 
analysis of the effect of species of capital presented in Chapter VIII. Family capital or family 
ties can be considered an advantage in pursuing a political career. Although other variables may 
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have comparatively more weight when analysing access to the political elite and permanence 
there in Chile (González-Bustamante, 2013), this descriptive analysis reveals not only an 
evolving historical pattern of family dynasties, but also that the majority of members of this 
elite group share ties of this type.   
 
As Joignant (2014) argues, this type of capital may also confer electoral advantages, which may 
be directly related to the use of family names. In this sense, as Scott (Scott, 1995) argues in the 
case of the United Kingdom, the use of patronymics or the hereditary use of paternal surnames 
is important in determining the way in which certain assets (in this case, political) are passed 
on. In Chile, most members of the political elites use the familial resource to develop networks 
and structures of succession and, as seen in the case of the eight families analysed here, this has 
contributed to the maintenance of certain dynasties in power for generations. This is also the 
case of the members of the nucleus of the elite, most of whom have family ties in the political 
field. 
 
However, due to the nature of family political capital, the way in which it operates should 
probably be compared with other networks and types of capital that could have greater 
importance than ties of this type. To this end, it would be useful to gather and analyse more 
information about the personal networks of each individual involved in elites of this type and 
















CHAPTER VIII. MEASURING AND COMPARING SPECIES OF CAPITAL  





In this chapter the quantitative analysis is carried out to respond to the main objective of this 
thesis. Using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010 (see sampling 
procedures, in the Introduction), this chapter examines the effect of species of capital on the 
access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative 
and executive branches, as represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. As 
indicated in previous chapters (mainly in chapter I), although there is extensive literature on the 
concepts of social, cultural and economic capital, there is a lack of empirical research 
examining comparatively the effects that these three forms of capital can have on both the 
formation of elites and their functioning, which is precisely the focus of this research. 
 
This chapter attempts to respond to the main question of this thesis: were the Chilean political 
party elite’s background and social resources, or species of capital, instrumental in allowing its 
members to access strategic positions? At least three points are relevant to this analysis: 1) 
Understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; 2) Describing and 
explaining the main aspects of the party elites’ background and social resources, including their 
family networks (independent variables); and, 3) Exploring the effect of these variables on 
individuals’ chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the 
legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent 
variable). 
 
This chapter seeks to provide an empirical insight into how this species of capital operates 
within these select groups. 
 
This research, instead of considering the elites solely as “the rich against the poor” (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2001, p. 939), uses a broad definition that considers them as those select groups 
of citizens and/or organisations that control a great deal of power within the society (Hartmann, 
2007; Domhoff, 2006). Through different resources (economic, political, cultural, symbolic), 
most of these groups are constantly searching differentiation from other people, which is 
defined in sociological terms as “social distinction” (Garrido-Vergara, 2013; Daloz, 2007; 
Bourdieu, 1984). In politics, this concept is often used to analyse the formation, performance 
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and behaviour of the power groups that either control certain fields, in Bourdieusian terms34, or 
are situated at the top of the social class structure (Domhoff, 2006). 
 
 
ii. Methodology, hypothesis and techniques of analysis 
 
The analysis begins with a descriptive analysis of the 386 members of Chile’s political elite 
that responded the survey. This is followed by a logistic regression analysis (logit models) to 
measure the effect of the different forms of capital in the case of ministers and deputies. The 
analysis comprises six models, considering individuals who served as minister or deputy in 
three different periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. The decision to divide the two 
decades into two separate periods was taken in order to be able to distinguish between the whole 
period and two rather different periods. The two decades were analysed separately in order to 
distinguish between two rather different periods: a conservative decade characterised by the 
transition and the Christian Democrat governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and 
Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), and the more liberal decade of the Socialist governments of Ricardo 
Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). This criterion has also been used in 
other recent studies of ministers in Chile (González-Bustamante and Olivares, 2016). 
 
The variables used are classified into three dimensions (Table 26). The first corresponds to 
political capital as reflected in party membership35 by political party (considering the main 
parties of each coalition) and participation in the election campaign of the president under 
whom the position was held (Samuels and Shugart 2010).36  The second dimension corresponds 
to cultural-educational capital represented by three variables: years of university education; 
whether the person studied as an undergraduate at the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad 
Católica; and whether the person attended a private school for secondary education. This 
species of capital is relevant for political recruitment as shown in the literature (Ashraf, 2017; 
 
34 Unlike Foucault, who considers power as “ubiquitous” and “all-encompassing” (Pickett, 1996) and, 
therefore, beyond any social structure, institution or agency (Foucault, 1983; 1982), Bourdieu sees power 
as a social construction that is culturally and symbolically instituted. Bourdieu’s main contention is that 
power is constantly legitimised in the interplay of multiple agencies and structures. In Bourdieu’s theory, 
the “fields” are the different social and institutional “arenas” in which people communicate, reproduce 
and share their dispositions and subjectivities (habitus). Moreover, the fields are structured by a set of 
relationships, which determine their networks and specificity (i.e. educational, cultural, political, 
business, economic). According to Bourdieu, individuals experience power in different ways depending 
on the field as they are constantly competing for the distribution of different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 
1990; 1986; 1984).  
35 Some 20% of the individuals that responded the survey switched political party during the period 
studied. In this case, the last party to which they belonged is considered.  
36 Party membership on its own was not included as a variable because too large a proportion of the 
respondents belonged to a party. 
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Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2012).  
 
Finally, the third dimension corresponds to the social-family species of capital, defined as the 
number of direct and indirect family connections a person has within the political system 
(Querubin, 2016). Religiosity is also considered in this dimension due to its remaining influence 
on political identity in Chile and as a social resource in the conformation of social networks 
(Thumala 2010; Valenzuela, Scully and Somma 2007).  These dimensions and variables are 
shown in Table 26. Age and gender are considered as control variables. 
 




Political Party membership† 
by political party, 
considering the 
main parties of 
each coalition  
(PS, PPD, PRSD, 
PDC, RN, UDI) 
H1a. Party membership by political party (X1) is 
positively associated with the likelihood of being 
appointed as minister or elected as deputy. 
 Whether 
participated in the 
election campaign 
of the president 
under whom 
served 
H1b. Participation in the campaign of the 
president under whom the position was held (X2) 
is positively associated with the likelihood of 
being appointed as minister or elected as deputy. 
Cultural- 
educational 
Years of university 
education 
 
H2a. Years of education (X3) is positively 
associated with the likelihood of being appointed 
as minister or elected as deputy. 
Whether studied as 
an undergraduate 
at the Universidad 
de Chile or the 
Universidad 
Católica  
H2b. Having studied as an undergraduate at either 
the Universidad de Chile or Universidad Católica 
(X4) is positively associated with the likelihood 
of being appointed as minister or elected as 
deputy. 
Whether attended a 
private secondary 
school  
H2c. Having studied at a private secondary school 
(X5) is positively associated with the likelihood 
of being appointed as minister or elected as 
deputy. 
Social-family Number of direct 
and indirect family 
connections within 
the political system  
H3. The number of family connections (X6) is 
positively associated with the likelihood of being 
appointed as minister or elected as deputy. 
Religiosity  H4. Religiosity (X7) is positively associated with 
the likelihood of being appointed as minister or 
elected as deputy. 
† Last party to which the individual belonged. 





iii.i. Descriptive analysis  
 
In general terms, the nucleus of the Chilean political elite shares certain characteristics in 
matters like religion, academic background and family connections. Figure 16 shows the 
frequency distribution by age of the 386 individuals who answered the survey. The X axis 
shows the year of birth and the Y axis the number of individuals. The oldest members of the 
nucleus were born in 1918 and the youngest in 1978 (2) while most were born between 1943 
and 1958 (the mean is 1952 and the mode is 1953). This is important in that it indicates that 
most of the people answering the survey were aged between 50 and 70.  
 
Figure 16. Year of birth 
 
(a) This variable includes 386 cases aged from 38 to 97 years.  
 The year of birth ranges from 1918 to 1977. The mean is 1952 and the mode is  
 1953 (14 cases). 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 27 shows members of Congress, the government and the governing bodies of political 
parties by gender. According to both the original number of individuals that responded the 
survey (386 cases), and the 432 cases considering that some individuals were appointed to more 
than one position between 1990 and 2010, men account for a majority of the political elite. In 
government positions, however, it is possible to observe a growing trend towards the 












Chile’s parliamentary elite (Cordero, 2006) and governmental elite (González-Bustamante, 
2013, p.137). 
 







Government Member of 
governing 





Aylwin Frei Lagos Bachelet 
Men 322 135 45 58 66 52 5 361 
Women 64 14 1 7 18 30 1 71 
TOTAL 386 149 46 65 84 82 6 432 
 
(a) This variable includes the 386 cases, classified by position held between 1990 and 2010 (n=432). 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 27 shows that Aylwin was the president who appointed least women to senior 
government positions (only 1%) while Bachelet appointed the most (37%). Between 1990 and 
2010, more than 80% of members of Congress were men while women accounted for less than 
17%. A similar trend is also seen in the political parties whose leadership included only one 
woman. Finally, considering the 386 cases, men account for almost 84%, similar to the result 
for the total based on appointments (432 cases).   
 
Another indicator of the homogeneity and concentration of the Chilean political elite is the 
municipal district where its members’ principal residence is located. A majority of the nucleus 
of the elite lives in the Santiago Metropolitan Region and, within this, principally in four 
districts where per capita income is among the highest in the country: Providencia, Las Condes, 
Ñuñoa and Vitacura (almost 45%). Outside Santiago, Viña del Mar, Temuco, Valparaíso, 
Concepción, Talca and Puerto Montt appear in the list but, together, account for less than 4% 










Table 28. Principal municipal district of residence 
Municipal district/city N° % 
SANTIAGO 81 21 
LAS CONDES 30 7.8 
ÑUÑOA 23 6 
PROVIDENCIA 22 5.7 
VIÑA DEL MAR 13 3.4 
TEMUCO 11 2.8 
SAN MIGUEL 11 2.8 
VALPARAÍSO 10 2.6 
CONCEPCIÓN 9 2.3 
TALCA 7 1.8 
RECOLETA 7 1.8 
VITACURA 6 1.6 
PUERTO MONTT 6 1.6 
 
(a) This variable includes the 386 cases. The 13 most mentioned municipal districts are shown 
(corresponding to those with 6 or more mentions). 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
Catholicism has historically been influential among Latin American elites and Chile is no 
exception (Lowden, 1993). Most members of its political elite identify themselves as Catholic 
(Table 29). This is hardly surprising. Since the Colonial period (1492-1810) when the Roman 
Catholic Church moved quickly to expand in what the Spaniards called the “New World” 
(Halperín-Donghi, 1967), this religion has exerted an important conservative influence on 
political power across Latin America.   
 
This situation, however, changed at some point during the 1970s and 1980s when, under 
authoritarian regimes, the Catholic Church incorporated new and more progressive 
ecclesiastical movements and organisations, helping to bring it closer to the oppressed and 
promote protection of human rights. In most Latin American countries, several of these groups 
still exist today, alongside the traditional conservative ones (Pawliková, 1997; Lowden, 1993; 
Lehmann, 1992). An interesting example of this is the Vicariate of Solidarity (1976-1992), an 
agency of the Chilean Catholic Church established in a bid to stop kidnapping and torture by 
the Pinochet regime. An historical bond between the elite and its religious tradition also 
continued to exist after the political transition, with the practice of more conservative forms of 




Table 29: Religion 
  N° % 
No answer 9 2.3 




Jewish 4 1 
None 113 29.3 
Other 20 5.2 
TOTAL 386 100 
 
(a) This variable includes the 386 cases.  
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 29 shows that almost 60% of the members of the political elite are Catholic as compared 
to some 30% who profess no religion. This is in line with their schooling since more than 40% 
studied at private religious schools.  
 
The influence of Catholicism is also reflected in the education of the elite’s children. As shown 
in Tables 30 and 31, family and religion are connected and important, “particularly the 
centrality of the religious education of children, the family celebration of religious feasts, and 
the coincidence of belief among family members” (Thumala, 2010:24). Although a significant 
number of politicians attended prestigious state schools such as the Instituto Nacional General 
José Miguel Carrera, the Liceo de Aplicación and the Internado Nacional Barros Arana, most 
of their children studied, or are studying, at private schools (Table 31). Among these, Saint 
George’s (religious school) receives most mentions for all groups of children, followed by San 
Ignacio in all groups except the fourth son/daughter. Other schools with a large number of 
mentions are Padres Franceses (Sagrados Corazones), Colegio Alemán, Alianza Francesa, La 
Girouette, San Juan Evangelista and Villa María Academy (the latter is a Catholic girls-only 
school) (Table 31). 
 
An educational reform implemented in Chile in the early 1980s created three types of schools: 
state schools run by municipalities, privately-managed state-subsidised schools and private fee-
paying schools (Mizala, Romaguera, & Ostoic, 2005). Almost all Chile’s top schools fall into 





Table 30. Schooling: Type of school for secondary education 
  N° % 
Private secular 51 13.2 
Private religious 162 42 
State-subsidised privately-managed  16 4.1 
State municipality-managed  29 7.5 
State  116 30.1 
Other 5 1.3 
Total 379 98.2 
Missing System 7 1.8 
TOTAL 386 100 
 
(a) This variable includes the 386 cases.  
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
The literature indicates that a school’s reputation generates tangible benefits for those who 
attended it, independently of their abilities and knowledge (Cook & Frank, 1991, p. 124). As a 
result, some schools become elitist because, in addition to education, they provide pupils with 
social prestige and other opportunities such as access to select groups that could be decisive for 
their professional careers. In the Chilean case, the conclusions emphasise the extent to which 
parents’ ability to pay for an expensive private education significantly improves their children’s 
chances of getting into a top university and on an upward path in terms of employment (Mizala 
& Romaguera, 2000). 
 
Elite private schools are located in or near Santiago and most of them have high tuition fees. 
Moreover, several of them are single-gender schools (mainly the Catholic ones). They also have 
their own highly selective admissions procedures. For instance, one of the main requirements 
for admission to Saint George’s is to be from a Catholic family and have been baptised (with 
the certificate). In addition, it gives priority in admissions to children whose families are already 
linked to the school (through siblings or other relatives who are alumni or currently studying 
there). Some give priority to foreign applicants (Alianza Francesa and Scuola Italiana). Finally, 
in some cases, such as the Grange School, applications for admission may require a letter of 
reference from a member of the school community.  
 
These schools, which appear frequently in the press and the CVs of the Chilean elites, represent 
what many Chileans would regard as a consensus set of prestigious private schools. However, 





“In the meantime, such debate has blocked the analysis of an important form of private schooling 
existing in Chile, which is attended by upper class students. These schools, although covering a 
small sector of the student population, have derived the most benefit from current neoliberal 
policies promoting competition, as under such a paradigm, elite private schools with their 
privileged social and economic background have been able to succeed more than any other group 
in Chile without having to meet any particular form of moral or legal regulation. In this sense, 
attending elite private schools in Chile is viewed as a legitimate right for those who are able to 
afford it and which doesn’t necessarily include a responsibility towards the rest of the population. 
Consequently, there has been no special concern about the effects elite private schools have in the 
country, about the increasing gap that exists between them and those schools that receive students 
from lower income sectors, and whether elite schools should receive more regulations” (Cavieres, 
2009, p. 34). 
 
The only elite state school in Chile is the Instituto Nacional, which charges no tuition fee and 
selects pupils based on a standardised entrance exam. Its alumni include 17 Chilean presidents. 
Table 31 shows the schools which the members of the elite most frequently attended and where 



























Table 31. Schooling: Type of school for secondary education, respondents and their 
sons/daughters 
 
  RESPONDENT 1ST SON/DAUGHTER 2ND SON/DAUGHTER 3RD SON/DAUGHTER 4TH SON/DAUGHTER 
  N° %   N° %   N° %   N° %   N° % 
1 LOS PADRES 
FRANCESES 
23 6.0 SAINT 
GEORGE’S 
25 6.5 SAINT 
GEORGE’S 
23 6.0 SAINT 
GEORGE’S 





23 6.0 SAN IGNACIO 20 5.2 SAN IGNACIO 16 4.1 SAN IGNACIO 14 3.6 LOS PADRES 
FRANCESES 
7 1.8 
3 ALEMAN 20 5.2 ALEMAN 16 4.1 ALIANZA 
FRANCESA 
14 3.6 LA 
GIROUETTE 
9 2.3 SAN IGNACIO 7 1.8 
4 INSTITUTO 
NACIONAL 
17 4.4 VILLA MARIA 
ACADEMY 
15 3.9 SAN JUAN 
EVANGELISTA 
14 3.6 LOS PADRES 
FRANCESES 
9 2.3 TERESIANO 5 1.3 
5 SAINT 
GEORGE’S 
15 3.9 ALIANZA 
FRANCESA 
14 3.6 VILLA MARIA 
ACADEMY 
12 3.1 VILLA MARIA 
ACADEMY 
8 2.1 CUMBRES 4 1.0 
6 VERBO 
DIVINO 
12 3.1 SAN JUAN 
EVANGELISTA 
14 3.6 ALEMAN 10 2.6 ALIANZA 
FRANCESA 







10 2.6 LA 
GIROUETTE 
13 3.4 LOS PADRES 
FRANCESES 
10 2.6 SAN JUAN 
EVANGELISTA 
6 1.6 SAN JUAN 
EVANGELISTA 
3 0.8 
8 LICEO DE 
APLICACION 
8 2.1 LOS PADRES 
FRANCESES 
10 2.6 LA 
GIROUETTE 
9 2.3 TERESIANO 6 1.6 URSULINAS 3 0.8 
9 MANUEL DE 
SALAS 
7 1.8 COLEGIO 
UNIV 
10 2.6 INSTITUTO 
INGLES 





7 1.8 INSTITUTO 
INGLES 
8 2.1 TERESIANO 8 2.1   
11 ALIANZA 
FRANCESA 
6 1.6 SAINT 
GABRIEL 
8 2.1 GRANGE 
SCHOOL 
7 1.8 
12 LICEO JOSE 
VICTORINO 
LASTARRIA 
6 1.6 MANUEL DE 
SALAS 





5 1.3 INSTITUTO 
NACIONAL 



























(a) This variable includes the 386 cases. 
(b) Missing cases: 9, 43, 72, 165 and 280, respectively. 
(c) The 17 most mentioned schools are shown (corresponding to those with 3 or more mentions in 
the case of the politicians). 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 31 shows the consolidation of private schools as the place where the elite receives its 
education. For the politicians surveyed, the Instituto Nacional is mentioned quite frequently 




Many members of the nucleus of the political elite went on to study for undergraduate and 
postgraduate degrees (Table 32). While 32.6% hold an undergraduate degree, 19.9% hold a 
master’s degree and 11.7% a PhD. Taking into account incomplete studies, less than 4% did 
not go to university. These descriptive results indicate that Chile’s political elite is not only 
concentrated but also highly educated (González-Bustamante, 2013, p.138). By comparison, 
according to a national survey in 2015, only 7.5% of the total population has a university degree. 
It found that 27.9% of Chileans had completed their secondary education and 10.8% had 
incomplete secondary education, but almost 30% had not reached beyond primary education.   
 
Table 32. Education 
ELITE NUCLEUS (a) TOTAL POPULATION (b) 
  N° %   N° % 
No answer 7 1.8 No studies 2 0.1 
Secondary schooling  8 2.1 Incomplete primary education 264 18.4 
Undergraduate degree 126 32.6 Complete primary education 159 11.1 
Technical or professional qualification  5 1.3 Incomplete secondary education 155 10.8 
Incomplete undergraduate degree, 
technical or professional qualification  
32 8.3 Complete secondary education 400 27.9 
Incomplete postgraduate studies  66 17.1 Incomplete 
technical or professional qualification  
60 4.2 
Master’s 77 19.9 Technical or professional qualification  125 8.7 
PhD 45 11.7 Incomplete undergraduate degree   79 5.5 
PhD candidate 20 5.2 Undergraduate degree  108 7.5 
TOTAL 386 100 Postgraduate studies (master’s, PhD) 33 2.3 
  No answer 2 0.1 
Total 1,387 97 
Missing System 47 3.3 
TOTAL 1,434 100 
 
(a) Includes the 386 cases.  
(b) Taken from a survey by the Santiago-based Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP, 2015) where the 
universe was the population of 18 years and over (urban and rural) of all the country, except Easter Island 
(target population). The sample covers 100% of the target population, with the exception of the Atacama 
Region which could not be surveyed due to the damage caused by an earthquake. The sample selection 
process is non probabilistic (Census), conglomerates and using a three-stage stratified design. 
Source: Compiled by author, with own data and data from www.cep.cl. 
 
The educational level of the majority of members of the nucleus may be related to the fact that 
they come from “enlightened” families and received an elite education (Tables 32 and 33) and 
most live in a municipal district with a high average income. In addition, Table 33 shows that 
more than 40% of the members of the nucleus’s fathers hold undergraduate degrees as 
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compared to 13% who only completed their primary education. The most common 
undergraduate degrees are Law (12.4%), Engineering (6.5%) and Medicine (5.4%). A majority 
of the respondents’ mothers completed their secondary education (51.8%) and 15.5% hold an 
undergraduate degree while 12% completed only their primary education. The main occupation 
of their mothers is housewife, followed by teacher (11.4%) and public employee (3.9%) (Table 
33).  
 
Parental educational level is also an important indicator of the social origins of the political 
elite, linked to the wealthier social classes, particularly since the most common year of birth of 
those surveyed was 1952 (Figure 16) when coverage of the Chilean educational system reached 
only 26.2% of the population (Núñez, 1993, p. 4). 
 
Table 33. Parents’ education 
  FATHER MOTHER 
N° % N° % 
No answer 14 3.6 22 5.7 
Primary education 50 13 46 11.9 
Secondary education 101 26.2 200 51.8 
Undergraduate degree 128 33.2 60 15.5 
Technical or professional  
qualification  
30 7.8 21 5.4 
Incomplete undergraduate 
degree, 
technical or professional  
qualification  
31 8 25 6.5 
Incomplete postgraduate 
studies  
13 3.4 6 1.6 
Master’s 12 3.1 4 1 
PhD 7 1.8 2 0.5 
Total 386 100 386 100 
 
Note: Includes the 386 cases.  
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Tables 30, 31, 32 and 33 indicate that most respondents and their families have received an 
elitist education. Table 30 shows that more than 50% studied at private schools (70% at private 
Catholic schools) and this trend is even more marked in the case of the secondary schools 
attended by their children (Table 31). In addition, Table 34 shows that lawyer is the most 
182 
 
common profession of both those surveyed (30.3%) and their fathers (12.4%) while housewife 
is the most common occupation among their mothers (50.8%). 
 
Table 34. Occupation: Mother, father and respondent 
Mother Father Respondent 
Occupation N° % Occupation N° % Occupation N° % 
Housewife 196 50.8 Lawyer 48 12.4 Lawyer 117 30.3 
Teacher 44 11.4 Tradesman 38 9.8 Business administrator 43 11.1 
Public employee 15 3.9 Farmer 31 8 Engineer 32 8.3 
Secretary 12 3.1 Public employee 29 7.5 Doctor 23 6 
Tradeswoman 10 2.6 Engineer 25 6.5 Teacher 22 5.7 
Lawyer 9 2.3 Doctor 21 5.4 Economist 15 3.9 
Nurse 9 2.3 Employee 20 5.2 Sociologist 13 3.4 
Social worker 7 1.8 Armed forces 18 4.7 Architect 9 2.3 
Housekeeper 4 1 Businessman 16 4.1 Vet 7 1.8 
Politician 4 1 Worker 16 4.1 Agronomist 6 1.6 
 
Note: Includes the 386 cases. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
In Table 35, which shows the university attended for undergraduate studies, those most 
frequently mentioned are the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Católica, with 44.3% 
and 17.9%, respectively. Whereas the Universidad de Chile is secular and public, the 
Universidad Católica is Catholic and private. Given that most members of the nucleus of the 
elite attended private religious schools and define themselves as Catholic, it is striking that, for 
their undergraduate studies, so many preferred a public secular university. Indeed, 20 former 
presidents of Chile studied at the Universidad de Chile, including three of the four presidents 














Table 35. Education: University for undergraduate studies 
  N° & 
Universidad de Chile 171 44.3 
Universidad Católica 69 17.9 
Universidad de Concepción 18 4.7 
Universidad Católica de Valparaíso 12 3.1 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile 9 2.3 
Universidad Diego Portales 7 1.8 
Universidad Austral de Chile 5 1.3 
Universidad de Valparaíso 3 0.8 
Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación 3 0.8 
Universidad Gabriela Mistral 3 0.8 
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez 1 0.3 
Universidad de Antofagasta 1 0.3 
Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María 1 0.3 
Universidad de Los Lagos 1 0.3 
OTHER 29 7.5 
N/A 53 13.7 
TOTAL 386 100 
 
Note: Includes the 386 cases. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
In the case of postgraduate studies (Table 36), almost 42 % of the members of the nucleus of 
the political elite studied in Chile and 24% in the United States. Importantly, a high proportion 
of those with PhDs studied in the United States (16), Spain (6) or Germany (5) while, for 
master’s degrees, most preferred Chile (41), the United States (30) or Spain (10). Most of the 
respondents who studied in the United States obtained either a master’s degree (30) or a PhD 
(16) while, in the case of those who studied in Chile, most either obtained a master’s degree 













Table 36. Education: Country and degree for postgraduate studies 









Chile 1 41 4 37 2 1 86 
US 16 30 0 1 3 0 50 
Spain 6 10 0 4 3 0 23 
Germany 5 4 0 1 1 0 11 
UK 2 4 0 0 3 0 9 
Belgium 2 3 0 1 2 0 8 
France 2 2 0 2 2 0 8 
Italy 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Mexico 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Others 1 5 1 1 0 0 8 
TOTAL 36 103 5 47 16 1 208 
 
Note: 178 missing cases 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 37 shows the country and field of postgraduate studies. Almost 27% of the respondents 
opted for economics, which is consistent with the growing role that this discipline has acquired 
in recent decades in administration of the state. As Markoff and Montecinos argue, economists 
took on an unprecedented role after the political transitions in Latin America and this certainly 
had an important impact on academia (Montecinos & Markoff, 2009; Montecinos, 1998): 
 
“Professional economists were assuming a role without precedent in politics and public policy in 
the last third of the twentieth century (Markoff and Montecinos 1993). In Latin America, as in 
Europe, the emulation of US-style professional norms, the wider use of mathematics both for 
theory and for the analysis of data as well as other international standards of professionalism have 
become more prevalent, although regionally distinctive professional profiles have not been totally 
abandoned, not even in institutions that closely follow the dominant canon. Economic journals and 
graduate programs advertise both their disciplinary rigor and their focus on Latin American issues 
(as illustrated by the Programa Doctoral Latinoamericano created in 2000 by the Universidad de 
Chile (Chile), the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina), and Mexico’s ITAM” (Montecinos & 
Markoff, 2009, pp. 10-11). 
 
In Table 37, it can also be seen that most of those who studied postgraduate economics did so 
in the United States (22) or Chile (17). This is the only discipline in which Chile does not have 






Table 37: Education: Country and field of postgraduate studies 
FIELD Chile US Spain Germany UK Belgium France TOTAL 





13 7 5 3 1 1 0 30 
Public Policy 12 5 2 0 1 0 0 20 
State 
Administration 
12 2 2 0 0 0 0 16 
Law 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 15 
Social Sciences 8 1 0 0 3 1 2 15 
Medicine 8 2 2 0 0 1 0 13 
Architecture 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Education 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 6 
Engineering 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Philosophy 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Development 
Studies 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
History 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Others 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 6 
TOTAL 86 50 23 11 9 8 8 195 
 
Note: 178 missing cases.  Includes only the 7 most mentioned countries (N=195). 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Another important aspect at the descriptive level is party membership. In politics, the parties 
normally strive to get their members elected to government. This is one of the main reasons 
why most politicians belong to a party and why this is a key variable for the study of polities 
and the behaviour of elites, “Parties and party membership are key variables in democratic 
polities. Party organizations vary in strength and party membership in viability. Theoretically 
the impact of party members on democracy is viewed differently – from essential to irrelevant. 
But even if party members are considered irrelevant as providers of vital mechanisms in 
democracies, the party membership will impact the way politics operate in practice. Members 
may, for example, distort (or at least affect) the true market mechanisms sustaining elite 
democracy” (Heidar, 2007, p. 3).  
 
For the Chilean case, González-Bustamante analysed the factors that determine access to and 
permanency in the governmental elite and concluded that, while professional experience and 
academic background favoured access, both political capital and previous participation in think-
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tanks favoured permanency (González-Bustamante, 2013). Although this is related with the 
permeability of the elites or, in other words, “quite simply the ease with which aspiring 
individuals can become members of the elite” (Laswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 35), in Chile, 
political capital is important for the development of a political career and membership of the 
political elite.  
 
As Joignant (2014) argues with respect to the 2013 elections in Chile, those politicians with 
both political and family resources have a considerable electoral advantage over other 
candidates. This, among other reasons, explains the formation of political dynasties. Table 35 
shows party membership in the political elite between 1990 and 2010 and includes three 
questions from the survey: Question 3 on whether the politician is - or has been - a member of 
a party; Question 34 (recoded) on whether his/her mother and father is - or has been – a member 
of a party; and Question 7 on whether the politician worked in the presidential campaign of the 
government of his/her first appointment.  
 
Table 38. Party membership 
 
Q3 Party membership 
  N° % 
No 25 6.5 
Yes 361 93.5 
Total 386 100 
  
Q34 (REC) Mother or Father with party 
membership 
  N° % 
No 187 48.4 
Yes 199 51.6 
Total 386 100 
  
Q7 - Did you work in the presidential campaign 
of the government of your first appointment? 
  N° % 
N/A 125 32.4 
Yes 209 54.1 
No 52 13.5 
Total 386 100 
 




As shown in Table 38, the vast majority of those surveyed are or have been a member of a 
party. Moreover, most of their parents (almost 52%) are or have been a member of a party. 
Finally, a majority of those surveyed (54.1%) worked in the presidential campaign of the 
government of their first appointment. 
 
Table 39. Party membership. Name of the political party 
 
  N° % 
Christian Democrat Party (PDC) 116 30.1 
Party for Democracy (PPD) 67 17.4 
Socialist Party (PS) 59 15.3 
Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI) 
32 8.3 
Independent (IND) 32 8.3 
National Renewal (RN) 24 6.2 
Radical Social Democrat Party 
(PRSD) 
20 5.2 
Regionalist Independent Party (PRI) 4 1 
Communist Party (PC) 2 0.5 
Humanist Party (PH) 2 0.5 
Others 2 0.5 
Centre Action Party (PAC) 1 0.3 
Without party membership 25 6.5 
TOTAL 386 100 
 
Note: Includes the 386 cases. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Table 39 shows that the PDC accounts for 30% of the respondents, followed by the PPD 
(17.4%) and the PS (15.3%). The right-wing UDI and RN parties are in fourth (8.3%) and sixth 












Table 40. Main reasons for the first appointment 
 










N° % N° % N° % N° % N° % N° % 
YES 34 8.8 124 32.1 4 1 187 48.4 273 70.7 103 26.7 
NO 350 90.7 260 67.4 380 98.4 197 51 111 28.8 281 72.8 
N/A 2 0.5 2 0.5 2 0.5 2 0.5 2 0.5 2 0.5 
TOTAL 386 100 386 100 386 100 386 100 386 100 386 100 
 
(a) Public system refers to the Alta Dirección Pública (Civil Service) system created in 2003.  
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Table 40 shows the factors which those surveyed view as decisive for their first appointment. 
The most important ones are professional career (70.7%) and personal relationships (48.4%). 
These results indicate that social resources related to either family ties or ties of friendship are 
relevant for appointment to positions of political power. In Chile’s hyper-presidential system 
with a single strong executive and very few constitutional constraints (Couso, Lovera, Guiloff 
and Coddou 2011, p.87), the president is allowed to appoint ‘cargos de confianza’ (positions 
of trust) which include ministers, undersecretaries and regional governors.  
 
Other resources are, however, also important. For instance, membership of certain 
organisations is common among respondents (Table 41). Those most frequently mentioned 
include student organisations (44.3%), professional associations (41.5%) and think-tanks 




















YES/NO N° % Type of 
organisation  
YES/NO N° % 
Community 
organisations 
NO 315 81.6 Religious 
organisations 
NO 295 76.4 
YES 71 18.4 YES 91 23.6 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Professional 
associations 
NO 226 58.5 Indigenous 
organisations 
NO 385 99.7 
YES 160 41.5 YES 1 0.3 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Trade/business 
associations 
NO 352 91.2 Student 
organisations 
NO 215 55.7 
YES 34 8.8 YES 171 44.3 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Trade unions NO 367 95.1 Cultural 
organisations 
NO 360 93.3 
YES 19 4.9 YES 26 6.7 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
NGOs NO 303 78.5 Human 
rights 
organisations 
NO 320 82.9 
YES 83 21.5 YES 66 17.1 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Voluntary 
organisations  
NO 336 87 Others NO 370 95.9 
YES 50 13 YES 16 4.1 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Think-tanks NO 266 68.9 None NO 342 88.6 
YES 120 31.1 YES 44 11.4 
TOTAL 386 100 TOTAL 386 100 
Private clubs NO 328 85   
YES 58 15 
TOTAL 386 100 
 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
 
iii.ii. Measuring and comparing species of capital in the Chilean political elite 
 
The analysis includes a set of binary logistic regressions to measure the effect of certain forms 
of capital (Table 26) on appointment/election to two relevant positions within the political 
system: minister and deputy. The positions of minister and deputy were chosen because they 
were the most common ones in the total of individuals that responded the survey (108 ministers 




A limitation of this analysis is that the total of individuals who responded the survey does not 
include the counterfactuals for each case. In other words, it does not include all those 
individuals who could have been considered to serve as minister or deputy. However, the use 
of regression models is also appropriate when there are comparison groups (Kuha and Mills, 
2017; Williams, 2009; Allison, 1999) and, in this context, the analysis focuses on comparing 
the effects of specific forms of capital, considering the political elite and its access to two 
important positions related to executive and legislative power. 
 
The hypotheses for this analysis are derived from three species of capital: political, 
cultural/educational, and social/family (Table 22). Each hypothesis (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6) 
indicates that these species of capital are positively associated with the likelihood of being 
appointed as minister or elected as deputy (Y). After carrying out different tests with numerous 
variables and considering indicators of the models’ fit, reliability and of multicollinearity (see 
appendix IV), eight variables were included in the logistic regression models, as indicated in 
Table 39. 
 
In all models, the dependent variable is dichotomous and defined according to either 
appointment as minister or election as deputy. In the case of deputies, it is important to note 
that they are assumed to be those individuals who were nominated as candidates and won the 
election. For each position, the dependent variable takes a value of 0 or 1, according to whether 
the politician did not obtain the position or obtained it, respectively. Most of the independent 
variables are dichotomous, except in the case of years of education, which is continuous (Table 
42). The analysis includes six models considering the individuals who became ministers or 
deputies for the three different periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.  
 
Between 1990 and 2000, 40 individuals served as minister and 71 were deputies while, between 
2000 and 2010, 71 were ministers and 109 were deputies. It is important to note that there were 
some repetitions between the two periods. Party membership and variables related to electoral 
performance were not included in this analysis. In the case of party membership, this was due 
to the respondents’ high level of homogeneity with respect to this variable and, in the second, 
because the study’s objective is to analyse the effect of species of capital on access to positions, 







Table 42. Values for binary logistic regressions (logit models) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
  Variable Concept Measurement 
Dependent 
variables 
Minister The politician was 




Deputy The politician was elected as 
deputy.  




Age Age in number of years Continuous 
Gender Gender  0 Man 
1 Woman 
Socialist Party  
(PS) 
The individual is member of 
the PS.  
0 No  
1 Yes 
Party for Democracy 
(PPD) 
The individual is member of 
the PPD.  
0 No  
1 Yes 
Radical Social 
Democrat Party  
(PRSD) 
The individual is member of 
the PRSD. 




The individual is member of 
the PDC. 
0 No  
1 Yes 
National Renewal Party 
(RN) 
 
The individual is member of 
the RN.  





The individual is member of 
the UDI.  
0 No  
1 Yes 
Campaign The individual participated 
in the presidential campaign 
of the government under 
which served. 
0 No  
1 Yes 





Undergraduate studies either 
at the Universidad de Chile 
or the Universidad Católica 
0 No  
1 Yes 
Private school  The individual studied at a 
private school. 
0 No  
1 Yes 
Family connection The individual has direct 
family connections (father, 
mother, child, sibling, 






    
  
Religion The individual professes a 
religion.  





Table 43 shows a set of binary logistic regression (logit) models according to each dichotomous 
variable for the three different periods. Table 43 also shows the goodness of fit for each model. 
Given the number of cases included (N considered), this is relatively good, with the pseudo 
R^2 oscillating between .19 and .38. The value of the AIC test, which reflects the relation 
between the bias and variance in construction of the model, shows that, although the six models 
are quite similar, the third one tends to have a better goodness of fit. Moreover, in order to 
prevent instability of the final results, variance inflation factor tests (VIF) were used to verify 
the absence of multicollinearity in both models.    
 
In this type of analysis, it is necessary to guard against problems of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity occurs in a logit model when two or more independent explanatory (or 
predictor) variables are highly inter-correlated, implying that one variable can be linearly 
predicted from the others with a non-significant degree of accuracy (Saikia & Singh, 2014; 
Tsutsumi, Shimizu, & Matsuba, 1997). In order to quantify the severity of multicollinearity, a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test was carried out, providing an index that measures how much 
the variance of the estimated regression coefficient models increases because of collinearity 
(Stine, 1995). For this reason, the categories proposed by Joignant were taken as a reference, 
but the variables finally considered in the analysis are those that did not present problems of 
multicollinearity.  
 
Both the correlation matrix and the VIF analysis conducted prior to the logit models can be 
found in Appendix IV. The correlation matrix analysis is important in order to detect statistical 
correlations that contribute to the development of the hypotheses of analysis while the VIF tests 
are necessary to detect collinearity problems which, in this case, are indicated by a VIF of above 















Table 43. Logit models for appointment/election by position 
  1990-2010 1990-2000 2000-2010 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Ministers Deputies  Ministers Deputies Ministers Deputies 












Gender 1.17***           
(.340) 
-.816**           
(.416) 
-.084           
(.617) 
-.509           
(.520) 
1.41***           
(.347) 
-.635           
(.412) 
Socialist Party  
(PS) 
.622           
(.472) 
1.05*            
(.652) 
.009           
(.685) 
.908           
(.896) 
1.04**            
(.545) 
1.08*           
(.676) 
Party for Democracy  
(PPD) 
.600           
(.463) 
2.02***           
(.613) 
-.212           
(.706) 
1.52*           
(.685) 
1.11**           
(.535) 
1.94***           
(.632) 
Radical Social 
Democrat Party  
(PRSD) 
.226           
(.711) 
1.65**           
(814) 
-.848           
(1.18) 
2.04**           
(1.00) 
-.992           
(.804) 




.845**           
(.417) 
.716           
(.574) 
-.270           
(.611) 
1.18*           
(.766) 
1.33***           
(.495) 




(omitted)† 2.24***             
(.759) 
(omitted)† 2.89***           
(.887) 





(omitted)† 2.42***             
(.757) 
(omitted)† 2.57***           
(.865) 
(omitted)† 2.47**          
(.748) 
Campaign (political) 1.57***           
(.307) 
-2.09***           
(.314) 
1.82***           
(.523) 
-1.81***           
(.379) 
1.16***           
(.340) 
-1.89***           
(.317) 





























(.296)               
-.611** 
(.333)               
-.161 
(.441)               
-.930** 
(.379)               
.598* 
(.332)               
-.478 
















(.326)               
1.35*** 
(.385)               
-.311 
(.499)               
1.35*** 
(.493)               
-.550 
(.355)               
1.02*** 
(.376)               
Constant -10.8*** 
 (1.84)               
5.40*** 
(1.91)               
-17.5*** 
(3.02)               
-2.83 
(2.09)               
-6.91*** 
 (1.92)               
5.89*** 
(1.91)               
N (N Considered) 386  386  386  386  386  386  
Log likelihood -173.679 -152.165 -87.617 -125.488 -149.986 -154.982 
LR 𝑿𝟐 108.34*** 181.81*** 81.82*** 117.51*** 68.51*** 149.52*** 
Pseudo 𝑹𝟐 .24 .38 .32 .32 .19 .33 
AIC*n 373.359 334.330 201.234 280.975 325.971 339.694 
 
(a)    Beta coefficient values.  
(b) *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(c)    Standard error in parentheses. 
(d) † Variables omitted because, as these parties were in opposition, their members could not be 
appointed as ministers.  
 




The results partially support the hypothesis of this research. The first two models (for the full 
two-decade period) show that age, gender (control variables) and variables related to cultural-
educational capital (except having attended a private school) and to social-family and political 
capital are significant for both positions, but have opposite effects. Considering the results, 
being older is more likely to be ministers than to be deputies, and being younger increases the 
likelihood to be deputies rather than ministers. Similarly, having had many years of education 
turns out to be significant to ministers in comparison with deputies, while having had less years 
of education is more likely to be deputy instead of minister.   
 
This is also reflected in the importance of having studied as an undergraduate at the Universidad 
de Chile or the Universidad Católica, which has a positive effect for ministers and a negative 
one for deputies. This may be related to the profile for the position of minister in Chile, which 
calls for technical and academic credentials as well as political experience (González-
Bustamante and Olivares 2016). Only family capital has a significant effect in the same 
direction for both positions, but loses importance when the data is analysed separately for each 
of the two decades, reflecting the fact that the models for the full period include different 
generations (parents and children). 
 
Another interesting result is seen in the case of gender. In the full period, being a woman is 
more likely to be minister than to be deputy but, when the two decades are separated, it remains 
significant only for 2000-2010. This is because there were very few women ministers in the 
Aylwin and Frei governments in comparison to the Lagos and Bachelet governments, which 
saw a significant increase in the incorporation of women as a result of the adoption of gender 
parity criteria in the executive branch (González-Bustamante and Olivares 2016). This was not 
the case for deputies where the negative effect of being a woman persists through both periods. 
However, it is important to consider that most of the women of the nucleus held their positions 
in 2000-2010, explaining why this variable was not significant in the period corresponding to 
the Aylwin and Frei governments. 
 
Another clear trend is participation in the presidential campaign of the government under which 
the position was held. In the case of ministers, this variable is significant for all three periods 
analysed. This is hardly surprising since a cabinet seat is a position in the trust of the president. 
The opposite occurs in the case of deputies which is also not surprising since access to this 






Finally, religion is seen to be significant for both ministers and deputies considering the whole 
period (1990-2010). However, for ministers, the effect is negative and loses significance when 
the period is divided into two decades. For deputies, on the other hand, it has a significant 
positive effect in all three periods, suggesting that, for them, unlike ministers, there is a species 
of capital related to their religious beliefs (H4).     
 
 The fact that years of education is a significant variable confirms the importance of academic 
and technical specialization to be appointed as minister and is in line with the literature on this 
for Chile. After analysing the results of the logit models, it is interesting to look at the predictive 
capacity which this variable and gender have for access to the positions of minister and/or 
deputy. This was calculated using non-linear models. 
 
Hypothesis H1b is borne out only for ministers. In the case of deputies, participation in the 
election campaign of the president under whom the position was held is significant, but 
negatively, which may be explained by the fact that deputies, unlike ministers, do not 
necessarily depend on the president’s support for access to their positions. Similarly, H2a is 
partially borne out only for ministers because the profile of the position makes academic 
specialisation important. For deputies, years of education is significant, but negatively, because 
their position is one of popular representation for which academic qualifications are not a sine 
qua non of access.  
 
H2b is ruled out partially for ministers and totally for deputies. Having studied at either the 
Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica has a significant effect for ministers in the 
two-decade period, but does not have a significant effect for deputies. Having attended a private 
school (H2c) does not have a significant effect for either position. Finally, H3 on the impact of 
family connections is borne out by the results for both ministers and deputies for the two-decade 
period. This variable, unlike others, needs to be considered for the two decades together, rather 
than separately, because the family relationship most frequently observed among those 
surveyed is that of parent/child.   
 
Returning to the hypotheses of this research, H1a is totally borne out for deputies and partially 
for ministers since, in the case of the former, most parties have a significant effect in both 1990-
2000 and 2000-2010 while, in the case of ministers, only two parties (PPD and PDC) have a 
significant effect and only in the second period. This was only to be expected given the profile 





The fact that years of education is a significant variable confirms the importance of academic 
and technical specialisation for becoming a minister and is in line with the literature on this for 
Chile. After analysing the results of the logit models, it is interesting to look at the predictive 
capacity which this variable, disaggregated by gender, has for access to the positions of minister 
and/or deputy. This was calculated using non-linear models. 
 
Figures 17 and 18. Probability of being appointed minister by years of education and gender 
 1990-2000         2000-2010 
 
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister) the 
dependent variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figures 17 and 18 show the probability of being appointed as minister by gender and years of 
education, with a 95% level of confidence. Predictive margins are based on predicted 
probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis and are used to get the predicted 
probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 
in increments of 1 while holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister)  the dependent variable 
at its mean. In the case of women, there is an important difference between the two periods.  
 
In both, the number of years of education and being a women increases the probability of 
appointment as a minister but, in 1990-2000, the confidence interval tends to be much wider 
than for men, reflecting the small number of women in the nucleus for that period, while, in 
2000-2010, both the probability and the fit increase. The curve for men is similar to that for 
women in the first period, but with a better fit while, in the second period, it is below the curve 




These results show that number of years of education and gender satisfactorily predict 
appointment as minister. For deputies, however, the opposite is true (Figures 19 and 20). 
Having less years of education (considering primary and secondary education as the minimum) 
and being a man increase the probability to be appointed as deputy rather than minister. This 
analysis does not consider effects at the level of elections. This position is only analysed 
comparatively with that of ministers. 
 
Figures 19 and 20. Probability of being appointed deputy by years of education and gender 
     1990-2000       2000-2010 
 
Source: Compiled by author.  
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
 
Despite the differences for men and women, these results reinforce the idea that number of 
years of education is relevant for becoming a minister, but not for becoming a deputy. This is 
in line with the positions’ respective profiles. While ministers are expected to have a level of 
specialisation and technocratic credentials on a par with their brief, deputies require a more 
political profile that does not necessarily call for specialisation.   
 
The results also confirm the favourable effect of the introduction of gender parity criteria on 
women’s incorporation into the executive branch, but not the legislature. Finally, the only 
variable that is not relevant in the analysis is secondary education at a private school. This could 
be due to the difficulties implicit in quantitative measurement of the school as a place of 
socialisation and a social entry barrier to the elite, as discussed in the descriptive analysis (Table 




The results of the models show that membership of a political party has a significant effect for 
ministers in 2000-2010 in the case of the PS, the PPD and the PDC. In line with this, the 
predictive capacity of membership of these parties, together with years of education, is 
compared as shown in Figures 21, 22 and 23.  
 
Figures 21, 22 and 23. Probability of being appointed minister by political party and years of 
education, 2000-2010 (PS, PPD and PDC)  
 




(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister) the 
dependent variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
 
The figures show the probability of being appointed minister by political party and years of 
education in 2000-2010 (PS, PPD and PDC), with a 95% level of confidence. In the case of 
ministers, although there are more significant variables related to technocratic qualifications, 
membership of a political party, together with years of education, has significant effects and is 
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effect is most significant for the PDC, followed by the PPD and, finally, the PS. In other words, 
being a member of one of these parties in 2000-2010 and more years of education and 
specialisation increased the probability of appointment as minister.   
 
For deputies, membership of a political party has a significant effect in both decades. Therefore, 
after analysing the results of the logit models, it is relevant to look at the predictive capacity of 
this variable and years of education for access to the position of deputy. This was calculated 
using non-linear models considering each of the six parties included in the analysis.  
 
Figures 24 and 25. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party  
and years of education (PS) 
 
Socialist Party 
        (PS) 
 1990-2010†       2000-2010 
 
† The full two-decade period was considered because membership of the PS does not have a significant 
effect in 1990-2000. 
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figures 24 and 25 show the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister by 
political party and years of education for the PS, with a 95% level of confidence. The full two-
decade period is considered as a reference because the logit analyses indicate that membership 
of this party did not have a significant effect in 1990-2000. The results show predictive capacity 
in both periods but, given that membership of the PS was not significant for 1990-2000, it is 
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In this case, it is important to note that, for the full two-decade period, the variables mentioned 
have significant predictive capacity for being appointed deputy rather than minister but, as 
membership of the PS does not have a significant effect in 1990-2000, the comparison shown 
in Figures 24 and 25 indicates that this effect is, in fact, concentrated in the second period, 
implying that a predictive analysis for the first decade would be spurious. 
 
 
Figures 26 and 27. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party  
and years of education (PPD) 
 
         Party for Democracy 
        (PPD) 
 1990-2000       2000-2010 
 
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Figures 26 and 27 show the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister as 
relevant groups of comparison by political party and years of education for the PPD, with a 
95% level of confidence. In contrast to the case of the PS, both variables are significant for both 
periods. However, the effect is larger in the second period as is also seen in the case of predictive 
capacity. Figure 26 shows that the confidence interval tends to be smaller and the probability 
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Figures 28 and 29. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party  
and years of education (PRSD) 
 
Radical Social Democrat Party  
(PRSD) 
         
 1990-2000       2000-2010 
 
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figures 28 and 29 show the probability of being appointed deputy instead of minister by 
political party and years of education for the PRSD, with a 95% level of confidence. As for the 
PPD, both variables are significant for both periods, but the logit analyses show that 
membership of this party tends to be more significant in the first decade. However, in the 
predictive graphs, it can be seen that the confidence interval is wide, reflecting that fact that the 
number of deputies belonging to this party is lower than for other parties since it is a smaller 
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Figure 30. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party  
and years of education (PDC) 
  




(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figure 30 shows the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister by political 
party and years of education for the PDC, with a 95% level of confidence, between 1990 and 
2000. The PDC is the only party for which membership is significant only in the first decade. 
This is explained by its electoral and political decline as from 2000. After the transition to 
democracy, it was the most powerful party in the Concertación and the two first post-transition 
presidents, Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, were drawn from its ranks. However, 
the subsequent two governments were headed by a member of the PS (Ricardo Lagos and 
Michelle Bachelet) and, in the 2009 congressional elections, the PDC began to lose electoral 
strength, with a drop in the votes obtained by its candidates for both the Chamber of Deputies 
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Figures 31 and 32. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party  
and years of education (RN) 
    
 National Renewal  
        (RN) 
 1990-2000       2000-2010 
 
(a)   Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figures 31 and 32 show the probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years 
of education for the RN, with a 95% level of confidence. Membership of this party was highly 
significant in both decades. In the predictive graphs, it is clear that, in the first period, the 
probability was extremely significant as compared to those who were not members of this party. 
This was due to the binomial system for congressional elections, which heavily favoured the 
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Figures 33 and 34. Probability of becoming a deputy by political party  





 1990-2000       2000-2010 
 
(a)    Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis. 
(b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men 
and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent 
variable at its mean. 
(c)    Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.  
(d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller 
the interval, the better the fit of the data. 
Source: Compiled by author.  
 
Figures 33 and 34 show the probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years 
of education for the UDI, with a 95% level of confidence. In this case, both variables are 
significant, but in opposite directions, with the probability of being appointed deputy decreasing 
with years of education (12) and increasing with membership of the party. Like the RN, the 





This study contributes empirically to the study of Chile’s political elites. The results show that 
ministers are highly qualified and have a shared space of socialization through where they 
studied and family connections. In the case of deputies, educational cultural capital tends to 
significant but in the inverse direction seen for ministers, suggesting that other resources or 
species of capital are very probably relevant for access to this position. Only religion and family 
tend to have a relevant significance, which is in line with the literature on this subject in Chile 
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In the full period, family capital is significant for both positions, reflecting the fact that, in most 
cases, there is a generation (for example, a father or a mother) that held the position in the first 
decade, followed by a second generation (for example, a son or daughter) in the subsequent 
decade. These results provide empirical evidence to the prevalence of this form of capital within 
the elites in Latin America since the oligarchic regimes (Lake Frank 2001; Rovira Kaltwasser 
2009, 2018). 
 
Within the implications of this study, the analysis of the results reveals a marked difference 
between members of the executive and legislative branches. In the case of ministers, a 
technocratic profile is seen to be important, which is a phenomenon that has prevailed since the 
mid-fifties in Chile (Silva 2009). Empirically, the results show that cultural capital expressed 
as level of specialization (years of education) is important for this position. This reflects the 
strategic role that ministers play in the design and implementation of public policies (González-
Bustamante and Garrido-Vergara 2018; González-Bustamante and Olivares 2016). 
 
In the case of deputies, an interesting result is that, as for ministers, family is important, along 
with religion. This is not trivial because it confirms the importance of this resource, not only 
for membership of the elite but also for access to key positions. The prevalence of religion, 
especially catholic, within the members of parliament also has happened in other Latin 
American countries (Fleet and Smith 1997).  
 
The data also reveals that other factors have important effects for becoming either a minister or 
a deputy. Age, which is equated with experience, is important for appointment to a ministerial 
position while, for deputies, youth (relative to other positions such as minister or senator) 
matters. Indeed, in the period studied here, the average age of deputies was between 45 and 48 
years. It is also important to note that regulation of the legislature (the Political Constitution 
and Constitutional Organic Law N° 19.918) stipulates that, among other requirements, deputies 
must be at least 21 years old and senators at least 35. There are, therefore, incentives for young 
people to seek these positions whereas ministers, because they are expected to have high levels 
of educational qualifications and specialisation, tend to be older.     
 
Both the existence and reproduction of these species of capital imply a growing effort of 
socialization on the part of individuals in which social recognition is determined by numerous 
relations of interaction through which it is constantly affirmed and reaffirmed (Bourdieu 1985, 
p. 52). Based on this logic, the results presented here indicate that, although many species of 
capital fulfil different functions for being appointed minister or deputy, family capital is a 




Given the limits of the data used here, there are some challenges that further research could 
address concerning the uses of cultural and social capital within the political elite. With regard 
to the cultural capital, it would be certainly relevant to study the elite preferences concerning 
their tastes and to compare them with the rest of the society, in order to analyse the relationship 
between the differentiation of tastes and the reproduction of social inequalities. This could 
certainly be addressed by replicating some other interesting studies that do measure these 
dimensions (Špaček 2017). 
 
On the other hand, with regard to social capital, although it is difficult to quantify as regards 
relations and reciprocal ties of power, there are some studies that have addressed the 
conformation, structure and consequences of political networks (Van Gunten 2015). This 
certainly remains as a challenge for further research.   
 
In general terms, this quantitative analysis is the first applied analysis to measure quantitatively 
the effects of species of capital in Chile’s political elite. It tests empirically a series of 
hypotheses that were defined and operationalized as indicated in the literature on elites in Chile. 
From a sociological standpoint, the analysis has defined and compared the profiles of ministers 
and deputies according to the species of capital found to be instrumental for accessing these 

















IX. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In the previous chapters, this thesis has sought to explain the nature of the party elites during 
the political transition; to describe and explain the main aspects of the party elites’ background 
and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and to measure 
the effect of those variables on individuals’ chances of achieving strategic positions in the 
political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and 
ministers (dependent variable). The quantitative data was obtained from 386 members of the 
nucleus of the Chilean political elite, who were surveyed to obtain information about their 
social, academic and family background, social resources and professional and political careers, 
among other topics.  
 
In general terms, the work presented here is the first applied analysis to measure quantitatively 
the effects of species of capital in Chile’s political elite. From a sociological standpoint, the 
study has defined and compared the profiles of ministers and deputies according to the species 
of capital found to be instrumental for accessing these positions. This instrumentality is 
expressed in shared social recognition of certain species of capital which enable individuals to 
access certain positions in the political system. This is referred to as the “transformation or 
convertibility of capital” and is a key concept from Bourdieu’s theory which is applied in this 
research.   
 
As regards the conclusions and scope of the research, Chapter I discussed in detail the main 
theories and relevant empirical research on political elites. This background is vital as context 
for this research and its theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of this sociopolitical 
phenomenon. This chapter also sets out the foundations of the conceptual definition of elites, 
the power structure and social differentiation. These three broad concepts are addressed from 
different theoretical perspectives and the standpoint of different contributions to the study of 
political elites as a phenomenon analysed by political sociology.  
 
Chapter I also examined the theoretical-conceptual foundations of species of capital as a 
category of analysis, comparing the approaches of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. While the 
latter two associate the use of social capital with the formation of reciprocal social networks of 
cooperation, Bourdieu defines it as a species of capital (in addition to the economic and cultural 
species) that requires recognition by other individuals for its conversion into a new type of 
capital. For example, if education at certain schools is valued and recognised as a means of 
access to the political elite, then those individuals who possess this species of cultural capital 
can, as shown by this research, turn it into political capital if they enter the political elite. This 
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empirical application of the Bourdieusian concept of social capital implies that this resource 
functions through individual recognitions that favour certain reciprocal social actions or 
behaviour.   
 
In other words, in the case of Bourdieu, recognition of the species of capital (expressed through 
practical dispositions characteristic of the habitus of each individual) is conducive to certain 
actions or behaviour of a social nature that favour certain types of social relations. This is where 
the empirical contribution of this thesis lies because, until now, no empirical evidence existed 
to prove this theory at the level of political elites.  
 
Chapter II showed that the course and quality of Latin America’s processes of democratisation 
have been quite heterogeneous. While some countries have achieved stable indicators of 
political development, related to the quality of democracy, the results in most others have been 
poor. This raises numerous questions about the role played by the region’s elites, both locally 
and across countries.  
 
The data presented, both of an historical nature and as measurements of trends, shows that most 
of the region’s countries have experienced difficulties in achieving sustained democratic 
development and economic progress. The data on the relationship between the legislative and 
executive branches shows that presidential regimes have prevailed in most countries and 
maintain strong control of political and legislative power. The paradox that arises is with 
stability because, on average, the countries where the executive intervenes more also have more 
stable democracies. This is vital for understanding the context that shaped the emergence and 
development of Chile’s post-Pinochet political elites, considering the previous period which 
determined the end of the military regime and the subsequent political transition to democracy.   
 
Chapter III examined the political process that brought an end to the military dictatorship and 
marked the formation of the two coalitions that governed Chile between 1990 and 2010: the 
Concertación and the Alianza. This chapter explained how the Chilean party system 
experienced significant changes after the restoration of democracy. In the wake of the 1988 
plebiscite, a new political landscape emerged, defined by the dichotomy between 
authoritarianism and democracy and the political loyalties formed under Pinochet. This 
situation, combined with the establishment of a binomial system for congressional elections, 
led to the formation of two main coalitions, grouping the main centre-left parties in the 
Concertación and the main right-wing parties in the Alianza. One of the main objectives behind 
the latter’s creation was to maintain Pinochet’s legacy and keep control over the executive and 
legislative branches. For the centre-left coalition, on the other hand, the main objective was to 
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promote a return to a democratic system of popular representation (Luna & Altman, 2011; 
Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002). 
 
As shown in this chapter, an authoritarian enclave in the form of the binomial system (Garretón, 
1999; Siavelis, 2009b) allowed these coalitions to stay in power. Thanks to this electoral 
system, both coalitions obtained the majority of votes in congressional, municipal and 
presidential elections between 1989 and 2009. The binomial system also meant that Chilean 
politics remained highly concentrated at the elite level and, therefore, increasingly remote from 
civil society. Another key aspect of this period was the ongoing existence of other authoritarian 
enclaves and their role in a democratisation process with numerous institutional limitations that 
were, nevertheless, accepted by the Concertación for the sake of the stability of the process.   
 
Chapter IV described and explained both the formation and evolution of these two coalitions 
before the 1988 plebiscite and after the first post-Pinochet presidential election in 1989. In the 
case of the Concertación, it notably won four consecutive presidential elections as well as a 
majority in all congressional and municipal elections through to 2008, making it the most 
successful coalition in the recent history of Latin America.  
 
When founded in 1988, this coalition comprised 14 parties, but only the largest - PDC, PS, PPD 
and PRSD - endured over time. Indeed, the first two of the coalition’s four consecutive 
governments were led by the PDC (Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle) and the two 
following ones by the PS (Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet). As a governing coalition, the 
Concertación showed pragmatism in the management of public policy and adopted the 
economic development strategy implemented by the Chicago Boys under the military regime 
(Navia, 2009). This led to debate and divisions within the coalition, which became more marked 
after its defeat in the run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential election.  
 
Thanks to the binomial system, the Alianza played an active role as opposition. Like the 
Concertación in the case of centre-left forces, it attempted to attract centre-right political forces 
after the restoration of democracy, but finally comprised only the two parties with the greatest 
political impact and largest social base (RN and UDI). As a political force, the Alianza grew 
significantly after its victory in the 2008 municipal elections and the 2009 presidential election. 
However, the incorporation of more progressive centre-right forces marked its end in 2015.   
 
These two coalitions shared similar social origins and formed a very closed political elite, with 
various mechanisms of social differentiation (as shown in Chapters VII and VIII). Their 
successful political performance is explained in detail in Chapter V, looking at how they 
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maintained total control of municipal, congressional and presidential elections between 1990 
and 2010. Election results demonstrate the Concertación’s domination of political power, since 
it won all elections from 1989 through to the 2008 municipal elections when the Alianza 
obtained more votes in the election for mayors. The Concertación then lost the 2009 
presidential election when the new Coalición por el Cambio (Coalition for Change), which had 
replaced the Alianza in 2009, was elected under President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014).  
 
The binomial system also helped these two coalitions by excluding other parties from 
representation in Congress. Between 1990 and 2010, only individuals who were members of 
their partners or independents supported by one of the coalitions won seats, as either senators 
or deputies. There was, in other words, a partyarchy, a concept used to define the form of 
bipartidism seen in Chile during this period. The binomial system promoted political stability 
but also political exclusion and the consolidation of a political elite after the end of Pinochet’s 
regime. 
 
Chapter VI described the methodological strategy used in this research, both as regards the 
gathering of the information and the analysis adopted. The quantitative information was 
obtained from the FONDECYT project that surveyed members of the nucleus of Chile’s 
political elite, covering a group of individuals defined according to specific criteria using the 
positional selection method (Hoffmann-Lange, 2007). At close to 70%, the response rate for 
the survey was acceptable, including for deputies and ministers, the positions considered by 
this research in its logit models (Chapter VIII). 
 
This chapter also describes the process in which 15 key members of the elite were interviewed 
in order to obtain qualitative information for use in defining the emphasis of the quantitative 
analysis. This information was useful in determining the importance of family capital and 
identifying key family dynasties (Chapter VII) and in providing perspective and determining 
the emphasis of the quantitative analysis, taking into account the research’s objectives and 
hypotheses (Chapter VIII). 
 
At the level of analysis, the research strategy comprised three stages. The first involved 
descriptive analysis and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey. In-depth 
interviews were then conducted with members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide 
additional, more inductive information for developing the findings obtained from the survey 
data. Finally, the variables were selected for the inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the 
species of capital on access to key positions in the political elite, comparing the executive 




Chapter VII analysed family ties, considering eight important political dynasties and the 
members of the nucleus of the political elite who were surveyed. This was essential in revealing 
the importance of this type of capital in the Chilean elite and justifying its inclusion in the logit 
models described in this chapter. As shown by network analysis, most members of the elite 
have familial links within political system and this form of capital can, therefore, be considered 
an advantage in pursuing a political career. Although other variables may have comparatively 
more weight when analysing access to Chile’s political elite and ongoing membership of it 
(González-Bustamante, 2013), this descriptive analysis reveals not only an evolving historical 
pattern of family dynasties, but also that most members of this elite group share ties of this type.   
 
As Joignant (2014) argued, this type of capital may also confer electoral advantages, which 
may be directly related to the use of family names. In Chile, most members of the political elites 
use the familial resource to develop networks and structures of succession and, as seen in the 
case of the eight families analysed in this chapter, this has contributed to the maintenance of 
certain dynasties in power for generations. This is also the case of the members of the nucleus 
of the elite, most of whom have family ties in the political field. 
 
Chapter VIII examined the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to 
strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches, as 
represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. The empirical analysis included 
network analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-
2010 and 1990-2010. In general terms, the results indicate that age, gender and variables related 
to cultural, social and political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, 
but with opposite effects: while ministers are highly qualified and have a shared space of 
socialization through where they studied and family connections, for deputies educational 
cultural capital tends to be significant but in the inverse direction seen for ministers, which can 
be explained mainly for the requirements to be appointed in this position (from 21 years).  
 
Only religion and family tend to have a relevant significance, which is in line with the literature 
on this subject in Chile and other Latin-American countries (Camp 1997, 2013; Thumala 2010). 
In the full period, family capital is significant for both positions, reflecting the fact that, in most 
cases, there is a generation (for example, a father or a mother) that held the position in the first 
decade, followed by a second generation (for example, a son or daughter) in the subsequent 
decade. These results provide empirical evidence to the prevalence of this form of capital within 





The results of this work permit the development of a sociology of the political elite through 
comparative analysis of the executive and legislative branches as represented by ministers and 
deputies. This study forms part of the FONDECYT project led by Alfredo Joignant, which has 
used the same data in a number of important applied research projects. Most of this work (for 
example, Joignant, 2014; González-Bustamante, 2013) has been used as a reference in this 
thesis. However, none of it follows the line of research addressed here, underlining the 
originality of the work presented here whose theoretical and methodological approach is unique 
at the local and regional level.  
 
Its results lay the foundations for a line of research that I intend to continue to pursue at the 
Chilean and Latin American level. It is clearly important to understand the role of the different 
species of capital in the formation and functioning of elites and, therefore, to expand this study 
to parliaments and other spheres of the executive. In the case of Latin America, it is interesting 
to compare parliaments at the local level (considering the counterfactuals) and between 
countries. In the case of the executive, it is more difficult to take the counterfactuals into 
account (that is, those who could have been appointed ministers but were not) because this is a 
decision at the discretion of the president. For Chile and Latin America, it is also important to 
look at the way in which senior civil servants are appointed since, in many cases, this is a 
competitive process, carried out either through a public application process or performance 
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Appendix III. Persons interviewed 
 
The interviews listed below were conducted between 2014 and 2017. Interviewees were 
selected based on the criteria of membership of an important political party, having held key 
positions in the Chilean political system and having important connections within the Chilean 
political elite. The aim of the interviews was to obtain information about important aspects of 
the functioning of the political elite as an input for quantitative analysis. The interviewees 
included former presidents, undersecretaries and leading members of political parties in the 
Concertación coalition during the period studied (1990-2010).  





- Law, Universidad de Chile 
Party membership 
- Radical Party (PR) (1948-1973) 
- Social Democracy Party (PSD) (1973-1980) 
- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1989-2014) 
Key positions 
- Minister of Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) under President 
Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994)  






- Economics, Universidad Católica de Chile; PhD in economics, Harvard University   
- Researcher and academic  
- Currently lecturer at Universidad del Desarrollo, Universidad Católica de Chile and 
Universidad Alberto Hurtado  
Party membership 
- Former member of Christian Democrat Party (PDC) (1987-2017) 
Key positions 
- Business association leader, consultant and politician  
- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999) 
- Deputy Managing Director of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington 
D.C. (2000-2003)  
- First Director General of International Christian Union of Business Executives 







- Geography, Universidad Católica de Chile; Master's in sociology, Universidad 
Academia de Humanismo Cristiano 
Party membership   
- Socialist Party (PS) since (1985) 
Key positions  
- Head of Citizen Participation and Environmental Education at National 
Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) (1999-2001) 
- Deputy Director of Social Organisations Division (DOS) of Ministry for the 
Government Office (2000-2001) 




- Undersecretary for Culture at National Council for Culture and the Arts and 
Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples Programme of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (2006-2013) 
- Chair of the Board of Directors of Casa de la Paz Foundation (2014-2015) 





- Law, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in economics and diploma in 
economic development, Graduate School of Latin American Economic Studies 
(ESCOLATINA), Universidad de Chile; Master of Arts (MA), Harvard University 
Party membership 
- Socialist Party (PS) (1963-2009) 
- Communist Party (PC) (2009-2010) 
- Movimiento Amplio de Izquierda (Broad Movement of the Left) (2011) 
Key positions 
- President of PS (1990-1991) 
- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994)  
- Minister of Labour and Social Security under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994-1998) 







- Civil engineering, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in economic theory, 
Centre d'Etudes des Programmes Economiques; MPA Harvard University 
Party membership 
- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987) 
- Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left) (1971)  
Key positions 
- Director of Department of Industries and Planning Centre of Faculty of Physical 
and Mathematical Sciences, Universidad de Chile (1968-1973)  
- Minister of Mining under President Salvador Allende (March 1973-July 1973) 
- Minister of Education under President Ricardo Lagos (2003-2005) 
- Minister of Public Works under President Michelle Bachelet (2008-2010) 






- Law, Universidad Católica de Chile; postgraduate studies, Oxford University; PhD 
in sociology, Leiden University 
Party membership 
- Christian Democrat Party (PDC) 
- Popular Unitary Action Movement (MAPU) 
- Worker-Farmer MAPU (MAPU OC)   
- One of founders of Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987-2017) 
- One of founders of Fuerza Pública (Public Force) political movement led by 
economist Andrés Velasco (2013) 
Key positions  
- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994- 1998) 
- President of National Television Council (CNTV) (1992-1994) 
- President of National Commission for Accreditation of Undergraduate Programmes 
(2006) 




- Member of Council of the National Fund for Scientific and Technological 
Development (FONDECYT)  





- Civil engineering with specialisation in hydraulics, Universidad de Chile; 
postgraduate studies overseas in administration and management techniques  
Party membership 
- Christian Democrat Party (PDC) (1958)  
Key positions  
- President of PDC (1991-1993) 
- President of Chile (1994-2000) 
- President of Senate (2006-2008)  
- Former Senator (2006-2014) 






- Law, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in political science, FLACSO; 
PhD in Latin American studies, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
(UNAM) 
Party membership 
- Socialist Party (PS) (1982) 
Key positions  
- Politician, academic and diplomat  
- Undersecretary of War (2000-2006) 
- Undersecretary for the Armed Forces (2014-2015) 
6/3/2014 
9 José Miguel 
Insulza 
Education 
- Law, Universidad de Chile; Master in political science, University of Michigan  
Party membership 
- Christian Democrat Party (PDC) 
- Worker-Farmer MAPU (MAPU OC) (1969-1973) 
- Socialist Party (PS) (1985-) 
Key positions 
- Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999) 
- Minister Secretary General of the Presidency under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-
Tagle (1999-2000) 
- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 
- Secretary General of the Organization of American States (2005-2015) 







- Law, Universidad de Chile; PhD in economics, Duke University  
Party membership 
- Radical Party (PR) (1958-1961) 
- Socialist Party (PS) (1983-1987) 
- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987) 
- Currently, member of both parties (PS-PPD) 
Key positions 
- Director of School of Political and Administrative Sciences and Institute of 
Economy, Universidad de Chile (1963-1972) 
- Secretary General, Universidad de Chile (1969) 
- Secretary General, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1973) 





- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992) 
- Minister of Public Works under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998) 





- Economics, Universidad de Chile; PhD in economics, Université Paris Nanterre   
Party membership  
- Independent  
- Socialist Party (PS) (1984-2009) 
- Convergencia Socialista (Socialist Convergence) (1978-1983) 
- Left-Wing Revolutionary Movement (MIR) (1968-1975) 
Key positions 
- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President 
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992) 






Education   
- Sociology and PhD in political sciences, Université de Paris 
Party membership   
- Communist Party (PC) (1967-1983)  
Key positions   
- Political analyst and academic 
- Currently Director of Globalisation and Democracy course, Universidad Diego 
Portales 






- PhD in economics, MIT 
Party membership  
- Not available  
Key positions 
- Coordinator of Economic Area for presidential campaign of Marco Enríquez-
Ominami (2013) 
- Director of FLACSO Chile (2010-2011) 
- Founder and President of International Centre for Globalisation and Development 
(CIGLOB) 
- Director for Andean Countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela), World Bank  






- Law, Universidad de Chile  
Party membership  
- PDC (1957-) 
Key positions 
- President of PDC (1976-1982) 
- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President 
Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968) 
- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968-1970) 
- Senator (1973) 
- Senator (1990-2006) 
- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Michelle Bachelet (2006) 
- Senator (2010-2018) 








- Economics, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; PhD in economics, Université 
Paris X Nanterre   
Party membership  
- PS (1985-2016) 
Key positions 
- Under-Secretary of Regional and Administrative Development (1990-1994) 
- President of PS (2003-2005) 


























Appendix IV. Correlation matrix and VIF analysis 
 
The correlation matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses conducted for each of the 




















Ministers (1990-2010) Minist~s 
Deputies (1990-2010) Diputa~s 
Ministers (1990-2000) Min_p1 
Deputies (1990-2000) Dip_p1 
Ministers (2000-2010) Min_p2 













Socialist Party (PS) PS 
Party for Democracy (PPD) PPD 
Radical Social Democrat Party 
(PRSD) 
PRSD 
Christian Democrat Party (PDC) PDC 
National Renewal Party (RN) RN 
Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI) 
UDI 
Campaign (political) CAMPANA 
Years of education Years_Ed 
Universidad de Chile or Católica Chile_PUC 
Private school (secondary education) Col_Privado 





Model I. Ministers (1990-2010) 






              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.0121   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec    -0.1277* -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.0043   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.1451*  0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.8770   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado     0.0079  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0000   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC     0.2324*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0000   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed     0.2388* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA     0.3376*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0018   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI    -0.1582* -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0017   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN    -0.1595* -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.1251   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC     0.0782   0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.7809   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR    -0.0142   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.4235   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD     0.0409  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0265   0.9396   0.5366
          PS     0.1130*  0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.0149   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer     0.1238* -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0026
       Edad2     0.1529*  1.0000 
              
              
   Ministros     1.0000 
                                                                             



























    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Model II. Deputies (1990-2010) 





              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.0000   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec     0.2294* -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.0849   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.0878   0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.9477   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado    -0.0033  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0000   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC    -0.2822*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0000   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed    -0.2824* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA    -0.4631*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0000   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI     0.3161* -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0000   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN     0.2345* -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.0137   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC    -0.1254*  0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.8156   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR    -0.0119   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2269   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD     0.0616  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0044   0.9396   0.5366
          PS    -0.1448*  0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.0220   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer    -0.1166* -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0094
       Edad2    -0.1320*  1.0000 
              
              
   Diputados     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Diputa~s    Edad2 Sexo_M~r       PS      PPD       PR       DC
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    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Model III. Ministers (1990-2000) 




              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.2564   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec    -0.0579  -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.0588   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.0963   0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.2871   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado    -0.0543  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0050   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC     0.1425*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0200   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed     0.1184* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA     0.2105*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0527   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI    -0.0987  -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0858   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN    -0.0875  -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.4151   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC     0.0416   0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.9566   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR    -0.0028   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.8103   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD    -0.0123  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1311   0.9396   0.5366
          PS     0.0770   0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.1826   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer    -0.0680  -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
       Edad2     0.3470*  1.0000 
              
              
      Min_p1     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 Min_p1    Edad2 Sexo_M~r       PS      PPD       PR       DC
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    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Model IV. Deputies (1990-2000) 





              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.0000   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec     0.2096* -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.1484   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.0737   0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.3754   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado    -0.0452  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0025   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC    -0.1537*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0000   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed    -0.2533* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA    -0.3280*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0000   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI     0.2118* -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0000   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN     0.2377* -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.7239   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC    -0.0180   0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.8495   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR     0.0097   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.4168   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD    -0.0414  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0060   0.9396   0.5366
          PS    -0.1397*  0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.0248   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer    -0.1142* -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0006
       Edad2     0.1737*  1.0000 
              
              
      Dip_p1     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 Dip_p1    Edad2 Sexo_M~r       PS      PPD       PR       DC
263 
 
























    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Model V. Ministers (2000-2010) 




              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.1097   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec    -0.0815  -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.0477   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.1009*  0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.1369   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado     0.0758  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0032   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC     0.1497*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0001   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed     0.1983* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA     0.2356*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0266   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI    -0.1128* -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0163   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN    -0.1222* -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.1921   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC     0.0665   0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.6884   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR    -0.0205   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2318   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD     0.0610  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1360   0.9396   0.5366
          PS     0.0760   0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.0001   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer     0.2017* -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1679
       Edad2    -0.0703   1.0000 
              
              
      Min_p2     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 Min_p2    Edad2 Sexo_M~r       PS      PPD       PR       DC
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    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Model VI. Deputies (2000-2010) 




              
              
Religion_Rec     1.0000 
                       
               Religi~c
              
                 0.0006   0.0003   0.0861   0.0064   0.2150   0.0000   0.0815
Religion_Rec     0.1742*  0.1813* -0.0875  -0.1385* -0.0633   0.2997*  0.0888 
              
                 0.6859   0.1859   0.7359   0.1097   0.2440   0.0261
     Familia     0.0206   0.0675   0.0172   0.0816   0.0594   0.1133*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0148   0.3181   0.0220   0.0032
 Col_Privado     0.1877*  0.1240* -0.0509   0.1165*  0.1499*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2050   0.0026   0.0007   0.0000
   Chile_PUC    -0.0646  -0.1527*  0.1721*  0.3825*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0849   0.0469   0.0175
    Years_Ed    -0.0878  -0.1012*  0.1209*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
     CAMPANA    -0.2152* -0.2378*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1427
         UDI    -0.0747   1.0000 
              
              
          RN     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     RN      UDI  CAMPANA Years_Ed Chile_~C Col_Pr~o  Familia
              
                 0.0001   0.9188   0.9966   0.0000   0.0010   0.0000   0.0000
Religion_Rec     0.1921* -0.0052   0.0002  -0.3099* -0.1666* -0.2095*  0.3121*
              
                 0.2355   0.4565   0.3023   0.6721   0.3912   0.4268   0.7096
     Familia     0.0605   0.0380  -0.0526   0.0216   0.0438  -0.0406   0.0190 
              
                 0.8972   0.0273   0.7275   0.0395   0.2434   0.0002   0.6955
 Col_Privado     0.0066  -0.1123*  0.0178  -0.1049* -0.0595  -0.1902*  0.0200 
              
                 0.0000   0.1180   0.4549   0.0802   0.8703   0.4980   0.6707
   Chile_PUC    -0.2465*  0.0797   0.0381   0.0892   0.0083  -0.0346   0.0217 
              
                 0.0000   0.0267   0.7378   0.0639   0.0452   0.2537   0.5562
    Years_Ed    -0.2463* -0.1128* -0.0171   0.0944   0.1020* -0.0582  -0.0300 
              
                 0.0000   0.3444   0.5598   0.0102   0.9019   0.3183   0.0069
     CAMPANA    -0.4160*  0.0483   0.0298   0.1307*  0.0063   0.0509   0.1373*
              
                 0.0000   0.0015   0.0325   0.0109   0.0058   0.1834   0.0000
         UDI     0.3338* -0.1608* -0.1088* -0.1294* -0.1402* -0.0679  -0.2093*
              
                 0.0007   0.2545   0.4981   0.0241   0.0145   0.2381   0.0002
          RN     0.1721* -0.0581  -0.0346  -0.1148* -0.1243* -0.0602  -0.1856*
              
                 0.0143   0.0083   0.2320   0.0000   0.0000   0.0009
          DC    -0.1247*  0.1343* -0.0610  -0.3067* -0.3481* -0.1685*  1.0000 
              
                 0.7419   0.3587   0.7532   0.0407   0.0266
          PR    -0.0168   0.0468  -0.0161  -0.1042* -0.1129*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2064   0.2282   0.6983   0.0000
         PPD     0.0645  -0.0615   0.0198  -0.2153*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0141   0.9396   0.5366
          PS    -0.1249*  0.0039   0.0315   1.0000 
              
                 0.0659   0.0033
  Sexo_Mujer    -0.0937  -0.1490*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0001
       Edad2    -0.1946*  1.0000 
              
              
      Dip_p2     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 Dip_p2    Edad2 Sexo_M~r       PS      PPD       PR       DC
267 
 














    Mean VIF        1.55
                                    
     Familia        1.06    0.943868
  Sexo_Mujer        1.08    0.925646
       Edad2        1.13    0.888228
     CAMPANA        1.17    0.858369
 Col_Privado        1.24    0.805958
   Chile_PUC        1.26    0.793534
    Years_Ed        1.27    0.789041
Religion_Rec        1.47    0.680485
          PR        1.47    0.678967
          RN        1.59    0.627819
         UDI        1.79    0.558119
          PS        2.14    0.467024
         PPD        2.24    0.446937
          DC        2.80    0.357660
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
